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Summary
Introduction
The end of the ten-year-long armed conflict between the Maoists and the 
government and the peace agreements of late 2006 brought widespread 
hope for a more inclusive and well-governed democratic Nepal. How-
ever, six years later in early 2013, the failure to produce the promised 
new constitution and an alarming deterioration of governance have ex-
hausted the hope of most Nepalis.
In 2011/12 the author carried out a study to examine the contribution of 
local and community-level governance for promoting peace and devel-
opment during Nepal’s post-conflict transition. The study gathered infor-
mation from secondary sources and interviews, focus group discussions 
and an opinion survey of governance stakeholders at the central level and 
in Doti, Mahottari and Pyuthan districts. It examined the situation of gov-
ernance, peace and development in general and the performance of four 
donor-supported programmes for local governance, poverty alleviation 
and peacebuilding.
This book presents the findings of the study. It analyses the experiences 
of Nepal and other countries and gives the perspectives of central, district 
and community level experts and stakeholders. It provides many insights 
into the situation of chronic political instability and the possibilities for 
fostering good governance, peace and development.
The situation of governance in Nepal
The period since the mid-1990s has been marked by chronic political 
instability in Nepal with frequent changes of government, in-fighting 
among politicians, the ten-year-long armed conflict and a faltering 
peace process. This has resulted in a worsening crisis of governance, 
little economic growth and limited progress on local self-governance. 
There is deteriorating law and order, increasing incidents of extortion 
and violent crime and a failure of the government to reach the periphery. 
Local and foreign investors are reluctant to invest amidst high produc-
tion costs, lengthy daily power shortages and frequent disruptions to 
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business. Vulnerable and poor communities suffer the most from these 
failings.
Nepal is in a state of transition operating under an interim constitution 
with the main agenda of writing a new constitution, restructuring the state 
and concluding the peace process. However, as of February 2013 there is 
political gridlock with the governing and opposition parties blaming one 
another for failing to produce a constitution. The major contested issues 
for the new constitution are the form of governance (executive president 
or parliamentary system) and the form of federalism (whether provinces 
should be single or multiple identity-based units). The dissolution of the 
Constituent Assembly in May 2012 and the endless struggle for power 
amongst the politicians have repeatedly undermined the addressing of 
these crucial issues.
The upheavals of the Maoist conflict and the continued domination of 
state affairs by the so-called high castes in the face of new ethnic and 
regional movements have brought ethnic and identity-based federalism 
to centre stage. The traditionally disadvantaged and marginalised ethnic, 
regional and other identity groups are pushing for a larger share in state 
power. This new identity politics has opened a Pandora’s box of compet-
ing claims.
The current and ex-government officials, development programme 
chiefs, civil society activists, development partner representatives and 
local people consulted for this study agreed that good governance, peace 
and development are closely inter-related and foster one another. They 
said that peace is needed for development, development is needed for 
peace, and good governance is needed for both while peace and devel-
opment foster good governance. On the other hand poverty and exclu-
sion from development lead to more poverty and conflict. The Nepalese 
development paradigm led to structural inequities and the exclusion of 
many people from economic opportunities, which prepared the ground 
for the Maoist insurgency.
The potential of local and community governance
Decentralised local (district and municipal) and community level govern-
ance have great potential for promoting development and peace in Nepal.
Local and community governance for peace and development in Nepal
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Local self-governance – If properly applied decentralised governance 
increases the authority and capacity of sub-national levels of government 
and enhances the responsiveness, transparency and accountability of all 
levels of government. Most opinion survey respondents agreed that local 
governments tend to be closer to the people, better at delivering services 
and implement less costly and more sustainable development projects 
than central government agencies. They also agreed that local govern-
ment is crucial for promoting peace, inclusive development and for in-
volving disadvantaged communities in governance. Local governments 
tend to be more aware of local issues and can handle them better.
The study, however, also found that local governance is deteriorating and 
suffering the impacts of the prolonged transition. There have been no 
elected local governments since 2002 and the transitional structures are 
accused of practising widespread corruption. The central government 
is only weakly committed to steering the decentralisation process and 
has been ineffective in coordinating local government and community 
efforts. The political parties bicker among themselves about the nature of 
transitional local government. The lack of transparency and accountabil-
ity and corruption affect all levels of government and the ability of local 
governments to deliver services has suffered. They are run by centrally 
appointed bureaucrats, who are challenged to execute programmes that 
give value for money and provide services to citizens, especially the poor. 
Citizens have to pay bribes for essential public sector services that are 
anyway often delayed and of low quality. The limited achievements of 
decentralisation have contributed to the demands for a federal system of 
government.
Community-driven development – Local development programmes 
that are planned, implemented and owned by communities are perceived 
to be more efficient than development programmes directly executed by 
government agencies. A large proportion of Nepal’s population are mem-
bers or beneficiaries of the country’s tens of thousands of user groups, 
self-help community organisations, ward citizen forums, local saving 
and credit groups and other community based organisations (CBOs). 
These organisations are playing an important role in filling the gap creat-
ed by the absence of elected local governments. They provide a vehicle to 
implement local infrastructure projects, raise awareness, improve access 
to credit and manage natural resources, health facilities and schools. The 
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large-scale community-driven development that has happened in Nepal 
has helped alleviate poverty, raised social awareness and provided an or-
ganised voice for many communities. It has empowered many women 
and disadvantaged, poor and marginalised people.
Community-level people favour this ‘community-driven development’ 
as they have so often been let down by local and central government. 
Most respondents said that community-driven development allows peo-
ple to participate in designing, planning, implementing and monitoring 
development projects and therefore promotes better resource allocation, 
cost effectiveness, transparency, accountability and sustainability. There 
was said to be less corruption in this level of governance. Central level 
stakeholders said that active CBOs make central and local governments 
perform more in the interests of local people. The main challenge here 
was said to be to align the work of CBOs with local government process-
es, to function without external donor support and to overcome the lack 
of commitment of central government and local elites.
Conclusions on community and local governance – Most respond-
ents agreed that social mobilisation and community development should 
be an integral part of local governance and that local government and 
community-driven development, as long as they work together, provide 
more benefits to local people. Community-based development usually 
strengthens decentralisation while effective local governance helps grow 
community organisations. Inclusive development and local peacebuild-
ing becomes possible for local governments when they engage with and 
empower CBOs. The major challenge here is to mobilise support, re-
sources and commitments at the national level for local and community 
governance.
The transition to federalism
Nepal is committed to introducing a federal system of government. The 
opinion survey respondents said that strengthened local governments 
and empowered CBOs will help smooth the transition to federalism by 
absorbing the shocks and uncertainties of the transition. Most respond-
ents agreed that local governments should be the subsidiary units of the 
federal provinces and that strengthened local governance will help the 
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transition. And CBOs can help manage the transition and build peace and 
development if treated as outreach mechanisms and a bridge between the 
government and its citizens.
Four case study programmes
The study examined the achievements of four donor-supported pro-
grammes on local governance, poverty alleviation and peacebuilding 
support in Nepal that work through local communities.
The Local Governance and Community Development Programme 
(LGCDP) was found to have successfully enabled demand-side mobi-
lisation. Many of the community awareness centres and ward citizen 
forums it has set up have attracted good local commitment, raised the 
awareness of disadvantaged communities and enabled them to demand 
their rights and funding for local projects. These mechanisms inform 
the public about village development committee (VDC) budgets and the 
earmarking of funds for women and disadvantaged communities. They 
are beginning to foster improved community and local governance and 
better transparency, accountability and resource management. The pro-
gramme’s promotion of formula-based grants and performance-based 
top-up funding was also praised by most stakeholders.
However, the community awareness centres and ward citizen forums are 
hindered by unpredictable resources and inadequate capacity and face a 
situation where citizens’ demands are being raised, but the limited capac-
ity of local government and a lack of funding make it difficult to fulfil 
them. LGCDP has also been badly affected by the generally poor perfor-
mance of the unelected local governments, a failure to use resources built 
up by previous programmes, lack of linkages and coordination with other 
programmes and agencies and the mistiming of programme activities.
GTZ/GIZ support to local governance in Nepal – GTZ/GIZ support 
to local governance in Nepal has successfully demonstrated good gov-
ernance practices and informed later innovations including LGCDP’s 
community awareness centres, ward citizen forums and the minimum 
conditions and performance measure system for incentivising local gov-
ernments. Whilst doing this it has strengthened many municipalities, 
VDCs and district development committees (DDCs) and the ability of 
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citizens to participate in local governance. The main shortcomings were 
said to be limited geographical coverage, limited resources and short pe-
riods of operation.
The Poverty Alleviation Fund – The World Bank-supported Poverty 
Alleviation Fund (PAF) has helped lift many poor people out of pov-
erty alongside other factors especially the large increases in remittance 
incomes. PAF’s interventions have empowered many women and disad-
vantaged people, increased school attendance and provided better access 
to services. It has created small infrastructures to support poor people‘s 
livelihoods. PAF’s model of directly funding groups of disadvantaged 
people is widely praised for ensuring that more benefits reach target 
groups compared to programmes run by local governments and line 
agencies. This approach has led to demand-driven, community-owned 
development.
The main challenges to the continuing success of PAF’s community or-
ganisations are uncertainties about future funding, their limited connec-
tivity with local government and line agencies and the limited support 
from politicians, national government and other development partners. 
Some central and district level interviewees believe that PAF is do-
nor-driven, unsustainable and works in parallel to local governments. It 
also needs to improve its targeting of the ultra-poor.
Local peace committees – Since 2007 local peace committees have been 
established in all Nepal’s 75 districts and in many VDCs for peacebuild-
ing and transitional justice. They have contributed to the peace process 
by collecting data on conflict victims and other damage and by helping 
conflict victims receive compensation. Active committees are building 
peace by mediating local disputes and are the only autonomous govern-
ment-mandated bodies to bring political and civil society leadership to-
gether at district level to work for peace. The participation of civil society 
representatives gives them broader legitimacy. They have great potential 
for resolving local conflicts but a lack of resources, capacity, proper man-
date and limited central support has resulted in many inactive commit-
tees. One view was that some committees were failing because they were 
led by politicians who only know how to compete for power and are less 
able to work together for a shared goal.
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Conclusions on the four programmes – Overall the four programmes 
have substantially empowered communities and strengthened local gov-
ernments and communities to contribute to development and peace. 
However, their impacts have been dampened by a number of challenges. 
A common one is the lack of commitment of politicians and bureaucrats, 
who use double-speak and are reluctant to ‘walk the talk’ because of their 
vested interests. Local politicians have not had to face the electorate since 
1997 while the bureaucrats are not subject to downward accountability. 
These programmes have also suffered from planning and implementation 
shortcomings; inadequate incentives for key politicians, bureaucrats, and 
elite class people; coordination gaps with local government and district 
line agencies; resource gaps and outreach and empathy gaps.
Overall conclusions
The findings of this study oppose the viewpoints that strong local gov-
ernment could hinder the role of provincial governments and that direct 
support to CBOs undermines the roles of local government and local pol-
iticians. On the contrary most study respondents believed that effective 
local government will complement provincial federal governments and 
enable the transition to federalism.
And on the future of the situation of governance in Nepal: Although re-
cent years have seen some shift in power and changes in social norms 
with the emergence of identity politics and the new Maoist and Madh-
esi political forces, the basic features of a just, equitable and inclusive 
democracy have yet to take root because of the continuing domination 
of the traditional elites. On balance, the views expressed by the study 
respondents give a pretty negative picture of governance in Nepal with 
citizens and local governments disconnected from power and democratic 
channels, and an authoritarian central government.
Recommendations
1. The overarching need is to write the new constitution and conclude 
state restructuring as soon as possible to establish a federal govern-
ment for a more inclusively governed Nepal.
2. The central government should make a compact with the people and 
implement it at all levels of government. A key part of this compact 
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would be to provide the general public with a means of engaging with 
the government. In the absence of elected local government this could 
happen by setting up formal dialogue structures between the govern-
ment and civil society or by going through ward citizen forums, com-
munity awareness centres, community organisations or VDC peace 
committees.
3. The government should make its institutions more inclusive to en-
hance access to services and improve its performance and reach. This 
calls for introducing affirmative action legislation, training civil serv-
ants from disadvantaged groups for higher level jobs and officially 
recognising local languages in local government alongside citizens‘ 
empowerment and more demand side mobilisation and government 
outreach (see below for recommendations on latter three points).
4. Improve accountability in local government by holding elections for 
temporary local governments, or at least by mandating local politi-
cians and other stakeholders to form inclusive local governments in-
stead of the current practice whereby political parties wield influence 
but carry no formal accountability.
Other means of improving accountability in local government include 
making the public sharing of information and decisions mandatory by 
local governments and CBOs, and integrating project identification 
by CBOs into VDC and municipal planning and providing technical 
support for locally prioritised projects.
5. Strengthen demand mobilisation, especially by disadvantaged 
groups, by institutionalising the role of CBOs in local governance. 
Achieve this by:
 • mentioning community level governance institutions in the new 
constitution;
 • introducing a statute to regulate, empower, monitor and facilitate 
CBOs and to formalise links between them and local and central 
government;
 • amending the Local Self-governance Act to recognise CBOs and 
their federations as formal institutions for community govern-
ance; and
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 • integrating citizen awareness centres and ward citizen forums into 
local government planning, monitoring, oversight and decision 
making.
6. Strengthen demand mobilisation, especially by disadvantaged groups, 
by providing more support for social mobilisation by:
 • selecting social mobilisers from target communities;
 • selecting local service provider NGOs at the regional level via a 
competitive process;
 • encouraging CBOs to act in a politically neutral way; and
 • where needed, tailoring social mobilisation to better reach ul-
tra-poor communities.
7. Strengthen decentralised local governance by preparing an action 
plan for the decentralisation of sectoral functions to local govern-
ments and ensuring that MoFALD acts as a facilitating rather than a 
controlling body.
8. Strengthen the supply side of government to deliver public goods and 
services by:
 • making the standard operating practices of bureaucrats more ser-
vice-orientated and rewarding them when they perform well with 
citizens evaluating their performance;
 • lessening the power of bureaucrats by putting the delivery of some 
public services into the hands of civil society and the private sec-
tor; and
 • improving coordination between local government and line agen-
cies by clarifying the roles, mandates and terms of references of 
line agencies and local governments and propagating coordina-
tion and team working between them.
9. With government leadership support the production of a new peace 
and development strategy for 2013/14 to 2015/16 focusing on conflict 
sensitive approaches and more engagement with local communities. 
This strategy should provide a basis for national planning, govern-
ance reform and mobilizing donor support.
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10. The government should make a compact with its development part-
ners to spell out its plans to improve the governance situation. This 
will involve taking a do-no-harm and conflict sensitive approach to 
development and, where appropriate, working through civil society 
and CBOs.
11. The external development partners should provide more predictable 
aid, engage with and support the government of Nepal and political 
parties to hold elections for transitional local governments, agree on 
a new integrated peace and development strategy, support commu-
nity-based peace and development programmes and help coordinate 
programmes at the local and community levels.
12. Reform the internal governance of political parties and make politi-
cians more responsive to the general public.
Local and community governance for peace and development in Nepal
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1 Introduction
1.1 A country in transition
Nepal is in a state of transition awaiting the production of a new constitution 
to mark the beginning of the end of the post-2006 peace process.
In 2006 Nepal’s mainstream political parties joined hands with the Commu-
nist Party of Nepal (Maoist), overthrew their common enemy the king, and 
declared Nepal a democratic republic. The parties agreed to elect a Constit-
uent Assembly on the basis of proportional representation plus a first-past-
the-post election system to write a new constitution for a federal democratic 
republic.
The 1990 constitution was scrapped and the country is now running under 
the 2007 interim constitution (MoLJPA 2007). The central agenda of the 
state is to write a new constitution, restructure the state and conclude the 
peace process. The implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Accord, 
2006 (CPA) between the Maoists and the alliance of the other seven main 
political parties has, however, been slow because of mistrust and political 
bickering for power. But progress has been made on writing the constitution 
and the integration of the Maoist combatants into the Nepal Army.
In April 2008 a 601-member Constituent Assembly was elected to write an 
inclusive constitution for a new Nepal within two years. But the assembly 
could not deliver and was dissolved in May 2012 after being extended four 
times. The failure to write a constitution has resulted in growing frustrations 
among citizens and especially among the historically marginalised and ex-
ploited communities (ICG 2010, 2; ICG 2011, 1-2).
Following the end of the armed conflict, new ethnic conflicts erupted in 
the hills and southern plains (the Terai). In January 2007, Madhes rights 
activists launched their movement for greater rights for the people of south-
ern plains origin (ICG 2007a, 12), while ethnic movements emerged in the 
Eastern and central hills among the Kirat-Limbu and other ethnic groups. 
The upheavals of the Maoist conflict and these movements alongside the 
continued domination by ‘high caste’ people of hill origin have brought 
ethnic and identity-based federalism to political centre stage. Nepal is a 
diverse country with many ethnic groups, languages, and cultural, regional 
and geographical variations. No group is in the majority. But the so-called 
Vidyadhar Mallik
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)12
high caste Brahmins and Chhetris from the hills have long-ruled the country 
and are perceived as the ruling class and traditional elite which has created 
deep-rooted grievances among Nepal’s many other communities.
These developments happened against the background of low economic 
growth, social inequality, limited development progress and widespread 
poverty. Over the last 15 years Nepal’s economic growth has only grown 
between 2  % and 4 % per year, almost on a par with population growth. The 
Gini Coefficient measure of inequality remains high at 32.8 %, although it 
has come down (improved) from 41.4 % in 2003/04 (CBS 2011, 11). The 
most recent survey found 25 % of Nepalis living below the poverty line 
(CBS 2011, 21) while another measure of poverty – the multidimensional 
poverty index value (MPI) reported that 64.7 % of Nepalis were living in 
poverty with 55.1 % living on less than $1.25 per day (purchasing power 
parity) (UNDP 2011a, 144). Thus, in 2011, Nepal ranked 157 out of the 187 
countries on UNDP’s Human Development Index (UNDP 2011a, 126-130).
Slow, inequitable and exclusionary growth continues to fuel the common 
people’s growing frustrations.
1.2 Resolving the major contested issues
The major contested issues for writing the new constitution are the form of 
governance and state restructuring. The potential forms of governance are 
an executive president, the Westminster parliamentary system or a hybrid 
system based on the French model. State restructuring is concerned with 
the geographical delineation of the new federal provinces, the basis of fed-
eralism (single or multiple identity-based units), and the division of power 
between the centre, the provinces and local governments (local bodies) at 
district, village and municipal levels.
Nepal has been a centralised state since its formation in 1768 and has no 
experience of federalism. There is a fear that tensions could emerge between 
local governments and the future provincial governments if the new govern-
ance structures are not well thought out in advance and managed properly. 
Failing to mobilise local support could complicate the present transition and 
deepen the divisions within Nepali society.
However, Nepal has considerable experience of decentralised and commu-
nity governance and the lessons learned from these initiatives should guide 
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the overall structure of government including the future provincial govern-
ments. The proper management of relationships, restructuring and the devo-
lution of power could result in better synergies, better governance and more 
sustainable peace and development for Nepal.
Nepal has a robust network of community and grassroots organisations in-
cluding many self-help community groups, user groups and rural cooper-
atives. These organisations play an important role in the present transition 
by helping fill the gap created by the absence of elected local governments 
since 2002. These organisations mobilise communities and build up social 
and economic capital. They are engaged in managing community forests, 
schools and health facilities, local irrigation systems; in running rights-
based awareness campaigns; improving local incomes and implementing 
local infrastructure projects.
1.3 Scope of this book
Community-level governance and decentralised local governance have 
great potential for promoting peace and development in Nepal. This book 
makes the case for this and proposes that empowered community and local 
governance should form the foundation and inner core of a well-governed 
Nepal as the country adopts a federal system of government (Figure 1). It 
presents the views of a wide variety of governance stakeholders and draws 
on lessons from experiences in Nepal and other countries.
The book is based on the findings of a 2011/12 study carried out in Nepal. 
The study looked at the relationships between community-level govern-
ance, local governments, the proposed federal provincial units and national 
government and the state of governance in Nepal. The relationships and 
division of functions between these four levels of governance is one of the 
most crucial issues for restructuring the Nepali state under a new constitu-
tion. A major rationale behind the study was to counter the viewpoints that 
strong local government could come in the way of true federalism and the 
role of provincial governments, and that direct support to community based 
organisations (CBOs) undermines the roles of local government and local 
politicians.
The study also examined the performance of four governance and peace-
building support programmes in Nepal: the Local Governance and Commu-
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nity Development Programme (LGCDP), GTZ/GIZ support to local gov-
ernance in Nepal (PASRA, udle and SUNAG), the Poverty Alleviation Fund 
(PAF) and local peace committees (see Box 1).
The book therefore covers a range of governance themes including:
 • community level governance by CBOs where local people organise to 
fulfil certain aspirations, manage common resources and form social 
capital;
 • local governance by local governments (district development committees 
or DDCs, village development committees or VDCs, and municipalities);
Figure 1: The four levels of government under a new constitution 
Source: own representation 
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 • local development for poverty alleviation through income generation 
and livelihood activities and by building local infrastructure; and
 • local and community level peacebuilding.
Box 1: The four case study governance programmes
The Local Governance and Community Development Programme 
(LGCDP, 2008–2013) is a local governance reform and strengthening 
programme. It promotes accountability, sustainability and inclusive de-
velopment through the use of community development, social mobilisa-
tion and the exercise of inclusive democracy. It is supported by the gov-
ernment and a pool of development partners and covers all 75 districts 
of Nepal.
GTZ/GIZ support to local governance in Nepal (PASRA, udle, 
 SUNAG) – The German government previously supported decentralised 
local governance in Nepal through its Urban Development through Local 
Efforts (udle, 1987–2005) and Poverty Alleviation in Selected Rural Are-
as (PASRA, 2005–2011) programmes. Its current Sub-National Govern-
ance Programme (SUNAG, 2011–2014) is supporting LGCDP by pro-
viding capacity building inputs for municipal and local level government 
and promoting community development and governance strengthening 
in a north-south corridor of districts in western Nepal.
The Poverty Alleviation Fund (PAF) is a community-driven programme 
for poverty alleviation that is supported by the World Bank. It targets poor 
and disadvantaged people and works on livelihood, social infrastructure, 
social capital formation, group harmonisation and the use of social funds 
in more than 40 districts. Phase 1 ran from 2004 and Phase 2 from 2008.
Nepal’s local peace committees have been in place since July 2007. 
These committees have been formed in almost all of Nepal’s 75 districts 
and in some VDCs. They are made of members of local government, 
political parties and civil society and report to the Ministry of Peace and 
Reconstruction (MoPR). They promote local dialogue to mitigate con-
flicts and help gather data on conflict victims and conflict damage.
The study collected the views of governance stakeholders in Nepal by ad-
ministering a questionnaire to 82 government officials, programme officers, 
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civil society activists and development partner representatives (Annex 1); 
interviewing 19 central level and 18 district level governance stakeholders 
(Annex 2); and by holding 12 focus group discussions with members of 
local community organisations (Annex 3).
The 82 questionnaire respondents were divided into three categories to an-
alyse questionnaire responses with the assumption that those directly in-
volved in local government and the Poverty Alleviation Fund (PAF) would 
tend to view their own areas favourably (Table 1). In this regard it is im-
portant to note that people who have benefitted from any of the initiatives 
investigated by this study will be more likely to have a positive outlook on 
that initiative and vice-versa. These data collection exercises were carried 
out at the central level in the Kathmandu Valley and in the three districts of 






Table 1: Types of questionnaire respondents 
Types of respondents Number of respondents 
Associated with local government at time of the 
study (LGCDP, local government and MoLD/ 
MoFALD): 
12 
Associated with the Poverty Alleviation Fund at 
the time of the study: 
21 
Other respondents (civil society, academia, devel-
opment partners, other): 
49 
Total respondents: 82 





A main subject of investigation was the performance of the four local gov-
ernance and peace programmes. Information was also gathered on the per-
formance of these programmes from programme evaluations and other re-
ports. Finally information was gathered on other countries’ experiences of 
local and community governance and federalism as they relate to Nepal’s 
situation.
The study was therefore based on four case study programmes and a rela-
tively small sample of respondents and focus group discussions. Although 
this sample is not nationally representative the findings across these im-
portant programmes and well-informed stakeholders at different levels of 
governance reveal many of the main challenges and opportunities for gov-
ernance, development and peace in Nepal.
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Box 2: The three study districts
The study collected district level perceptions and views on governance in 
Doti, Pyuthan and Mahottari districts. These districts lie in different parts 
of the country and have differing ethnic compositions and geographical 
situations. They were also selected for being implementing districts of 
LGCDP, PAF, the local peace committees, PASRA and udle.
Doti lies in the middle hills of the Far Western Development Region. 
Most of the inhabitants are Brahmins, Chhetris and Dalits (caste Hin-
dus). The Far West of Nepal lies far from the centre of power in Kath-
mandu and, along with the Mid-Western region, comprises the most 
socioeconomically disadvantaged part of the country. Many men leave 
their home areas seasonally or for longer periods to work in other parts 
of Nepal, India and elsewhere. Most people of the Far Western hills want 
to maintain the boundaries of the Far Western region as a province in the 
new federal system.
Pyuthan lies in the middle hills of the Mid West Development Region 
close by the hotbed of the Maoist conflict (1996-2006). This district has 
many Janajatis (ethnic group people). Many men also leave this district 
in search of work and the remittances they send back provide an impor-
tant source of income for many families.
Mahottari lies in the central part of Nepal’s southern Terai plains. The 
district’s population is made up of Madhesi caste people and Terai Jana-
jati people plus settlers from the hill districts in the northern parts of the 
district. The district was affected by the Madhes movement of 2007 when 
the Madhesi people asserted their demands for territorial and regional 
federalism. The culture of the Madhesi caste groups is similar to that of 
people across the border in India. This district faces the challenges of 
lack of social awareness, perceived discrimination by the state and exten-
sive poverty. There are good roads and communication infrastructure in 
the north, but many southern rural areas lack adequate infrastructure and 
have few livelihood opportunities.
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1.4 The line of argument
This book argues that the fundamental underpinning of federal restructuring 
in Nepal should be the creation of an inclusive, fair and efficient govern-
ance structure that fulfils people’s basic needs and listens and responds to 
the voices of all. It calls for the principle of subsidiarity to be applied (see 
Box 3), with extensive responsibilities given to the local (district, VDC and 
municipality) and community tiers of governance. The study also asserts 
that community-driven development and effective local government are 
both needed to promote economic and social development.
Box 3: The principle of subsidiarity
 • Subsidiarity is an organising principle which says that decisions are 
best made at the lowest possible level of government or an organi-
sation and that political power should be exercised by the smallest, 
lowest or least centralised competent authority.
 • The principle holds that a larger and greater body should not exercise 
functions that can be carried out efficiently by a smaller and lesser 
body, but rather the former should support the latter and help coordi-
nate its activity with the activities of the whole community.
 • Subsidiarity is the idea that a central authority should have a subsid-
iary function, performing only those tasks that cannot be performed 
effectively at a more local level. It is ideally one of the features of 
federalism (Democracia Participativa 2012).
Nepal has experienced a very divisive conflict, which was caused by wide-
spread poverty, socioeconomic exclusion and bad governance. Local people 
and their communities want to be able to influence decisions that impact 
their daily lives and to own the local development process. This can best hap-
pen through transparent, accountable, efficient and participatory governance 
that is local and accessible through local government and community-based 
organisations. Such a set-up will bring harmony and people’s participation 
resulting in more peace and development and should minimise future con-
flicts including between district level governments and the federal provinces.
The theory of change underlying this book is therefore that communi-
ty-based development improves local socioeconomic infrastructure, gener-
ates livelihood opportunities and helps social capital formation while effec-
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tive decentralised local government expands the outreach of government to 
citizens. This will complement and strengthen the new federal system.
The book covers these subjects by first explaining the key concepts of peace, 
development and governance, describing the present governance situation 
in Nepal and presenting the study findings on governance, peace and de-
velopment in Nepal (in Chapter 2). Chapter 3 presents the experiences of 
decentralised self-governance in Nepal and other countries and the study 
findings on this subject. Chapter 4 looks at the experiences of Nepal and 
other countries on community based development and the findings on this 
subject. Chapter 5 analyses the performance of the four case study pro-
grammes from Nepal.
Chapter 6 gives the overall findings and conclusions and presents the suc-
cesses, shortcomings and gaps of the four programmes and local and com-
munity governance in Nepal. The final chapter gives recommendations to 
guide the government, Nepal’s development partners and other stakeholders 
on building a structure for a well-governed and prosperous Nepal.
2 Governance for peace and development
This chapter demonstrates that peace and development are closely relat-
ed and the quality of governance in a country impacts them both. It first 
describes the situation of governance in Nepal related to the political tur-
bulence around the 1996–2006 Maoist conflict. It goes on to recount the 
associated poor governance, the limited progress on decentralisation and 
the low levels of economic growth. The text then analyses the concepts of 
peace, development and governance in relation to Nepal’s situation giving 
the study findings related to these concepts and the relationships between 
them according to the international literature.
2.1 Political instability in Nepal
2.1.1 Up to the end of the Maoist insurgency
Nepal has seen many uprisings in the past 75 years. The first martyrs of these 
movements date back to 1941 and the fight against the autocratic rule of the 
Rana prime ministers. There are now hundreds of officially recognised mar-
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tyrs and the numbers increase every year. In the post-Rana period the Shah 
Kings also met large scale popular opposition for their autocratic rule.
King Mahendra dissolved the democratically elected parliament in 1960 
and jailed the prime minister and the political leaders for opposing him and 
disbanded the parliamentary system. He introduced the partyless Panchayat 
system in 1962 and by giving power to his cronies at local and central levels 
maintained full control over all important decisions of state.
The first major uprising against the monarchy took place in 1990. This brought 
about the reintroduction of multiparty democracy. The 1991 parliament in-
troduced press freedom, economic liberalisation, local self-governance, and 
civil service reform. The same period saw a large growth in civil society.
But the political parties soon familiarised themselves with the taste of power 
and started bickering for power within their parties and with rival parties. 
Governments started to fall regularly, changing on average about once a 
year between 1991 and 2006.
The coalition and minority governments that came to power after 1994 did 
not take the national and peoples’ agenda as their priority as they busied 
themselves with money-making and making deals to keep hold of power. 
The peoples’ frustrations with the government and its agents grew. This dis-
satisfaction was more pronounced in the outlying rural parts of the country 
as little development and few public services trickled down to these areas 
and their disadvantaged communities. The Maoists ‘people’s war’ resulted 
in 1996, fought first in the remote hills of Mid-Western Nepal and then 
across almost the whole of the country (ICG 2003, 1-8).
This civil war resulted in the deaths of more than 15,000 Maoist combatants, 
security personnel and innocent people. Other casualties included the physi-
cal and social infrastructure, governance networks, development and the old 
social institutions based on feudal bondage and that had kept the masses of 
oppressed people silent. The Maoist insurgency gave fire to the aspirations 
and frustrations of those who viewed themselves as oppressed and made 
them more conscious of their identities (Gersony 2003; ICG 2005, i–ii).
The conflict had far reaching consequences. In July 2002 the elected local 
governments at district, VDC and municipality level were dissolved once their 
terms expired as it was not possible to hold new elections. The community 
organisations engaged in local social and developmental activities were often 
at odds with the local Maoist cadres and had to scale down their activities.
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The royal massacre of 1 June 2001 saw most of the members of the royal 
family killed. Gyanendra became king. He quickly turned into an autocrat 
and in February 2005 dismissed the government for not being able to hold 
parliamentary elections and took direct charge of the government. He ruled 
the country through his notorious advisors and stifled the media, civil soci-
ety, and the political parties.
The opposition political parties and many educated urban people, media 
persons, businesspersons, members of civil society and student unions 
started a peoples’ movement in Kathmandu and other urban centres. The 
Maoists already occupied most of the rural areas. In November 2005 the 
opposition parties and the Maoists joined hands to topple the king’s rule 
(ICG 2007b, 1-7). The spring of 2006 thus saw the second popular uprising. 
After the overthrow of the autocratic king, the dissolved parliament was 
re-established, a government of the seven political parties came into power, 
a ceasefire was announced between the new government and the CPN (Mao-
ist) and peace negotiations began.
After several rounds of negotiations a Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) 
was signed in November 2006 between the seven parties‘ alliance (SPA) 
government and the CPN (Maoist). The Maoists joined the government. A 
roadmap to elect a Constituent Assembly (CA) was agreed on and a plan of 
combatants’ management, integration into the security forces and rehabil-
itation was agreed. The United Mission to Nepal (UNMIN) was invited to 
oversee the management of the combatants.
2.1.2 The peace process from 2008 to May 2012
The focal point of the peace agreement was for an elected constituent 
 assembly to write a constitution for a ‘new Nepal’ with the fair representa-
tion of men and women and all major ethnic, caste and regional groups. 
But the elections were delayed as issues emerged that had to be settled be-
fore elections could be held. Most important was the issue of ethnic and 
regional representation. The Madhesi people of the southern plains and eth-
nic groups in the eastern hills launched their rights-based movements using 
both non-violent and violent means to press for a degree of autonomous 
government in the new constitution (ICG 2007a). The state power and its 
apparatus were already weak and weakened further where these new move-
ments erupted.
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Elections were finally held in April 2008 after a series of agreements and 
compromises and after the Interim Constitution was amended and promises 
made that Nepal would be declared a ‘Federal Democratic Republic’. The 
Maoists won the most seats with more than the combined second and third 
largest parties (Table 2). These elections saw the emergence of a fourth po-
litical power in the Madhesi parties. 
 
 
Table 2: Seats held by main parties in the 2008 Constituent Assembly 
 Party No. seats Percentage 
1 Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)  229 38% 
2 Nepali Congress 115 19% 
3 
Communist Party of Nepal (United 
Marxist Leninist) 
108 18% 
4 Madhesi Peoples’ Rights Forum 54 9% 
5 Terai Madhes Democratic Party 21 3% 
6 Other 74 12% 
Total  601  






The Maoists did not gain a majority in the 601 seat assembly and so the 
formation of successive minority and coalition governments and struggles 
for berths in the cabinet began. From its very beginning power politics took 
precedence over the writing of the constitution and advancing the peace 
process. The quarrel for power started over selecting the president following 
the dissolution of the monarchy at the assembly’s first session. As the parties 
lost their common enemy (the king), they started finding enemies in each 
other and the fragile consensus to complete the peace process and write the 
constitution was weakened. A blame-game and mistrust between and among 
the parties badly affected the work of the assembly. After four extensions it 
was dissolved in May 2012 without producing the new constitution.
2.1.3 The ethnic and identity issue
The new assembly was by far the most diverse national legislature in the 
history of Nepal with a third women membership and many members from 
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Box 4: Ethnic and caste domination in Nepal
The founding of the Hindu kingdom of Nepal in the late eighteenth cen-
tury was based on the language, religion, and culture of the upper Hin-
du castes of the Midhills and led to the domination by Brahmins and 
Chhetris of all public and political spheres (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012). 
All the other groups have been largely excluded from political and socio-
economic power. It is ironic that even the Maoist leadership is dominated 
by upper caste men from the Midhills.
Hill Brahmin men in particular have been and are hugely overrepre-
sented in politics and the administration (ICG 2011). For example, five 
out of the eight prime ministers since 1990 have been Brahmins. The 
worst off groups are the Dalits and the Muslims. These and the many 
disadvantaged ethnic groups (Janajatis) such as Tamangs and Tharus, 
suffer from prejudice, political and administrative underrepresentation 
and economic disadvantage. It is widely recognised that discrimination 
by upper caste people in politics and administration is a major cause of 
this situation.
The Interim Constitution (2007) fundamentally redefined the Nepalese 
state’s identity. Nepal is no longer a Hindu state, but an “inclusive and 
fully democratic state”. However, the traditional hierarchical thinking 
persists in the minds of many leaders, leading to the continuing depri-
vation of women, Dalits, most ethnic groups and Madhesi people. The 
disadvantaged groups remain under-represented in positions of power in 
the government, the political parties, the administration, the judiciary, 
the media, the teaching profession and business (Bertelsmann Stiftung 
2012, 6).
In practice most political parties and their leaders refuse to address the 
deeply rooted problems of socioeconomic and ethno-religious cleavag-
es, social exclusion, and regional inequalities. The government has only 
half-heartedly addressed the demands of the Madhesi people and Jana-
jatis. While Nepal is supposed to be moving towards a federal system to 
the traditionally marginalised Janajati, Dalit and Madhesi groups. Together, 
these people were in a majority. This unsettled the traditional power elites 
(see Box 4) who felt threatened, especially as the other groups mobilised 
into caucuses demanding more political power.
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Many Janajati members demanded ethnically based federalism with the new 
provinces to be named after the major ethnic group of the area in ques-
tion. A major cause of the demise of the Constituent Assembly in 2012 was 
the opposing and entrenched views on the subject of ethnic federalism (see 
Box 5). Many ethnic, regional and other identity groups demonstrated out-
side the Constituent Assembly for a larger share in state power including 
women, Dalits, people of the Far West, Madhesis and Janajatis.
Box 5: Federal restructuring
The report of the High Level State Restructuring Commission (SRC) of 
the Constituent Assembly (SRC 2012) created much heated debate and 
controversy, as a majority of its members opted for an ethnic model of 
federalism with most provinces to be named after ethnic groups. The 
committee’s report gave less importance to the efficiency and econom-
ic viability of the provinces. Moreover, the report suggested that local 
governments be treated as an integral part of provincial governments 
without any constitutional status. The minority members of the State Re-
structuring Commission went public with their opposition to the ethnic 
model and stated their preference for two levels of local government with 
district and village/municipality level governments under the provinces.
The debate is focused on the geographical delineation of provinces and 
their names. The ethnic activists are calling for most of the hill provinc-
es to be named after the majority ethnic group (e.g. Tamsaling for the 
area around and outside of the Kathmandu Valley after the Tamang eth-
nic group and Magarat in the mid-west of the country). These demands 
have gone along with calls by Janajati activists to reserve power in such 
provinces for the traditionally marginalised Janajati groups. The many 
politicians who oppose ethnically named states fear that it could lead 
to domination by these ethnic groups and the lessening of the power of 
the traditional elites. The debate remains unresolved as to whether fed-
eral restructuring should be based on single ethnic identities or multiple 
(mixed) identities. The debate on decentralisation and the relationship 
ensure the representation of all groups, the top level political leaders are 
failing to ensure the diverse aspirations and demands of the countries‘ 
many identity groups (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012, 26).
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This issue had come to prominence during the Maoist conflict as the Mao-
ists had won much support from the Janajatis and Dalits by promising them 
a degree of autonomous self-governance in a federal state. The government, 
in agreements made prior to the Constituent Assembly elections in 2008, 
assured the identity groups that there demands would be fulfilled in the new 
constitution.
The issue of ethnic identity opened a Pandora’s box of competing claims. In 
the last months of the Constituent Assembly, with some justification and as 
a strategy to oppose the naming of provinces after ethnic groups, the Brah-
mins and Chhetris claimed that they should also be treated as ethnic groups. 
And then there are the competing demands of the Madhesi people and the 
Tharu ethnic group. The Tharu are a large ethnic group that lives in the Terai 
and inner Terai parts of the country. It saw its identity as allied with the other 
ethnic groups (Janajatis) and opposed the calls by the Madhesi groups for a 
single Madhes province across the Terai.
2.1.4 The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly
The Constituent Assembly was dissolved in 2012 because of its failure to 
overcome differences on several major issues (see Box 6). Backstage agree-
ments could not resolve the differences and many agreements were not 
properly implemented or simply ignored. In November 2011 the Supreme 
Court ruled that the tenure of the Constituent Assembly could not be ex-
tended and should end on 28 May 2012. This decision put pressure on the 
politicians and ethnic leaders to try and reach a last minute consensus to 
finish the constitution. There were big demonstrations and strikes by ethnic, 
regional and political groups for their demands to be addressed in the new 
constitution. This created further divisions among communities. When the 
CA expired on 28 May 2012 Nepalese society became calm again, but was 
struck with grief (UNRCHO 2012).
between the provinces and local/municipal level governments have been 
overshadowed by the heated emotional debates on ethnic federalism and 
the divisions it has created.
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Box 6:  Major unresolved issues at dissolution of the Constituent 
Assembly, May 2012
 • The form of governance and whether Nepal should have an executive 
presidential system, a Westminster parliamentary system or a hybrid 
model with executive power divided between the prime minister and 
the president.
 • State structuring and federalism and whether Nepal should have a 
single ethnicity based federal structure, a multiple and mixed ethnic-
ity based federal structure, or a federal structure based on integrating 
adjoining areas of the mountains, hills and plains. The main conten-
tious issues relate to the geographical delineation, the naming and 
number of provinces.
 • The judiciary and whether it should be fully autonomous or if it 
should be overseen by the legislature, whether a separate constitu-
tional court is needed, and whether the appointment of judges should 
be scrutinised by hearings of the legislature.
 • The election system and the legislature and whether Nepal should 
have a first-past-the-post or proportional system, or a mixed system 
for elections; and the number of legislatures at the centre and in the 
provinces; number of members; and the proportional representation 
of ethnic and caste groups.
2.1.5 The peace process after May 2012
In spite of the many setbacks, up to January 2013 the peace process has 
continued as most mainstream parties have remained in dialogue and have 
reached a series of agreements and understandings for resolving issues. On 
the other hand, however, many such agreements have not been fulfilled and 
have turned out to be hollow thus weakening trust between the opposing 
parties. The failure to observe agreements has almost become the norm with 
a widespread acceptance by the general public that politicians often do not 
do what they promise and do not hold to agreements (ICG 2010).
Progress on the peace process ground to a halt after the dissolution of the 
Constituent Assembly in May 2012. Eventually, in the last week of August 
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2012 the committee responsible for deciding issues of army integration 
reached a decision on the integration, voluntary retirement and rehabilita-
tion of Maoist’s army combatants – key parts of the peace process. It has 
taken more than four years to verify and classify these combatants and de-
velop integration and rehabilitation packages. The combatants who opted 
for cash payments and immediate integration into society were paid in early 
2012 while those opting for integration into the Nepal Army came under the 
responsibility of the Nepal Army in late 2012. The slow process of integra-
tion and confusions and misunderstandings over their qualifying criteria has 
caused frustration among the Maoist combatants.
Differences of opinion and mistrust among the governing and opposition 
parties continue to hinder the peace process. The Nepali Congress, the 
Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist Leninist) (CPN UML) and the 
United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)1 are beset by personality con-
flicts and factionalism. In June 2012 the UCPN(M) suffered a vertical split 
as the hard-line Mohan Vaidya faction split off to form the Communist Party 
of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M). And there are intense rivalries and a lack of con-
sensus within UCPN(M) between the cadres aligned with Prime Minister 
Baburam Bhattarai and party president Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda).
As of January 2013 there is political gridlock with the governing and oppo-
sition parties blaming each other for the failure to produce a constitution. 
Discussions are on-going with some suggesting reinstating the old Constitu-
ent Assembly while others call for the election of a new parliament, holding 
a referendum or calling a round table conference of all parties. The focus 
has changed from the contents of the new constitution to how to continue 
constitution writing.
A major sticking point in the second half of 2012 was that the Interim Con-
stitution says that the Prime Minister must be a member of the CA (the 
legislature) and could not continue as prime minister if he ceased to be a 
member, but would remain as caretaker prime minister until a new prime 
minister is appointed. But the dilemma was that as there was no CA (the leg-
islature), nobody else could become prime minister as well, as the candidate 
had to be a CA member. This meant that the fresh appointment of a prime 
1 Note that during the insurgency the Maoist political party was called the Communist Part 
of Nepal (Maoist) or CPN (Maoist). In January 2009 the party merged with another small 
Maoist party and renamed itself the United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) or the 
UCPN(M).
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minister was a tricky issue with the only way out being a consensus decision 
by the major parties on appointing a new prime minister and forming a new 
government. But, as of February 2013, such a consensus has been elusive.
2.2 The legacies of political instability in Nepal
The political developments since the mid-1990s have led to a worsening 
crisis of governance in Nepal as reported by a number of international and 
national agencies. The political instability has led to only low levels of eco-
nomic growth and halting progress on local self-governance.
2.2.1 Declining quality of governance
The World Bank reports increasing political instability and corruption, less 
rule of law and less effective government in Nepal between 1996 and 2010 
(Figure 3). Even the level of voice and accountability decreased in spite of 
the Maoists’ people’s war and the popular movement for democracy during 
this period.
Transparency International reports worsening corruption in between 2004 
and 2011 (Figure 4). In 2006 Nepal ranked 121st out of 163 countries on its 
Corruption Perception Index; but by 2011 it had fallen to 154th out of 183 
countries. Another index (World Bank 2012a) ranks Nepal at 107th out of 
183 economies for doing business in. One business unfriendly indicator is 
that it takes an average of 326 hours per year for businesses to pay taxes.
The Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) measures the state of gov-
ernance in 128 developing countries and countries in transformation. In 
2012 Nepal ranked 98th among 128 countries for the state of democracy, 
the economy and political management, with a score of 4.45 out of 10 (Ber-
telsmann Stiftung 2012). It also ranked:
 • 75th on BTI’s political transformation index with a score of 5 out of 10;
 • 101st on BTI’s political management index value with a score of 3.74 
out of 10; and
 • 112th on BTI’s economic transformation index with a score of 3.89 out 
of 10.
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The 2010/11 report of the Commission for Investigation of Abuse of Au-
thority (Nepal’s main anti-corruption body) said that in the previous ten 
years the number of complaints against corruption or abuse of authority had 
grown 2.5 times from 2,522 to 6,145 (CIAA 2011, Annex 11).
Nepal’s auditor general found audit objections of almost 22.5 billion Nepa-
lese rupees (NPR) out of the NPR 527 billion it had audited for government 
agencies for 2010/11 (OAG 2012, 3-28). It also reported that the cumulative 
revenue arrears had reached almost a third of total revenues in the same 
year, and there was a cumulative audit objection of more than 10 % of the 
total amount audited for 2010/11. This report highlighted how many gov-
ernment agencies lacked proper internal controls, and in many cases had not 
been following the law.
ICG (2010, 21-30) reported a deteriorating law and order situation, increas-




Figure 3: Nepal’s performance on World Bank governance indicators, 1996–
  2010 
 
Note: These indicators are scored from a minimum of minus 2.5 to a maximum of 2.5 
Source: Kaufmann / Kraay / Mastruzzi (2010) 
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ment to reach the periphery of the country (ICG 2009b; 2010). It reported 
how the political parties had established a mafia market, were using patron-
age to protect cadres engaged in violence and extortion, alongside a largely 
ineffective police force and a culture of anarchy for political benefit.
2.2.2 Limited progress on decentralised government
Considerable progress was made in the 1990s on decentralising government 
to elected district, VDC and municipal governments. This culminated in the 
introduction of the Local Self-governance Act in 1999. However, the failure 
to hold local elections led to the dissolution of the elected local governments 
in 2002 since when there have been no elected local representatives. This 
has led to only limited progress on decentralizing authority from central 
government line ministries to local governments in the districts.
Local governments have lost much of their legitimacy. They handle large 
amounts of money for providing local services and improving the physical 
infrastructure. But the absence of elected representatives means that these 
governments lack transparency and accountability and corruption is a seri-
 
 
Figure 4: Nepal’s international Corruption Perception Index score, 2004– 
  2011 
 
Note: 0 = most corruption and 10 = least corruption 
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ous challenge. Most are performing poorly in implementing programmes 
and providing services.
The ad hoc arrangements for local government in place since 2002, includ-
ing the all-party mechanisms which served as advisory bodies from 2009 
to 2011, have been the backdrop for growing and widespread corruption. 
These all party mechanisms were disbanded in 2011 for misusing their pow-
ers (Ekantipur 2011). And as of January 2013 there is no elected authority to 
oversee the performance of the deputed bureaucrats who are running local 
governments.
The decentralisation of governance is in limbo. The political parties bicker 
about the nature of transitional and temporary arrangements. Many com-
mentators believe that local government elections are needed while others 
believe that transitional local government structures should be set up based 
on the percentage of votes won in the April 2008 CA elections. See more on 
the state of governance in Nepal in Chapter 3.
2.2.3 Poor economic growth
The past decade and a half has been lost in terms of connecting Nepal to the 
high speed growth of India and China. Nepal’s 2 % to 4 % economic growth 
has been much less than its neighbours’ double digit or near double digit 
growth. Nepal’s GDP per capita growth was only 3.8 % in 2010/11 (MoF 
2012, 4) and 4.5 % in 2011/12 (MoF 2013, 6).
Political instability and poor infrastructure are the two greatest challeng-
es for private sector growth, with high production costs, growing power 
shortages, frequent disruptions to business operations and trade and de-
clining competitiveness (Afram / Del Pero 2012). Militant labour unions 
have caused a number of businesses to close. Political gridlock meant that 
there were no regular annual government budgets at the start of fiscal years 
2011/12 and 2012/13 with interim budgets introduced instead. This has 
hindered the accurate forecasting of subsequent budgets, leading to un-
der-spending on development programmes thus constraining the develop-
ment of new programmes.
Much of the domestic revenue goes on administrative expenses. In fiscal 
year 2011/12, the revenue surplus (revenues minus current expenditure) of 
the government budget was only 23.6 % of total capital and principal re-
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payment expenses. The rest was financed by public borrowing and foreign 
grants and loans (MoF 2012).
And each year the government fails to spend funds allocated for develop-
ment and programmes are not executed on time and capital budgets are un-
spent. At the same time last minute efforts to spend result in large payments 
on ‘late starter’ public works, many of which are washed away by the mon-
soon rains. A number of prestige projects, including a fast track highway to 
join the capital to the southern plains and large irrigation and water supply 
schemes are mentioned in each year’s budget, but are yet to come on line.
This situation has disappointed Nepal’s domestic and foreign investors be-
cause of big risks and low yields on their investments.
Nepal, however, has great potential for economic growth because of some 
sound fundamentals. The macro-economy is in reasonable shape because 
of managed fiscal deficits and foreign currency reserves accruing from 
remittances and also because of the country’s connectedness to the thriv-
ing Indian economy. The comfort of the dependable foreign currency re-
serves comes from the huge accumulations of remittances, with remittance 





Figure 5: Trends in Nepal’s macroeconomic indicators, 2002 to 2012 
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living standards of many Nepalese have improved mainly because of the 
large number of people working away from home. But the dependence of 
the economy and society on remittances and an absentee population brings 
into question long-term sustainable growth. The country’s economic growth 
depends mostly on agricultural production with higher economic growth if 
the monsoon rains are favourable and vice versa. The last ten years has seen 
slow growth in gross domestic product and the manufacturing sector and 
high rates of inflation (Figure 5). There was food price inflation of 15  % in 
2010/11 (MoF 2012).
2.2.4 Shifting ground?
There are indications that the political developments since 1990 are leading 
to a fundamental shift in power and changes in social norms. To some ex-
tent the traditional power structure is crumbling under the multiple shocks 
of increased political and ethnic awareness, the chaos of transition, rising 
expectations and the inept performance of transitional governments. There 
are growing fault-lines of ethnic division and the traditionally dominant hill 
Brahmins and Chhetris fear losing their dominance. At the same time the 
older political parties (the Nepali Congress, the CPN [UML] and the Na-
tional Democratic Party [RPP]) are losing influence to the Maoist and Mad-
hesi parties. The latter now exert a large influence on the country’s strategic 
direction.
The values, norms and rules of the game of political and social relationships 
are changing fast. Many people who worshipped the king as the incarna-
tion of God have lost their respect for the traditional Hindu caste hierar-
chy. Demands for social justice go against the traditional norms of social 
harmony to the dismay of many of the traditional elites. Diverse influences 
have raised the people’s awareness for egalitarian values, sectarian norms 
(thinking on ethnic identity lines) and socialist norms for the socioeconomic 
restructuring of the state.
These changes are set against a bureaucracy that deteriorates as it becomes 
more politicised and removed from the people as physical threats have made 
many civil servants leave their field postings. The civil service finds it hard 
to adapt and respond to these changes and the rising expectations of the 
people.
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Although some change is happening, many things stay the same. The ba-
sic features of a just, equitable and inclusive democracy have yet to take 
root because of continuing domination by the traditional elite even within 
the new political centres of the Maoist and Madhesi parties. The traditional 
elite downplay the importance of the culture, language and socioeconomic 
attributes of other groups. They continue to visualise the ‚Nepali’ nation as 
having a singular identity based on the cultural or social attributes of the 
dominating ruling class, to the exclusion of other identities. And most high-
er level civil servants continue to be Brahmin men from the less remote hill 
districts. They share real power with other Brahmin and Chhetri politicians, 
media men and the intelligentsia and tend to be insensitive to the rights of 
other groups. They are selected on the basis of their language and clerical 
skills and less on the required competencies for their jobs. Thus, rather than 
providing solutions, they often cause problems and create tensions during 
the current transition acting as a conservative force that blocks change.
2.3 Peace, development and governance in Nepal
Nepal’s transition has seen the development of deepening divisions based on 
political, ideological, ethnic and regional differences. As of January 2013 
it is not possible to predict future political developments. The responses of 
the 82 questionnaire respondents and the leading governance stakeholders 
revealed the inter-relationship between peace and development, the impor-
tance of good governance for peace and development and the need to inte-
grate and strengthen community and national level peacebuilding efforts.
2.3.1 The relationship between peace and development
As posited in the international literature on the relationship between peace 
and development (see discussion in Box 7), almost all questionnaire re-
spondents agreed that peace and development are inter-related (Figure 6). 
They agreed that development brings about peace by fulfilling people‘s 
needs. In the same way most respondents agreed that poverty and exclusion 
from development leads to conflict and disorder that block development 
and lead to more poverty and conflict. Economist Dilli Raj Khanal said that 
the Nepalese development paradigm has led to structural inequities and the 
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exclusion of many people from economic opportunities. This had resulted 




Figure 6: Proportion of questionnaire respondents agreeing that peace and 
  development are inter-related (82 respondents) 
 
Source: Study respondents, 2012  
 
Another widespread view was that the increased awareness of the tradi-
tionally marginalised and disadvantaged groups brought about conflict thus 
undermining the traditional social harmony. But a more inclusive and just 
society is yet to emerge and so further conflict is likely.
On the other hand, another respondent argued that some conflict is desirable 
for development as it drives social change while another respondent did not 
see any relationship between peace and development in Nepal because of 
the elite capture of public resources. He favoured community based devel-
opment, social inclusion and targeted development programmes for disad-
vantaged communities for sustained peace and development. A number of 
respondents argued for people-centred development programmes.
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Box 7: The inter-relationship of peace and development
This brief review of the international literature on peace, conflict and 
development helps explain Nepal’s situation where limited progress on 
peacebuilding is hindering development.
Development – Development is a process of expanding the freedoms that 
people enjoy (Sen 2000, 3). It therefore requires the removal of sourc-
es of ‘un-freedom’ including poverty, tyranny, poor economic opportu-
nities, systematic social deprivation and the neglect of public facilities. 
Expanding freedom should be the primary end and the principal means 
of development. Many argue that human development is most needed to 
expand people’s freedoms and empower them to engage actively in de-
velopment processes (Alkire 2010, 40). People are both the beneficiaries 
and agents of long-term, equitable human development that puts people 
at the centre, enlarges human choices (not just incomes), builds human 
capabilities and makes full use of these capabilities (Huq 1996, 16-23). 
Sustainable development is crucially important to meet human needs 
while preserving the environment so that the needs of future generations 
can also be met.
The causes of conflicts – The causes of violent conflict include rapid 
change, rising expectations, greed and grievances, horizontal inequities, 
ethnic divides, lack of genuine democracy and weak institutions. The 
economic stresses of low incomes, the low opportunity costs of rebellion, 
youth unemployment, severe corruption and rapid urbanisation all trig-
ger violence (World Bank 2011a, 73-81). Multiple stresses such as low 
incomes and high unemployment and inequalities usually exacerbate the 
risks of violence. This was and is the situation in Nepal.
Conflict and underdevelopment – Conflict is often both a cause and an 
effect of underdevelopment (Ghani / Iyer 2010). Thus, conflict reduction 
and poverty alleviation need to go hand in hand for development in con-
flict affected countries like Nepal. Civil wars often lead to a vicious cycle 
of poverty, low growth and growing grievances (Collier 2007). Rebel 
movements, such as Nepal’s Maoists during the insurgency, justify their 
actions in terms of the repression, exploitation and exclusion practised 
by the state. Young men are easily allured to join rebel armies in envi-
ronments of hopeless poverty. And where economies are weak, the state 
is also likely to be weak (because of inadequate resources to provide 
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security and maintain public order), and so rebellion is not so difficult. 
It is also important to recognise that peace is more than the absence of 
violence. It is also the absence of exploitation, oppression and aliena-
tion, and the absence of the cultural violence that legitimises direct and 
structural violence (Galtung / Scott 2008, 106). This narrative closely 
matches Nepal’s situation with the central importance of empowering 
Nepal’s traditionally marginalised and disadvantaged populations and of 
bringing about inclusive growth to raise the incomes and levels of human 
development of all citizens.
Poverty and conflict – Where low incomes and poverty cause conflict, 
then the focus should be on reducing poverty. Reducing conflict is a pre-
requisite to political stability, which, in turn is needed for implementing 
pro-growth policies. In India, there is evidence that states with higher 
incomes and fewer police have less violence than ones with more police 
and lower incomes (Ghani / Iyer 2010). There is also evidence that ine-
qualities between identity groups cause conflict and thus the benefits of 
‘development’ need sharing fairly across groups.
Conflict undermines development – In recent years the levels of eco-
nomic growth in countries affected by violent conflict has been a percent-
age point lower per year than in other countries (World Bank 2011a, 60). 
Countries experiencing major violence in the 1981 to 2005 period had 
a 21 percentage points higher poverty rate than countries without vio-
lence and development in such countries lagged on almost every Millen-
nium Development Goal indicator. People in fragile and conflict-affected 
countries are more likely to be impoverished, to miss out on schooling 
and lack access to basic health services (World Bank 2011a, 63).
Peace and development – Peace usually leads to development. Ethiopia 
(where conflict tailed off after the 1988 treaty with Somalia) experienced 
a more than quadrupling in access to improved drinking water from only 
13 % of its people in 1990 to 66 % in 2010. In Mozambique there was a 
very large increase in primary school completion in the years following 
the end of the civil war – from 14 % in 1999 to 46 % in 2007. In Rwanda 
(where peace returned in 1993) the prevalence of under-nutrition reduced 
from 56 % of the population in 1997 to 40 % in 2005. And in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina measles immunisation increased from 53 % of young children 
in 1995 (when its conflict ended) to 96 % in 2007 (World Bank 2011a, 6).
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2.3.2 The importance of good governance
Good governance is key for peaceful development and especially so for 
developing countries such as Nepal (see discussion in Box 8). Almost all 
questionnaire respondents agreed that good governance is needed to deliver 
peace and development (Figure 7). Many said that improved governance 
brought faith and ownership of the people in the government and creat-
Box 8: Governance for peace and development
Good governance – Governance is the exercise of political authority 
and the use of institutional resources to manage society‘s problems and 
affairs (World Bank 2006). It is also the processes for making decisions 
and implementing them (UNESCAP 2012). Good governance has the 
following five characteristics:
 • people’s participation and consensus orientation that give legitimacy 
and voice;
 • strategic direction to implement strategic visions;
 • responsiveness, effectiveness and efficiency for good performance;
 • accountability and transparency; and
 • equity and rule of law for fairness (IoG 2012).
Governance and conflict – Contemporary patterns of internal armed 
conflicts and societal breakdown indicate that the main drivers of col-
lective violence are exclusion and lack of access to resources and power 
(UNDP 2009, 3). Ineffective governance is thus one of the factors lead-
ing to violent conflict as it reduces the delivery of critical political goods 
like security, rule of law and social services. This was certainly the case 
with Nepal’s recent conflict.
Weak institutions – Conflict is more likely to occur where state institu-
tions are weak, resources are unequally distributed, there are unstable so-
cial relations, and where there is a history of violence and the exclusion 
of certain social groups (UNDP 2009). The likelihood of violent conflict 
is higher where there are significant political or economic horizontal in-
equalities, such as between ethnic and other identity groups. Although 
Vidyadhar Mallik




Figure 7: The importance of good governance for peace and development  
  (82 respondents) 
 




deprivation and unequal treatment may not generate an immediate revolt, 
these experiences can remain in people’s memories and influence the lat-
er course of events. Legitimate governance processes and institutions are 
central to any effort to address the structural causes of conflict and the 
triggers of violence.
Governance and development – Bad governance is often a development 
trap. Seventy-six per cent of the 58 smaller countries that are home to the 
‘bottom billion’ in terms of economic growth and poverty have “been 
through a prolonged period of bad governance and poor economic poli-
cies” (Collier 2007, 79). It is clear that good governance and economic 
policies help growth while bad governance and policies can destroy an 
economy at an alarming rate. Smaller land locked countries such as Ne-
pal are more prone to failures and misery if they do not improve govern-
ance and policies (Collier 2007, 64-65).
Local and community governance for peace and development in Nepal
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 41
ed hope for peace and stability. Improved governance leads to improved 
service delivery, equity and justice while poor governance results in fewer 
services and more corruption, inequity, exclusion and conflict. Many men-
tioned accountability, responsiveness, transparency, people’s participation, 
the empowerment of disadvantaged people, the rule of law and social in-
clusion as the features of good governance. Other views were that good 
governance creates social capital, which helps build social harmony while 




Table 3: The governance situation in Doti, Pyuthan and Mahottari 
Doti Pyuthan Mahottari 
1. The district suffers 
from less attention 
from the centre and 
more staff shortages 
in government 
offices than in 
Pyuthan. 
2. Caste discrimination 
is a prominent issue. 
3. A united Far West 
issue is a major issue 
here for the deline-
ation of the federal 
provinces. Most local 
people oppose the di-
vision of the current 
Far West Develop-
ment Region.  
4. Local people feel 
disconnected from 
Kathmandu because 
it is so far away. 
1. Local people are more 
politically sensitised 
and empowered than 
in the other two 
districts. 
2. The Janajati commu-
nities are progressing 
less than most 
Brahmins and 
Chhetris. Some Dalits 
are progressing as 
they have been 
targeted by LGCDP. 
Here poor Brahmins 
and Chhetris feel left 
behind. 
3. Unhappiness about 
federalism in certain 
political groups. 
4. Local people feel 
more connected to 
Kathmandu than Doti 
people. 
1. Local people feel 
most helpless and 
disconnected with 
poverty and vulner-
ability the most 
pronounced. 
2. There is widespread 
caste discrimination 
in Madhesi society. 
3. Madhesi people feel 
neglected by the 
state. 
4. There are significant 
differences in out-
look between people 
of hill origin and 
Madhesi people, but 
mixed communities 
do better. 
5. Poor governance 
with staff often ab-
sent, LGCDP and 
PAF not started in 
many areas or started 
late and the local 
peace committee 
feels it is victimised 
by central govern-
ment. 
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Alongside the common governance failings identified in Chapters 3, 4 and 
5 of this book, a number of issues were identified as of particular concern in 
the three study districts (Table 2.2). The study found caste discrimination to 
be a major concern in Doti and Mahottari while the Janajatis felt left behind 
in Pyuthan. Mahottari was the district where poverty and poor governance 
was most pronounced.
2.3.3 Relationship between the national peace process and 
local peacebuilding
One crucial issue for peacebuilding in Nepal is the relationship between the 
national peace process and local peacebuilding and conflict resolution. Two 
central level stakeholders said how it is important to move ahead on both 
fronts and to integrate national and community level peacebuilding.
John Paul Lederach of the Kroc Institute, who supports the national peace 
process and local peacebuilding in Nepal, said that peacebuilding in Nepal 
needs to happen both in a bottom-up way at the community level for mediat-
ing small-scale conflicts and in a top-down way for resolving larger conflicts 
like the Maoist conflict. At the same time community level peace processes 
need to be integrated into national peacebuilding through federated struc-
tures like the federations of forest and irrigation user groups. However, he 
pointed to the large gap between the local and national peace processes in 
Nepal. He also pointed to the importance of balancing the maintenance of 
social harmony, which can entail denying justice for the sake of harmony, 
and social justice by building the mediation and peacebuilding capacities 
of communities. Here it is essential that communities feel ownership over 
mediation processes with the ability to join together to resolve larger ‘con-
flict’ issues.
George Varughese, Country Director of the Asia Foundation in Nepal, be-
lieves in the relationship between social capital and peace. According to him, 
during conflict, the social fabric breaks down and social capital is depleted. In 
this way the traditional power structure, in which the local elites commanded 
respect and were thus able to mediate conflicts, was seriously challenged 
during the Maoist insurgency. In the current context social capital formation 
is essential for building peace at the local level and beyond in Nepal. This 
can happen by community-based organisations facilitating dialogue between 
opposing communities. He pointed out how mediation carried out by associ-
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ations of community organisations, such as the Federation of Forestry User 
Groups of Nepal (FECOFUN), is successfully resolving many conflicts.
2.3.4 Conclusions
In conclusion it seems that good governance, peace and development are 
closely inter-related and all of them foster one another. Peace is needed 
for development, development is needed for peace and good governance is 
needed for both while peace and development will foster good governance. 
The connections are clear, but as related in the earlier part of this chapter 
only limited progress is being made in Nepal on these three fronts. The fol-
lowing two chapters relate the promise that decentralised local governance 
and community-driven development hold for Nepal’s progress.
3 Decentralisation and governance
This book asserts that the decentralisation of government and federalism 
are complementary for delivering peace and development if authority is 
decentralised to the lowest appropriate level of government. This chapter 
covers decentralisation as an instrument of good governance. It argues that 
decentralisation that empowers communities and embraces federalism will 
facilitate sustained growth and human development in Nepal.
The first part describes experiences with decentralisation and federal gov-
ernment in other parts of the world to inform the steps that Nepal needs to 
take and challenges it will face in restructuring the state. The second half 
describes the current situation of local self-governance in Nepal and gives 
the study findings on the strengths and weaknesses of this type of govern-
ance and discusses how local and federal governments can complement one 
another under the future new constitution.
3.1 Decentralisation, local government and federalism
3.1.1 Decentralisation
Decentralised governance is the organisation of authority into a system 
of co-responsibility at central, regional and local levels according to the 
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principle of subsidiarity. This type of government increases the authority 
and capacity of sub-national levels of government as it increases people‘s 
participation in decision making; develops local people‘s capacities; and 
enhances responsiveness, transparency and accountability of all levels of 
government (UNDP 1999). Decentralisation can be seen as a fulcrum that 
provides a stable arrangement where the centripetal forces that tend towards 
centralisation and the centrifugal forces that tend towards the periphery in-
teract and maintain a win-win position for forces of unity and for local au-
tonomy and diversity (Kauzya 2004). The interplay between the centripetal 
and centrifugal forces can lead to a mid-point equilibrium of decentralised 
governance with the shared exercise of power.
The three aspects of decentralisation
The decentralisation of governance entails political, administrative and fis-
cal decentralisation.
 • Political decentralisation is where citizens or their elected representa-
tives are given more power over public decision-making (World Bank 
2001a). Advocates of this type of decentralisation assume that decisions 
made with greater people’s participation are better informed and more 
relevant to diverse local interests than those made only by national polit-
ical authorities. This implies that elected local representatives are likely 
to be better acquainted with the needs and desires of their constituents 
and to be more accessible to their constituents.
 • Administrative decentralisation involves redistributing authority, re-
sponsibility and financial resources for providing public services (World 
Bank 2001a). It is the transfer of responsibility for planning, financing 
and managing public functions from central government agencies to the 
field units of government agencies, subordinate levels of government, 
semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations, or area-wide, re-
gional or functional authorities. The three major forms of administrative 
decentralisation are deconcentration, delegation, and devolution. It is 
usually ‘devolution’ that underlies most political decentralisation (World 
Bank 2001a). Devolution transfers responsibilities for services to local 
governments that elect their own representatives, raise their own reve-
nues, and have the independent authority to make investment decisions. 
In a devolved system, local governments have legally recognised areas 
over which they exercise authority and perform public functions.
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 • Fiscal decentralisation involves shifting some responsibilities for ex-
penditure and revenues to lower levels of government. The various types 
of fiscal decentralisation include self-financing or cost recovery through 
user charges and other user contributions; the expansion of local reve-
nues through property or sales taxes or indirect charges; inter-govern-
mental transfers of central government tax revenues to local govern-
ments; and loans. A case study shows how, in spite of fiscal decentralisa-
tion, in Uganda local governments still depend on central funding which 
undermines their autonomy (Box 9). The situation is similar in Nepal.
Box 9: Fiscal decentralisation in Uganda
In Uganda local governments can raise their own revenues and access 
three types of grants:
 • conditional grants for spending on development works such as health, 
education, agriculture, water, and rural roads;
 • unconditional grants for paying wages, salaries, and pensions for lo-
cal civil servants and political leaders; and
 • equalisation grants that go to the poorest districts to reduce the hori-
zontal fiscal imbalance, and regional disparities.
However, many local governments’ in Uganda remain highly dependent 
on central government transfers. In the long run this will limit their au-
tonomy and flexibility to respond to local needs through more targeted 
and efficient service delivery. This is shown by the fact that most local 
governments’ expenditure allocations in Uganda reflect central govern-
ment priorities and not necessarily the priorities of specific districts.
Source: Boko / Baliamoune-Lutz (2009)
Decentralisation and peace and conflict
Decentralisation can defuse conflicts since local and regional governments 
will tend to:
 • improve public services;
 • are better acquainted with the local causes of conflict;
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 • facilitate participation and co-determination by minorities; and
 • enable the reconstruction of failed states from the bottom up (GTZ 
2006).
Decentralisation is often advantageous in states made up of different ethnic 
groups as a means of distributing political power (Monteux 2006, 162-182). 
If properly implemented it will limit central authority as elected local repre-
sentatives demand that the centre promotes local development and does not 
overstep or abuse its powers. Decentralisation will often enhance the partic-
ipation of minority groups in the political process and protect them from the 
dictatorship of the majority. It should also allow groups to deal with local 
issues at the local level.
However, while decentralisation may reduce ethnic conflict and secession-
ism by bringing the government closer to the people and increasing local 
participation, it can increase ethnic conflict and secessionism by encourag-
ing the growth of regional parties (Brancati 2006). Regional parties usually 
reinforce ethnic and regional identities, legislate in favour of certain groups 
and can mobilise groups for ethnic conflict and secessionism (Brancati 
2006).
Decentralisation has highly differentiated effects on ethnic conflict (Siegle / 
O’Mahony 2006). Initiatives that support increased levels of local govern-
ment expenditure and employment have been less likely to succumb to eth-
nic conflict. Conversely, countries with higher levels of local government 
taxes have been more susceptible to ethnic conflict. Countries and places 
that have previously experienced ethnic conflicts, have weak central govern-
ment control over the security sector, and where certain ethnic groups have 
dominant control over valuable natural resource revenues are particularly 
vulnerable to ethnic conflicts.
If implemented properly and fairly decentralisation will strengthen both 
central and local governments by bringing about more engaged governance 
to address the wellbeing of all citizens. This is why decentralisation usually 
helps to sustain peace where it already exists. Decentralisation does not, 
however, work within the framework of power sharing to resolve disputes 
over who should have the most powerful position in a hierarchy of power. It 
does work well within the framework of the shared exercise of power to es-
tablish arrangements and practices to facilitate shared power for the benefit 
of all (Kauzya 2004, 16).
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“Decentralization succeeds best in situations where there is a strong cen-
tral Government (strong in terms of legitimacy and capacity) as well as an 
empowered population at local community level. Otherwise it contains no 
intrinsic value for being a natural promoter of peaceful development and 
democracy. The whole issue is also contingent on the environment and situa-
tion in question. Sometimes decentralization will mitigate conflict by allow-
ing sufficient shared exercise of power among competing groups. At other 
times, centralization may mitigate violence by strengthening central gov-
ernment and enabling it to sustain a stable strong State.” (Kauzya 2004, 4)
Peacemakers will usually support territorial decentralisation (including fed-
eral restructuring or the creation of federal sub-units) because it recognises 
political and spatial realities on the ground. Decentralisation usually main-
tains existing external borders, and thus does not challenge the territorial in-
tegrity of the state while satisfying local demands for autonomy by granting 
each group a state-within-a-state (Lake / Rothchild 2005).
Decentralisation and good governance
Decentralisation will often increase accountability in governance by short-
ening the distance between policy makers, citizens and public service pro-
viders (Campos and Hellman 2005). It should also bring politicians closer 
to the people by giving them better information about constituents’ prefer-
ences and making it easier for constituents to monitor politicians’ perfor-
mance. And citizens can more easily learn about activities and programmes 
that their local leaders promote and support, discern how much effort they 
devote to improving public services, and see how far they deliver on their 
campaign promises.
On the other hand, decentralisation bears some risks for good governance 
including state capture at the local level, clientelism (the exchange of goods 
and services for political support), capacity constraints, inter-governmental 
tensions and the stifling of competition.
The performance of local governments usually determines their popular-
ity. While Spain’s regional governments have performed well and gained 
widespread support the opposite case has been true in Kyrgyzstan where 
poorly performing local governments have attracted little support (Box 10). 
As reported there are mixed opinions and hence mixed levels of support for 
local government in Nepal.
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Box 10:  The performance of local governments in Spain and 
 Kazakhstan
Spain – In Spain, citizens’ support for decentralisation is a product of 
both sub-national identities and the knowledge that regional govern-
ments govern better than the central government. The decentralisation 
of many governance functions to the regional level happened from the 
1980s as a product of the assertion of sub-national ethnic identities and 
as an evolutionary process. Although a strong sense of sub-national iden-
tity is a good predictor of regionally oriented support, even in regions 
without a different or strong sub-national identity, support for regional 
self-government is greater where it does a good job and where regional 
policies work better than national ones (Cesena / Casarramona 2011).
Kyrgyzstan – Between 1996 and 2001 the decentralisation process in 
Kyrgyzstan created promising new local self-government structures and 
channels for the participation of local people to wield direct influence 
on matters of local concern (Grävingholt et al. 2006, 1-14). However, 
the achievements have been limited by the inadequate capacity of most 
local governments, the lack of clear functional assignments to each level, 
the disproportionate power of local state administrations and insufficient 
financial resources. Lack of decision making power and competencies at 
the lowest level of local government has led to many local people see-
ing these institutions as irrelevant while officials do not always welcome 
people’s participation in decision making and tend to keep the process 
opaque. The resulting lack of participation has produced a vicious circle 
of weak local government and lack of people’s participation. Participa-
tion in decision making only makes sense if decisions can be influenced!
In developing countries support for decentralisation can decrease due to 
problems caused by the seven traps in Box 11. Most of these traps apply to 
some extent to the situation in Nepal. Alongside and in addition to these sev-
en traps are the risks of elite capture, more disparities in interregional trans-
fers, the weakening of accountability mechanisms, fragmented economies 
of scale and failures to address disparities between lagging and advanced 
localities (Kaiser 2006).
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Box 11: The seven traps of decentralisation, after Fuhr (2011)
 • The policy trap where governments promise the creation of new ter-
ritorial units providing internal autonomy, but get trapped in endless 
political battles with and among local interest groups.
 • The coordination trap of multi-level rivalry between local govern-
ments and regional or local offices of sectoral ministries.
 • The fiscal trap due to free-riding by some local governments and the 
inappropriate or unclear assigning of national tax revenues and ex-
penditure responsibilities between national and sub-national govern-
ments.
 • The debt trap where uncontrolled borrowing by local and provincial 
governments contribute to economic overheating and puts overall 
macroeconomic stability at risk.
 • The capturing trap where some local governments manage to capture 
significantly more resources than others by exerting pressure on the 
national government for a larger revenue base. This can also happen 
where provinces capture resources that according to the principle of 
subsidiarity should accrue to municipalities.
 • The inequality trap with wealthier local governments benefitting 
 disproportionately because of their greater taxation and spending 
powers.
 • The capacity trap of limited progress on upgrading the performance 
of local governments.
A further risk is that decentralisation can act against national unity as con-
flict or the threat of conflict can lead to fragmentation unless the central 
government can suppress rebellions (Bird et al. 2010, 27-29). Secessionism 
may arise for economic reasons due to regions feeling that they are pay-
ing too much or getting too little, or for cultural or opportunistic political 
reasons. Asymmetric decentralisation may provide a solution to such situ-
ations, but in many conflict affected countries, this has been a staging post 
on the road to separation, as happened in Southern Sudan (Bird et al. 2010, 
27-29).
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Decentralisation can increase disparities, jeopardise stability and under-
mine efficiency (Prud’homme 1995). As in the following two cases, a good 
degree of authority needs to remain with central government to counteract 
such problems.
 • Attempts by local governments to redress income disparities are often 
unfair as the poor in well-off regions often fare better than those in more 
deprived regions. Thus, income needs to be redistributed among juris-
dictions as well as among individuals, which is possible only if central 
government has the authority to do this.
 • Fiscal policies for macroeconomic stability should be handled by central 
governments as local authorities have few or no incentives to under-
take economic stabilisation policies. But if the national government uses 
fiscal policies to affect overall demand, its share of national taxes and 
expenditures must be significantly large, something that is challenged 
by fiscal decentralisation. Decentralisation can cause fiscal perversity 
because of large fiscal transfers from the central government or large-
scale borrowing. Borrowing by provincial governments can cause un-
sustainable deficits which can undermine national efforts to attain price 
stability and sustainable economic development.
3.1.2 Local government for local development
Local governments are usually made up of locally elected officials who are 
responsible for providing local services, and promoting local development 
under mechanisms that hold them accountable for their actions. The follow-
ing write-up also explains the constraints that many local governments have 
to work under.
Local government is often seen as a way of more effectively facilitating 
local development and service delivery (Helling et al. 2005, 33-35). This 
happens when local governments are given responsibilities for delivering 
basic services and when civil society institutions are involved to comple-
ment and influence the actions of local governments. Here local govern-
ments should act not only as decision-makers and service providers but also 
as coordinators and facilitators among public agencies and private actors. 
Core responsibilities are to lead strategic planning and build partnerships 
among public sector, civil society organisation, community organisations 
and the private sector for more effective governance, service delivery and 
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economic development. This can also help resolve the demand overload that 
local governments often suffer from.
Local governments are usually mandated to govern in a way that empowers 
local people. They can empower local people in a number of ways (Helling 
et al. 2005):
 • Through civic education programmes to help people understand how 
local government operates and what public services they may expect or 
demand from local government.
 • By enhancing the capacities of representative institutions such as munic-
ipal councils or assemblies to contribute to local planning and decision 
making.
 • By holding community-level consultations and other efforts to promote 
stronger communication between citizens and representative bodies.
 • By including marginalised segments of the population in consultations 
and deliberations.
The introduction of local governments with substantial powers facilitated 
widespread meaningful people’s participation in local decision making in 
Bolivia (Box 12).
Box 12:  Local government in Bolivia facilitated people’s participa-
tion in governance
In 1994 Bolivia created hundreds of new local governments. These have 
proved more sensitive to local conditions and more accessible to lobby-
ing and grassroots pressure than the central administration that previ-
ously had simply abandoned large expanses of the country. The superior 
responsiveness of local government has been a feature of the new local 
governance structure in which power and influence are nurtured and ul-
timately channelled by voting and information. This decentralisation has 
engaged thousands of neighbourhood councils, peasant communities, 
interest groups and business associations in local policy making. Such 
groups previously had no voice in how their communities were run. The 
locating of resources and political power in local government has offered 
rich and poor the means to improve their lives and a concrete incentive 
to participate.
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Decentralisation changed both the form and substance of government. 
The relatively few central officials stationed beyond national and region-
al capitals before 1994 had almost no incentive to concern themselves 
with local demands. Career success was determined by ministerial fiat 
unrelated to local outcomes in distant districts. Business interests and the 
rich hoped to gain some favours from the centre, but throughout most of 
the country ordinary citizens’ concerns were effectively shut out. Decen-
tralisation changed this by creating local authorities beholden to local 
voters.
Source: Faguet (2003)
Effective local government needs strong in-built accountability mecha-
nisms. The overarching accountability mechanism is the power of local peo-
ple to vote out representatives or their parties at the next election (Helling 
et al. 2005).
Participatory planning and budgeting is an important complement to formal 
accountability systems. Many such participatory initiatives go beyond pri-
ority setting and resource allocation to join representatives of communities 
and service beneficiaries with local officials in monitoring resource use and 
the quality of services. Participatory planning and budgeting are thus em-
ployed to strengthen accountability in ways that promote mutual learning 
by citizens and public officials on improving service delivery (Helling et al. 
2005). Such empowerment strategies had large knock-on effects in strength-
ening the voices of communities in Brazil’s cities (Box 13).
However, local governments be seriously constrained by the lack of com-
mitment of central government or the main political parties. The experienc-
es of Bangladesh and Uganda show how the domination of local governance 
by central government undermined the effectiveness of local government 
there (Box 14). This tendency is also a concern for decentralised governance 
in Nepal.
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Box 13: Local empowerment leads to local development in Brazil
In Brazil, measures introduced in the 1980s to empower municipal local 
governments enabled the city of Porto Alegre to experiment with partic-
ipatory budget planning. This empowered citizens’ associations in the 
city’s 16 regions to propose local projects (Binswanger / Aiyar 2003, 23). 
The projects were publicly debated and short-listed, with final allocations 
decided by a weighting system combining citizens’ preferences with ob-
jective criteria.
Many benefits resulted. Between 1989 and 1996 access to safe drinking 
water increased from 80 % to 98 % of households and the number of chil-
dren enrolled in school doubled. Local government revenues increased 
by 50 % because of the willingness of citizens to pay for improved ser-
vices. And equal weight was given to all regions of the city, with the 
poorest one with only 5,000 people being given the same voting powers 
as the wealthiest one with 300,000 people.
Brazil’s decentralisation laws did not mandate such participatory budg-
eting. But once Porto Alegre’s innovation became known, public pres-
sure led to other municipalities adopting the same approach and by June 
2000 nearly 100 municipalities were using participatory budgeting. This 
shows how empowerment can spur participatory innovations, and how 
competition between local governments can help scale-up improved gov-
ernance and voice.
Source: Binswanger / Aiyar (2003)
Box 14: Constrained local government in Bangladesh and Uganda
Bangladesh – The limited fiscal and administrative powers of local gov-
ernments in Bangladesh have seriously constrained their effectiveness 
(World Bank 2011c):
 • Some of the functions assigned to local governments overlap with the 
functions of more powerful and better-resourced central government 
agencies.
 • The fiscal base is weak as transfers are neither predictable nor trans-
parent and local governments are not capitalizing on their tax raising 
potential.
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 • Local governments have too few skilled personnel and limited ave-
nues to reach out to citizens and forge partnerships with the private 
sector.
 • Local governments have weak accountability systems and lack in-
stitutionalised mechanisms for participation in planning and public 
expenditure prioritisation.
This situation was set against the historically highly centralised arrange-
ments for public service delivery and the opposition of many members 
of parliament to the devolution of authority as it threatens their role in 
local development. Citizens have assigned the tasks of service delivery 
and local development to the central government and its agents, thus em-
boldening the centre to extend ever more control on local governments 
leading to their further incapacitation.
Uganda – Budgeting decisions and prioritisation by the central govern-
ment in Uganda undermines the effectiveness of local governments in 
Uganda. For example, the central government has kept control over con-
ditional grants to the education sector at the local level, which has result-
ed in local preferences often being ignored. At the same time corruption, 
lack of incentives, conflicting relationships between local politicians and 
their technical staff, and lack of capacity hinder local service delivery 
(Boko / Baliamoune-Lutz 2009).
3.1.3 Federal systems of government
The shape of federalism in Nepal has yet to be decided. This section dis-
cusses the differences between federalism and decentralisation, looks at the 
different kinds of federalism and discusses some of the challenges faced by 
federal systems.
Federalism is a system of government where sovereignty is divided between 
a central authority and constituent political units such as states or provinc-
es. Federalism defines the relationship between the central national gov-
ernment and its constituent units at the regional, state and local levels. It is 
the presence of separate polities within a comprehensive structure of gov-
ernment (shared rule); and a guaranteed distribution of power between the 
comprehensive government and the constituent polities (self-rule) ( Lijphart 
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1984, 169). In federalism no level of government can subordinate the other. 
Federalism recognises a multi-centred and non-centralised structure of gov-
ernment where each centre has a guaranteed portion of power which cannot 
be removed by the others (Baldi 1999, 4). A federal system is thus different 
to decentralised government where the periphery can be subordinated to the 
centre.
Federalism can help achieve the dual desires of building an efficient and 
dynamic state and the search for distinctive identities through shared rule 
and self-rule (Watts 2002). It is a means of constitutional organisation that 
permits action by a shared government for certain common purposes, to-
gether with autonomous action by constituent units for maintaining their 
distinctiveness, with each level directly responsible to its own electorate. 
A case in point is how Switzerland’s 2000 constitution extended the central 
powers of the federal government and compensated the cantons (provinces) 
for their loss of powers by giving them more rights to participate in central 
decision-making. The new constitution diminished self-rule and expanded 
shared rule (Fleiner 2009, 89).
Stability or instability in a society is often a function of the extent of social 
polarisation and how this is managed (Muhammad 2007, 207-208). Federal 
systems can help manage this major source of political instability. For ex-
ample, while Nigeria’s federal structure may not have succeeded in solving 
all the country’s political ills, it has kept the country together.
The various types of federalism, including asymmetric federalism, coop-
erative federalism and ethnic federalism all have their strengths and weak-
nesses.
Asymmetric federalism is where different states in a federation possess 
different powers with, for example, some states having more autonomy than 
others. This system is frequently proposed as a solution to dissatisfactions 
that arise when one or two constituent units feel significantly different needs 
from others because of ethnic, linguistic or cultural differences (Galtung / 
Scott 2008, 99). The experiences of asymmetric federalism in Spain and 
Canada show that it can bring stability where deep diversity exists but can 
also lead to instability and secession (Funk 2010). Canada and Spain have 
been witness to a great deal of tension between symmetry and asymmetry 
and competing visions of equality. Nevertheless, both polities are relative-
ly stable considering the diversity they contain. Asymmetrical federalism 
can be a stabilizing mechanism and is an appropriate tool to accommodate 
Vidyadhar Mallik
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)56
diversity (Funk 2010, 63-65). The advantages and disadvantages of India’s 
asymmetric system of federalism are discussed in Box 15.
Box 15:  The advantages and disadvantages of asymmetric federal-
ism in India
India has an asymmetric system of federalism with unequal political, 
administrative and fiscal powers and relationships between its 28 states 
(Rao / Singh 2004, 3). It is recognised that such a system is necessary 
for these units to come together and hold together. The rule-based and 
transparent asymmetry and the special treatment accorded to some states 
by the Indian constitution and in the evolving inter-governmental transfer 
system have contributed to the health of the federation. These transpar-
ent asymmetric arrangements are justified on the grounds of the overall 
gains to the federation.
However, discriminatory policies followed for short term political gains 
can be inimical to the long term interests and stability of federalism. In 
India the discretionary treatment of states arising from the frequently 
changing dynamics of political power and the vagaries of coalition and 
regional party politics, weakens the institutions of inter-governmental fi-
nance and are harmful to the long term stability of the federation.
Source: Rao / Singh (2004)
Cooperative federalism is where state governments, local governments, 
and the federal government share governance responsibilities. They work 
out the details concerning which level of government takes responsibility 
for particular areas and for creating policy in that area. This concept views 
national and state governments as partners in the exercise of governmental 
authority (USLegal 2012). This characteristic has strengthened the Indi-
an federation while some commentators assert that it has undermined the 
strength of the German federation.
 • It has been asserted that India’s federal system is a system of ‘coop-
erative federalism’ with formal and informal rules to maintain the 
political system and peaceful change (Kelkar 2010). The 73rd and 
74th constitutional amendments (1992), which created a third tier of 
government (the Panchayati Raj), are an example of the flexibility for 
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peaceful change that the Indian federal constitution can accommodate 
(ISPWD-K 2012).
 • Some commentators believe that German federalism has been an exer-
cise in ‘half-hearted’ decentralisation and a well-led central state would 
have been a better option (Hillgruber 2005). Around the year 2000, Ger-
many was suffering a structural crisis exacerbated by economic stagna-
tion and weak state finances. It was believed that this situation was due 
not only to a failure of political leadership but also to a federal system 
that was in need of fundamental structural reform (Hillgruber 2005). 
Advocates of reform pointed to the need to disentangle powers and 
clearly attribute responsibilities between the different levels of govern-
ment. Critics maintained that under the German system of cooperative 
federalism, one level can always interfere with the other level result-
ing in immobility and stagnation, irresponsibility and chaos (quoted in 
Hillgruber 2005). This point of view has, however, had less currency in 
recent years.
Ethnic federalism – The experiences of Ethiopia are instructive as this 
country’s communist government introduced a system of ethnic federalism. 
In Nepal the leading party in the Constituent Assembly was communist 
(UCPN(M)) and a system of ethnic federalism is still on their agenda in 
January 2013.
In 1994 the ruling Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front 
(EPRDF) radically reformed the country’s political system (ICG 2009a). 
It transformed the centralised state into a federal democratic republic and 
redefined citizenship, politics and identity on ethnic grounds. The govern-
ment created nine ethnic-based regional states and two federally adminis-
tered city-states. However, there was discontent with the ethnically defined 
states and fears of continued interethnic conflict as the ruling party was 
unable to accept that the opposition could take power via the ballot box and 
regarded the expression of differing views and interests as a form of betray-
al. It staged serious crackdowns on the opposition before the 2005 elections.
Political parties proliferated in Ethiopia as a result of the polarisation of na-
tional politics that sharpened tensions between and within parties and ethnic 
groups from the mid-1990s. This ethnic federalism increased competition 
between groups that vie over land and natural resources, as well as adminis-
trative boundaries and government budgets. This system of governance has 
failed to accommodate the genuine grievances of some ethnic groups while 
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promoting ethnic self-awareness among all groups (ICG 2009a). The key 
point here is that ethnic federalism in Ethiopia has not promoted grassroots 
democracy, decentralisation or political competition. Autocratic rule has sti-
fled genuine democracy.
3.2 Decentralisation and local governance in Nepal
3.2.1 The situation
As of January 2013, Nepal is a unitary state with two tiers of local gov-
ernment as per the Local Self-governance Act, 1999 (MoLJPA 1999). Ne-
pal has 75 districts with district development committees (DDCs) serving 
as the country’s middle tier of government. The districts are divided into 
village development committees (VDCs) and municipalities, which are the 
lowest level administrative and governing units. VDCs and municipalities 
are divided into wards as the lowest unit of service delivery. Furthermore, 
local people at the community level organise themselves into community 
organisations, user groups and other types of community based organisa-
tions (CBOs).
The Government of Nepal’s ministries and departments have regional, zonal 
and district offices across the country. The sectoral line agencies and func-
tionaries of the central government operate at the local level through service 
centres and district offices (line agency offices).
The Local Self-governance Act, 1999 provides for the devolution of powers, 
responsibilities and resources to local governments including the responsi-
bilities and functions of sectoral line agencies. The act makes local govern-
ments responsible for carrying out participatory planning and monitoring 
and gives them the right to collect and mobilise financial resources. The 
legislation also calls for private sector participation in local self-govern-
ance and for mainstreaming socially and economically excluded groups in 
the development process. The current responsibilities of local governments 
exclude the functions of the judiciary, the civil administration and sectoral 
line agencies.
The 1990 constitution (Article 25[4]) mentioned decentralisation saying 
that “the State shall maintain conditions suitable to the enjoyments of fruits 
of democracy through wider participation of the people in the governance 
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of country and by way of decentralisation” (MoLJPA 1990). It did not, how-
ever, specify the structure and roles of local government bodies. This made 
Nepal’s local government system vulnerable to the executive’s arbitrary 
behaviour and shifts in the parliamentary equation (ADDCN 2001). Many 
other factors including overlapping roles, planning weaknesses, the armed 
conflict and the limited involvement of civil society hampered progress on 
decentralisation. The Interim Constitution, 2007 does not mention ‘decen-
tralisation’ in its directive policies (Article 35[13]), but does provide for 
self-governance and people’s participation in governance.
Nepal’s local governments are independent local bodies with devolved pow-
er, responsibilities and authority. They are guided by the Ministry of Federal 
Affairs and Local Development (which until May 2012 was the Ministry 
of Local Development [MoLD]2). Local governments are supposed to have 
2 On 18 May 2012 the Ministry of Local Development was restructured into the Ministry 
of Federal Affairs and Local Development with added responsibilities for federal affairs.
 
 
Table 4: Local government in Nepal: main events 1990–2012 
Date Event 
1992 
First local government elections under the 1990 
constitution 
1997 Second local government elections 
1999 
Passing into law of Local Self-governance Act and its 
rules 
July 2002 
Dissolution of elected local governments after the fail-
ure to hold new elections amidst the deepening conflict. 
July 2002 to January 
2013 and beyond 
Local governments running under LDOs, and VDCs 
and municipalities running under their secretaries with 
informal involvement of local politicians in decision 
making. 
February 2006 
Municipality elections held under the king’s govern-
ment. They were boycotted by the major political par-
ties and the results were not recognised. 
July 2009 to 
December 2011 
All-party mechanisms appointed as advisory bodies for 
district, VDC and municipal local governments. 
Dissolved in December 2011 after CIAA alleged wide-
spread corruption. 
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elected councils and executive bodies, although no elections have been held 
since 1997 and there have been no elected local governments since July 
2002 following the end of the 1997 governments. Until this time the ulti-
mate authority for local government decision making were the VDC, mu-
nicipal and district councils attended by all local representatives including 
ward representatives.
Since then Nepal’s DDCs, VDCs and municipalities have been led by cen-
trally appointed bureaucrats (local development officers for DDCs, secretar-
ies for VDCs and executive officers for municipalities) with the informal in-
volvement of local politicians. This involvement was formalised in the 2009 
to 2011 period through advisory all-party mechanisms. The mechanisms 
were however disbanded in December 2011 accused of widespread corrup-
tion. Table 4 summarises the developments in local government since 1992.
3.2.2 Local governance support programmes
Since the mid-1990s there has been a series of large-scale decentralisation 
support and local governance strengthening programmes in Nepal (see Ta-
ble 5). UNDP, the government of Norway, the United Nations Capital De-
velopment Fund (UNCDF) and DFID have supported the Ministry of Local 
Development and the National Planning Commission to roll out the Partic-
ipatory District Development Programme (PDDP), the Local Governance 
Programme (LGP) and the Decentralised Local Governance Support Pro-
gramme (DLGSP). A number of smaller support programmes have been run 
by GIZ, the Swiss Development Cooperation, DANIDA and other bilateral 
development partners and INGOs.
PDDP was initiated by the National Planning Commission in 1995 in 30 
districts while LGP was implemented from 1996 by the Ministry of Local 
Development in a further 30 districts. The major objective was to improve 
the management of local development through participatory planning and 
management, to improve the socio-economic conditions of rural people and 
to support decentralised development efforts by building the capacity of 
central level institutions and local governments (MoLD 2002). These pro-
grammes mobilised communities to plan and implement local development 
projects.
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These two programmes made considerable achievements including the in-
stitutionalisation of bottom-up participatory planning and monitoring, the 
formation of community organisations, the creation of local trust funds 
(LTF) and providing seed money for local development initiatives. Howev-
er, many challenges remained to make local government effective (Box 16). 
Many of these challenges remain and were mentioned by study respondents. 
The donors thus decided to provide further support, but the escalation of the 
conflict and the resulting failure to hold local elections meant that only a 
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Box 16: The challenges faced by PDDP and LGP
 • The low sustainability of community organisations.
 • The lack of political commitment to decentralisation reform as gov-
ernment agencies resisted reform as it threatened their power.
 • The government’s system for allocating grants to local governments 
lacked transparency and failed to follow clear criteria.
 • Local governments not making sufficient use of their taxation powers.
 • The government-supplied DDC and VDC secretaries undermining 
local government autonomy.
 • Inadequate coordination between local governments and line agen-
cies and continuing government control over most sectoral matters.
 • Poor transparency and accountability of local governments.
 • Insufficient involvement of women and disadvantaged people in de-
cision making.
 • Unclear assignments of tasks and lack of resources for poverty reduc-
tion as most poverty reduction programmes were directly implement-
ed by line agencies.
Source: ADDCN (2001)
The Decentralised Local Governance Support Programme (DLGSP) was a 
large-scale continuation of PDDP and LGP to support local governance, so-
cial mobilisation, empowerment, and strengthened livelihoods across rural 
Nepal. The programme’s Village Development Programme built social cap-
ital at the grassroots level across large parts of rural Nepal. It formed 10,405 
new community organisations and built their awareness, skills, confidence 
and savings to give these organisations the means to act for their own devel-
opment. The programme was implemented in 22 % of Nepal’s VDCs with 
10 % of all Nepali households being members of a community organisation 
under the programme (UNDP 2010, 1-7).
The programme also:
 • helped communities forge links with local government and civil society
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 • helped reduce domestic violence and increased gender equity as local 
people came together to mediate disputes, resolve problems and oppose 
anti-social behaviour; and
 • promoted the saving habit and improved access to credit, community 
infrastructure and local livelihoods.
DLGSP’s support to DDCs was however limited by the absence of elected 
local government and the depredations of the armed conflict although the 
continuity of support it provided was crucial to keep up the momentum for 
local governance and provide the basis for the resurgence of this work after 
the conflict.
The Local Governance and Community Development Programme (LG-
CDP) is the current national support programme (MoLD 2008). It aims to 
contribute to poverty reduction through inclusive, responsive and account-
able local governance and participatory community-led development that 
ensures the increased involvement of women, Dalits, Janajatis, Muslims, 
Madhesis, and disadvantaged groups in the local governance process. A de-
tailed analysis of LGCDP is given in Chapter 5.
3.3 Views on decentralisation and federalism in Nepal
3.3.1 The role and potential of local government in Nepal
Most 70 non-local government questionnaire respondents agreed that local 
governments are closer to the people, better at delivering services and im-
plement less costly and more sustainable development projects (Figure 8). 
(See Annex 1 for list of all respondents by type.)
Most respondents also agreed that local government is crucial for promot-
ing peace and harmony, inclusive development, and for involving disadvan-
taged communities in governance (Figure 9). A number of them said that 
local governments have a strong role to play in peacebuilding because they 
are close to the people and know their concerns, values and surroundings. 
They said that local governments tend to be more aware of local issues, are 
better at handling them and can better harness local potential. They are thus 
well placed for designing and implementing peacebuilding initiatives.
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Figure 8: Views on local government of non-local government respondents  
  (70 respondents) 
 









Figure 9: Views on local government for inclusive development and peace  
  (all 82 respondents) 
 
Source: Study respondents, 2012 
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It was also said that local governments can bring peace and stability by 
acting as a link between citizens and the state’s formal institutions and by 
liaising between different interests and mediating in disputes. The greater 
proximity of local governments to the people helps creates an environment 
to discuss and solve common problems, ultimately helping in peacebuilding 
and stability.
3.3.2 Hindrances to effective local government in Nepal
Many other responses highlighted the shortcomings of local governments 
and the many hindrances they face. The respondents pointed to the absence 
of elected local governments as the main overarching handicap. The follow-
ing assertions summarise many study respondents’ views on the hindrances 
to effective local government:
 • Local governments are not governments of the people but governments 
of politicians. These politicians create conflict and violate the peoples’ 
rights by their focus on winning power and making money for them-
selves and their parties. This has brought conflict and instability and 
undermines democracy.
 • The institutional capacity of many local governments is weak. They fail 
to mobilise local resources and suffer from poor management, unskilled 
staff, and inadequate monitoring and downward accountability. They 
also suffer from the frequent loss of qualified human resources, a bu-
reaucratic culture and the lack of inclusive decision making.
 • The central government provides inadequate resources to local govern-
ments and is indifferent to local issues. On the other hand there is un-
necessary interference by the centre through restrictive guidelines and 
instructions.
The views of three ex-high level bureaucrats encapsulate the views of study 
respondents on the many hindrances and shortcomings.
 • Khem Raj Nepal, retired secretary at the Ministry of Local Develop-
ment, believes that miracles happened when elected local bodies were 
functioning between 1998 and 2002. They worked hard for resource mo-
bilisation, fiscal sustainability and development results. However, the 
central government and the Ministry of Local Development interfered 
by issuing dozens of directives aimed more at control than facilitation. 
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He also pointed out that the Local Self-governance Act needs amending 
in 22 places to match the letter and spirit of the Interim Constitution. For 
example the structure of local governments need to be made inclusive by 
reserving places for women and disadvantaged groups before elections 
take place. He also said that the all-party mechanisms were only meant 
to be advisory bodies but went beyond their remit as they acted like 
elected officials. These mechanisms were not mentioned in the Interim 
Constitution and lacked terms of reference.
 • Jagadish Pokhrel, former vice-chairperson of the National Planning 
Commission, said that Nepal is paying a huge cost for the erosion of 
local government. Local governments worked well up to 2002 and were 
vibrant and well-connected to local and community levels. But the Mao-
ist war jeopardised them as local institutions. The lack of local govern-
ment elections has resulted in a lack of downward accountability and 
only residual structures of local government remain. The present local 
government structures function as arms of the ministries of local de-
velopment and finance and the National Planning Commission provide 
funds for fake projects because of pressure from local elites. The peo-
ple’s sense of ownership and connectedness has been lost and it will be 
difficult to regain the trust that was evident up to 2002. He opined that 
fresh local government elections are essential.
 • Bimal Koirala, former chief secretary of the government (2002–2005), 
said that lack of adequate funding has prevented DDCs, VDCs and 
municipalities from carrying out many of their functions. And their 
empowerment has been undermined by the lack of central support for 
the decentralisation project. The job of decentralisation has been given 
solely to the Ministry of Local Development (now MOFALD) as if the 
job of other ministries and agencies at the centre is only to ‘centralise’. 
Even the government’s business transaction regulations do not speak 
about decentralisation and the National Planning Commission does not 
have a separate division for decentralisation. All ministries understand 
decentralisation in their own way and there is little integration across 
sectors.
On this topic, more than a half of questionnaire respondents agreed that the 
central government is unwilling to devolve power, that local governments 
receive inadequate grants from the centre (even after acknowledging that 
there have been large increases in annual block grants in recent years) and 
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the central government agencies are unwilling to devolve their powers to 
local governments (Figure 10).
Bimal Koirala also said that the lack of elected local government since July 
2002 has seriously affected local governments as it led to:
 • MoLD using its discretionary powers to try and improve local govern-
ment accountability;
 • expenditure becoming more supply-based according to the availability 
of funding and not demand-based according to local needs;
 • hierarchy consciousness leading to many VDC secretaries, who are 
mostly junior clerks, being side-lined by officials, making it difficult for 
secretaries to do their work; and
 • conflicts between the appointed bureaucrats and nominated politicians 
in the all-party mechanisms, as the latter behaved like party workers 




Figure 10: Problems of local government (all 82 respondents) 
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A recurring theme in the study interviews was that the lack of downward ac-
countability has seriously weakened the effectiveness of local government.
 • Bimal Koirala said that the accountability framework is weak as the dis-
play boards, social audits, public disclosures and financial audits are car-
ried out as formalities to pass the minimum conditions and performance 
measures (MC/PM) test.
 • Horst Mattheaus, chief of GIZ’s Sub-National Governance Programme 
(SUNAG) and long-time associate of local government reform in Nepal 
pointed out how the elected local representatives have been replaced by 
bureaucrats to lead local government but adequate bureaucratic control 
over such bureaucratic leaders is now lacking. The implementation of lo-
cal projects has continued by mobilizing user groups and local commit-
tees. This has had some success, but these user groups and committees 
cannot play the role of elected local bodies. At the same time, the line 
agencies continue to exert bureaucratic control with little contact with 
local government.
 • Members of the Association of District Development Committees of 
Nepal (ADDCN) said that there is almost no downward accountability 
in the current local governments. As a result little funding is reaching 
disadvantaged people as money earmarked for them is often usurped by 
the better-off who have voice and threaten local government officials to 
fund their programmes.
 • Pashupati Nath Jha of SUNAG’s Nepalgunj office said that the failure 
to implement their many rules, regulations, manuals and guidelines was 
at the root of local governments’ poor performance. Corruption in the 
all-party mechanisms was damaging. Everyone blamed the transition, 
but the political parties should have taken more positive interest in de-
livering services. He also said that local government bureaucrats had 
little incentive to do their jobs well. And during the heat of the Maoist 
insurgency some of them had used it as an excuse not to produce results. 
Such bureaucrats became more lazy and corrupt and blamed the conflict 
for their poor performance.
A majority of questionnaire respondents agreed that local governments are 
not performing well and lack technical and administrative capacity. They 
agreed that most local governments are inefficient and corrupt (Figure 11), 
although members of central and local government agreed less on this. Al-
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most all respondents, including the local government control group, agreed 
that the main political parties in the districts tended to capture resources for 
their personal and party benefits.
Local government and district officials felt that a number of external factors 
prevented them from doing their jobs properly. Local government officials 
said they lacked proper mandates and resources to perform and suffered 
from pressure from local politicians. They also said that the central govern-
ment seeks to serves its elite clients, exclude marginalised communities and 
only give lip service to local and community self-governance. The central 
government has also not properly resourced or capacitated LGCDP, PAF 
and local peace committees while the ministry responsible for local govern-
ment behaves like a controller more than a facilitator.
District level officials complained that they were not well connected to the 
centre and lacked financial resources, manpower and competencies. They 
said they suffered frequent unwarranted interventions from the centre and 





Figure 11: The failures of local governments (all 82 respondents) 
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3.3.3 Local government and federal restructuring in Nepal
There are differing views at the central level on the crucial issue of how 
local government should be incorporated in a new federal system.
The report of the committee on State Restructuring and Allocation of State 
Powers (Constituent Assembly of Nepal 2010) recommended putting local 
governments as the third level of governance under the central and federal 
levels. In line with this the Association of District Development Committees 
of Nepal (ADDCN) wants ‘federalism’ to be an exercise in strengthening 
local government and bringing governance closer to the people (Sapkota et 
al. 2009). They say that under federalism the number of districts should be 
reduced to about 25 from the present 75 with these units being called either 
provinces or districts. These should serve as the coordinating units rather 
than executing federal units while municipal governments and a reduced 
number of village local governments should be the real executing agencies.
Most central level officials, politicians, development practitioners and 
members of civil society agreed that local governments need a constitu-
tional status and that federalism is not an end in itself but a tool to strength-
en decentralisation. They said that the demand for federalism had emerged 
because the decentralisation of government has not met the people’s aspi-
rations. But strengthened local governments are now needed to facilitate 
federal restructuring, bring more accountability to local government and to 
promote community-driven development.
A major reason why the debate on identity-based federalism has gained 
prominence is because Nepal lacks inclusive institutions (Acemoglu / Rob-
inson 2012). Several study respondents stressed that the appointed offi-
cials and nominated politicians who run local government need to be held 
more accountable. It was suggested that nominated transitional councils be 
formed and empowered to appoint executives from among themselves with 
appropriate downward accountability structures. The big question here is 
how these councils would be appointed and how this could happen fairly.
Central level governance stakeholders made the following suggestions for 
the federal restructuring of the Nepalese state:
 • Krishna Prasad Sapkota, former chairperson of ADDCN and member 
of the Constituent Assembly, said that federalism is for decentralizing 
central government and should be multi-layered and multi-system with 
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multi-ethnic structures. Local governments should also be given legis-
lative, executive and judicial powers. There should be a bottom-up ap-
proach to governing starting from community organisations rising up 
through VDCs and municipal governments to the district level and on 
to provincial and national level government. He said that community 
organisations should be mentioned in the new constitution as the lowest 
unit of governance and that community level judicial powers be given to 
local governments.
 • George Varughese of the Asia Foundation said that there is a need to 
ensure that community initiatives are not stifled. Presently even local 
governments are struggling to find their position in the new constitu-
tion. Nepal needs a debate on how to bring the government closer to the 
people; but the discourse on federalism has seemingly turned on efforts 
to distance the people and communities at the local level for the sake of 
provincial level autonomy. The new constitution must clearly spell out 
the authority of the different layers of government, of the centre, the 
provinces and local governments. He also called for the clear division 
of authority on sectoral responsibilities between line agencies and local 
government.
 • Bimal Koirala said that Nepal needs about 1,000 local township councils 
(by restructuring the present VDCs and municipalities) and 40 de-con-
centrated units of central and provincial governments (by restructuring 
the present districts), and then some provinces. The 40 de-concentrated 
units should be responsible for administering police, revenue, and law 
and order alongside central and provincial government agencies.
 • Jagadish Pokhrel called for service centres to be set up to serve clusters 
of VDCs.
District level stakeholders pointed to the following fault lines in the study 
districts that were putting the national peace process at risk and threatening 
the institution of federalism.
 • Officials in Doti said that the movement for a single Far Western prov-
ince had widespread support. The location of the current regional head-
quarters at Dipayal in Doti meant that there was strong opposition in 
Doti to the proposal of the CA’s state restructuring commission to in-
clude the Far Western hill areas in a province with Surkhet (which lies 
outside the current Far West) as its capital.
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 • Officials in Mahottari said that shifting government offices from the 
current district headquarters Jaleswor to Bardibas would create serious 
conflicts between residents of the north and south of the district. This 
divide between the people of hill origin and Madhesi people has been 
whipped up by the political leaders against the genuine demands of the 
Madhesi rights movement.
 • Officials in Pyuthan said that the rise of ethnic identity politics could 
lead to large-scale conflict. Pyuthan could experience trouble if provinc-
es were named after single ethnic groups. The district is a stronghold of 
the Janmorcha anti-federalist party.
3.4 Conclusions
The decentralisation of government is widely viewed as necessary for gov-
ernance reform and effective service delivery, which in turn are essential for 
local peace, social justice and broad based development. Nepal’s long expe-
rience of decentralisation has been supported by donor funded programmes. 
However, decentralised governance has only delivered limited benefits be-
cause of inherent weaknesses and the disruptions caused by the ten-year-
long armed conflict. The main hindrance to effective local government has 
been the absence of elected representatives since 2002. As a result Nepal‘s 
decentralisation programme has not mobilised enough commitment from 
the politicians and the ruling elites. At the same time the central agencies 
have been reluctant to share power and many political and bureaucratic ac-
tors only give lip service to decentralisation. The limited achievements of 
decentralisation have led to the demands for a federal system of government.
4 Community development for local governance
This study investigated how community-driven development can help 
achieve inclusive development and peace in terms of the experiences of Ne-
pal and other countries. Other country’s experiences show that this kind of 
development is often a more effective way to promote local development 
than central government led initiatives.
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4.1 Community-driven development for local governance and 
development
Community development is where a community engages in improving its 
social, economic and environmental situation. Amongst the various types 
of community development approaches the level of community participa-
tion ranges from simple information sharing to the social, economic, and 
political empowerment of community groups. This study proposes that 
‘community-driven development’ has great potential for advancing devel-
opment and peace in Nepal’s current situation. It is a kind of community 
development where communities, usually organised into groups, are given 
control over decision making and resources for development (World Bank 
2012b). They are directly funded and decide how funds are used. They of-
ten work in partnership with support organisations and service providers 
including elected local governments, the private sector, NGOs, and central 
government agencies. ‘Community-based development’ is another kind of 
community development where funding decisions are made by local or cen-
tral government agencies, and CBOs are only involved in ensuring that the 
money is spent properly and do not directly receive funds.
4.1.1 The strengths of community-driven development
Community-driven development improves the ability of communities to 
collectively make decisions about the use of resources such as infrastruc-
ture, labour and knowledge and helps people develop their ability and po-
tential to respond to shared problems and needs (Cavaye 2012). This kind 
of development is a way of providing social and infrastructure services, em-
powering poor people, improving governance and enhancing livelihoods. It 
treats poor people and their institutions as assets and partners. It operates 
with the underlying assumption that communities are the best judges of how 
their lives and livelihoods can be improved (World Bank 2012b).
The five elements of community-driven development are as follows with the 
third point, the community control of resources, distinguishing communi-
ty-driven development from other forms of community development:
 • A community focus, as the target beneficiary, grantee, and implement-
ing agent is some form of community-based organisation (CBO) or rep-
resentative local government.
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 • Participatory planning and design.
 • The community controls the resources, which ensures that at least some 
resources are transferred to the community or community based organ-
isation.
 • The community is involved in implementation through the direct supply 
of inputs, labour, or funds, or indirectly by managing and supervising 
contractors or operation and maintenance functions.
 • Community-based participatory monitoring and evaluation is used for 
downward accountability (ADB 2006a).
Community-driven development is premised around the building of social 
capital through collective action. Social capital is the features of organisa-
tions, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of 
societies by facilitating coordinated actions (Putnam quoted in Mansuri / 
Rao 2004). The term social capital also refers to the ability of individuals 
and groups to build bonds with other individuals and groups to work for 
individual and group betterment. Social capital is thus a stock from which 
people can draw to facilitate economic growth and development.
When individuals engage in collective action, the strength of a group’s re-
sources, knowledge and efforts are combined to reach a shared goal. Where 
groups are small collective action only makes goods available to active par-
ticipants (Olson 1965, 35-36). Accordingly, the larger a group, the farther 
it falls short of providing an optimal amount of collective good to its mem-
bers. Therefore, in general small groups further common interests better 
than large groups (Olson 1965, 50-52) – a matter of key concern for com-
munity-driven development.
Community-based development can be particularly suited for communities 
emerging from armed conflict, such as many communities in Nepal. Con-
flicts, such as Nepal’s can often change social and political dynamics by for 
example helping break down traditional feudal arrangements. The post-con-
flict period can provide the opening to initiate more inclusive, cohesive 
community processes. Alongside this community-driven development has 
the potential to address urgent needs and to serve as a catalyst for building 
healthier social and political dynamics. It can also provide a speedy and 
cost-effective means of reconstruction assistance; create inclusive commu-
nity organisations that foster relationship-building and reconciliation; and 
develop community capacity and action plans (World Bank 2011d).
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The strengths of the community-driven approach for local development is 
demonstrated by the success stories from South Asia featured in Box 17.
Box 17:  Success stories of community-driven development from 
South Asia
Bangladesh – Phase 1 of a community-driven development project in 
Sri Lanka (Nutan Jibon, the Social Investment Programme Project, [SIPP 
II]) built and strengthened community level organisations and developed 
mechanisms to channel funding to community organisations (World 
Bank 2010a, 3-4). The programme reached 500,000 households in seven 
of Bangladesh’s poorest districts including many previously unreached 
poor and vulnerable households.
The programme established and strengthened 1,350 community level 
pro-poor institutions. They were supported to decide their priorities for 
local development and manage funds to implement small infrastructure 
and social service projects. Most decision-making positions in these 
groups were occupied by poor women. Alongside this, 21,500 savings 
groups were formed with 90 % women membership and most of them 
provide small loans to their members. The project also supported skill 
enhancement and job creation, and income generation grants to the poor-
est people (World Bank 2010a).
The quality of the infrastructures financed by SIPP and managed directly 
by beneficiaries was much better than comparable works delivered un-
der regular government programmes. For example, the compactness and 
durability of earthworks was better than that of the same kind of works 
built by local governments. The new infrastructures cost on average 15 % 
less than those built under traditional public sector programmes. The pro-
gramme successfully empowered the poor, built and strengthening their 
institutions to deliver services, and improved incomes and the ability of 
communities to withstand shocks (World Bank 2010a).
Pakistan – A community-driven development approach facilitated the 
successful implementation of the Rural Punjab Water Supply and Sanita-
tion Programme in the state’s poor rural communities (Padawangi 2009). 
It was implemented and the new infrastructures managed by CBOs, with 
women playing a central role. This setup enabled the charging of tariffs 
Vidyadhar Mallik
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)76
for water supplies for the first time in spite of the traditional belief that 
water is a gift of God and thus should be available for free. Empower-
ing the communities to take ownership of the infrastructure enabled the 
CBOs to be financially and technically self-sufficient (Padawangi 2009). 
The involvement of communities from the beginning led to a strong lo-
cal sense of ownership of the water supply and sanitation infrastructure. 
Though operation and maintenance costs are met by communities, ini-
tial capital costs and any large-scale repairs are met by the government. 
Strong government support, including monitoring and technical guid-
ance, has been a key ingredient for success.
India – Local communities played a critical role in four communi-
ty-based urban development projects in India (Kerala, Kolkata, Madhya 
Pradesh and Rajasthan) for sustaining their small-scale infrastructure in-
vestments and poverty reduction impacts (ADB 2006b, 11-12). The main 
trends and key lessons were as follows:
 • The community based approaches were taken in response to the com-
bined failures of top-down, state-led, big development strategies to 
combat urban poverty. Community-based participatory programmes 
such as livelihood promotion through self-help groups have enhanced 
the success and sustainability of these projects.
 • The crucial role of community involvement in facilitating slum up-
grading through demand-led, participatory approaches with, for ex-
ample, the use of poverty mapping in Madhya Pradesh allowing the 
targeting of the most vulnerable slum dwellers.
 • The levels of participation varied with the Madhya Pradesh project 
being the most community-driven as it granted ownership of facilities 
to user groups by directly transferring funds to their bank accounts 
for planning, design, implementation, operation, maintenance and 
management.
 • All four projects supported state governments to implement local 
government reforms to provide an enabling environment for commu-
nity-based and community-driven development, thus creating oppor-
tunities for scaling-up (ADB 2006b).
Sri Lanka – The Community Development and Livelihood Improve-
ment ‘Gemi Diriya’ Project (2004–2010) in Sri Lanka enabled communi-
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ties across two provinces to build accountable and self-governing institu-
tions and to manage investments (World Bank 2010b). This World Bank 
supported project developed a model for working in poor plantation es-
tate communities. It reached out to the poorest of the poor through one-
time grants to youths from poorer families, women and estate workers. 
Government programmes had rarely reached these people. The project 
opened up new income earning opportunities for estate worker house-
holds. It demanded that sub-projects were identified by local poor people 
and that 80 % of benefits went to poor people with the poorest of the poor 
and the needs of remoter, poorer hamlets prioritised. Participatory wealth 
ranking was carried out by communities to identify the poor (World Bank 
2010b, 12-20). The sustainability and engagement of the community in-
stitutions was central to the project with considerable efforts put into 
community mobilisation, strengthening and accountability. A range of 
new skills and capabilities were built in the communities and poor vil-
lagers are now taking over service provision previously carried out by 
external service organisations while community professionals are begin-
ning to provide services to other areas and agencies (World Bank 2010b).
4.1.2 Community-driven development and local government
One objection to community-driven development is that it can bypass local 
government and service delivery institutions and create parallel structures 
that do not sustain once projects close. Many early community-driven de-
velopment interventions operated in this way with no links with formal in-
stitutions (ADB 2006a). However, this pitfall is now well recognised and 
many community-driven development initiatives work through and with 
local governments to increase development impacts (Wong / Guggenheim 
2005, 36-38).
Community-driven development devolves decision making to communi-
ties and seeks to make local institutions, such as local governments, more 
participatory, accountable, and responsive. Local governments and CBOs 
working together can achieve what neither can achieve on their own. CBOs 
can mobilise local people to act collectively in support of local government 
programmes. And local governments can provide technical support and 
linkages to communities (Krishna 2004). Community-driven development 
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usually promotes greater civic participation, voice, and accountability in 
local governance and provides a means of delivering services in a cost-ef-
fective way. It encourages the creation and strengthening of community 
groups, and forges new norms of civic behaviour and expectations between 
government and the people (Wong / Guggenheim 2005).
The considerable advantages of using the community development approach 
to complement the work of local governments and central government line 
agencies are as follows:
 • Public sector funds can channel resources to address needs for which 
conventional sectoral and local government mechanisms are not well 
adapted, including investments to meet short-term, highly specialised or 
complex demands.
 • Participatory community-based planning can efficiently allocate resourc-
es for investments that respond to locally defined priorities. Community 
contributions through matching fund and co-production arrangements 
enhance local ownership and help investments to be demand driven.
 • The community-based management of resources and investments is of-
ten more transparent and cost-effective than public sector management, 
resulting in more productively employed assets and faster and less costly 
impacts.
 • Control over decisions and resources can enable communities to build 
social capital by extending the depth, range, and effectiveness of their 
social networks.
 • Targeted community-driven approaches can devolve decision making 
and control of resources to the poor and other marginalised groups.
 • Supporting inclusive CBOs will increase poor people’s voice in local 
political processes and governance (Wong / Guggenheim 2005).
Working with local governments is important for sustainability and the 
scaling-up of community-driven development initiatives. Experiences from 
Nicaragua, the Philippines, Tanzania and Zambia show that the more com-
munity organisations and local governments work together and link up, the 
stronger are accountability relationships. On the other hand, the weaker the 
decentralisation framework, especially for fiscal decentralisation, the weak-
er are partnership possibilities. Thus; whenever the decentralisation frame-
work is weak or non-existent, attempts to get local governments and CBOs 
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to work together need to be supported by decentralisation reforms to open 
up the enabling environment (World Bank 2005). Experiences from Mace-
donia, Honduras and Chile show how community driven planning can make 
much better use of social funds for driving local development interventions 
in tandem with local government authorities (see Box 18).
Box 18:  Three examples of the devolution of responsibilities to 
 communities for the more efficient use of social funds
Macedonia – The Macedonia Community Development and Culture 
Project (MCDP) (2001–2007) increased the transparency and dynamism 
of local development by promoting collaboration between municipalities 
and local communities (Helling et al. 2005, 19). Prior to 2001, commu-
nity development committees had no channel to propose specific actions 
to their municipal councils, resulting in disenchantment with the coun-
cils. The project supported ‘community implementation committees’ as 
forums for communication and deliberation between municipalities and 
citizens. These committees complement the more formal and political 
municipal councils. The committees assumed responsibility for outreach 
and promoting development at the community level and were given au-
thority over community micro-projects. The committees are made up of 
local notables, members of vulnerable groups, municipality representa-
tives and representatives of central government agencies and local civil 
society. Committee meetings provide a forum for community represent-
atives to present the needs of their communities, to identify solutions to 
community problems and agree on which micro-projects MCDP should 
fund. This collective decision-making process enables stakeholders to 
hear others’ concerns, local government representatives to understand 
community priorities and communities to understand resource limita-
tions.
Honduras – The progress achieved under the Honduras Social Invest-
ment Fund (FHIS) shows how social fund agencies can strengthen com-
munity and local government for governance and service provision. The 
fund was created in the early 1990s to create employment for the poor on 
small-scale public works. It proved a more efficient means of providing 
basic infrastructure to rural communities than sectoral investment pro-
grammes managed by line ministries. The government and FHIS subse-
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quently became more concerned with the quality, sustainability, and rel-
evance of its investments. This led to a greater emphasis on community 
participation in resource allocation (Helling et al. 2005, 5) and began to 
alter the relationship between poor communities and public sector organ-
isations. FHIS investments in community capacities to prioritise needs, 
to deliberate over solutions to local problems, and to contribute to local 
initiatives led to communities increasing their influence over local affairs. 
These participatory planning innovations led to the central government 
devolving responsibilities for managing and maintaining sub-projects to 
municipalities and other more participatory and transparent methods of 
investing in local infrastructure improvements at the national level. This 
all led in 2000, to FHIS introducing a community execution modality 
in which funds are transferred directly to and managed by communities 
(Helling et al. 2005).
Chile – The Fund for Solidarity and Social Investment (FOSIS) was cre-
ated in Chile in 1990 to finance interventions to increase incomes and 
improve the lives of poor people. This fund avoided the drawbacks of 
centrally managed funds that deal directly with beneficiaries and thus 
undermine decentralisation efforts by bypassing local governments (Bar-
rientos 1999). This fund developed mechanisms to integrate communi-
ty-level poverty alleviation interventions with regional and local govern-
ment planning. It operated by each year by:
1. allocating programme resources to the 13 regions according to a tar-
geting criteria based on poverty maps;
2. regional authorities selecting participating communities;
3. municipal authorities targeting each approved programme to small 
geographical areas or neighbourhoods within these communities; and
4. project implementation by intermediary NGOs and beneficiaries, 
which was monitored by the regional and municipal authorities.
This way of working integrated FOSIS’s investments into the local gov-
ernment system, enabled synergy with other activities and strengthened 
the capacity of regional and municipal governments for participatory 
planning and poverty alleviation (Barrientos 1999).
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4.2 Community-driven development in Nepal
Nepal has considerable experience of community-driven development for 
managing and developing local forests, irrigation systems, drinking water 
systems, schools and health facilities, extending access to micro-credit and 
implementing poverty alleviation schemes. These initiatives are centred on 
various types of local groups or CBOs that provide the vehicle for local in-
volvement in planning and for managing interventions. Nepal has more than 
100,000 CBOs including PAF’s 20,000 community organisations, the 4,000 
community awareness centres and 33,000 ward citizen forums formed un-
der LGCDP, the 15,000 community forestry user groups, and the many ir-
rigation user groups, and livelihood, saving and credit, and mothers groups 
(Box 19).
Box 19: Types of community based organisations in Nepal
The term community based organisation (CBO) is used to refer to the 
local groups that form the focus and the means of implementing com-
munity-driven development. CBOs are distinct from local governments, 
political parties, and formally registered NGOs and include:
 • the community organisations formed under the Poverty Alleviation 
fund (PAF), DLGSP and other development programmes;
 • local user groups including community forest and irrigation user 
groups;
 • the ward citizen forums (WCFs) and citizen awareness centres 
formed under LGCDP;
 • local small-scale saving and credit and agricultural production 
groups;
 • mothers groups; and
 • school and health facility management committees; and
 • community learning centres (which are run by NGOs under the Min-
istry of Education).
Cooperatives are not included here, although small scale cooperatives 
have similar characteristics to other types of CBOs.
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In Nepal decentralisation reforms and local governance strengthening pro-
grammes have supported community based development and community 
governance through the formation and strengthening of CBOs. The large-
scale local governance support programmes described in Section 3.2.2 have 
promoted local governance through community involvement and empower-
ment. Local governments also mobilise communities as user groups to plan, 
execute and monitor small infrastructure projects like rural roads, rural irri-
gation and rural water supply and sanitation.
4.2.1 Case studies of community-driven development in 
 Nepal
The community-driven development of local forests, irrigation schemes, 
schools, health facilities and drinking water and sanitation schemes has 
been successfully implemented in Nepal by making CBOs responsible for 
managing these resources and institutions. The community organisations 
established under the World Bank supported Poverty Alleviation Fund and 
the community awareness centres and ward citizen forums established under 
LGCDP are other examples of successful community-driven development 
in Nepal (see Chapter 5). In addition Nepal’s thousands of rural and local 
cooperatives promote agriculture, rural marketing and savings and credit 
through local community organisations and groups.
 • Community forestry – Since the 1980s, Nepal’s community forestry de-
velopment programme has handed over the management of about 25 % 
of the country’s forest area into the hands of local communities. Com-
munity forestry has empowered many rural forest users economically, 
socially and politically (SDC 2011). Nepal has become a global leader 
in engaging communities in forest protection and management as its 
community forestry programme empowered local users and regenerated 
large areas of degraded forests (World Bank 2001b). This programme 
halted the large scale loss of forests in Nepal’s Midhills and addressed 
the failure of state-controlled measures to conserve these forests. The 
concept of user group management was adopted in 1988 under the Mas-
ter Plan for the Forestry Sector (MoFSC 1989). The Forest Act, 1993 
gave user groups legal status as “autonomous and corporate institutions 
with perpetual succession,” with the right to sell and acquire forest prod-
ucts. Under current arrangements, the government owns the land, but 
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user groups are entitled to all benefits flowing from their forests, which 
gives them a vested interest in caring for them. The community forestry 
development programme has stopped deforestation in the Midhills and 
strengthened the livelihood of many communities. From around the year 
2000 more attention has gone to directing benefits to poorer forest users 
as the elite capture of many of the benefits of community forestry and 
its failure to address the needs of poor and marginalised groups became 
apparent (Yadav / Bigsby / MacDonald 2008).
 • Community managed irrigation – Farmer-governed and managed 
irrigation systems in Nepal, especially those without any modern en-
gineering infrastructure, often outperform agency-managed systems in 
all types of terrains and sizes in the country (Benjamin et al. 1994, xi). 
This is attributable to the extent the two types of governance structures 
promote cooperation among stakeholders. The governance structures of 
farmer-managed irrigation systems emphasise problem-solving, reci-
procity, and active rule-crafting, which enables farmers to develop more 
appropriate rules to coordinate their activities and build social account-
ability and human artisanship. Such systems tend to have more pro-
ductive working relationships with high degrees of mutual trust, active 
participation in the crafting and monitoring of rules, and high levels of 
conformity to rules. On the contrary, agency-managed irrigation sys-
tems are based upon a dominance-dependence relationship between irri-
gation officials and farmers. This creates the situation where farmers are 
discouraged, or in some instances disallowed, from taking initiatives to 
deal with problems while irrigation officials have to govern and manage 
systems that they have little expertise, resources or incentives to handle 
(Benjamin et al. 1994).
 • Community managed schools – In 1972, the government took over the 
management of more than 8,000 schools in Nepal. However, the results 
were disastrous because of the remoteness of many areas, the country’s 
diversity and weak government capacity. Many teachers failed to attend 
their classes, textbooks vanished, and quality plummeted. In 2001, Par-
liament transferred the oversight of school management to local com-
munities. Many communities subsequently took over the management of 
their schools and efforts were made to transform the government’s role 
from being a provider to a facilitator of education. Community-based 
organisations were at the heart of the transition at the local level (World 
Bank 2009). Partly as a result of this net primary enrolment rose from 
Vidyadhar Mallik
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)84
84 % in 2003 to 92 % in 2008 and gender parity improved from 83 % to 
98 % over the same period. At the current rate, the community manage-
ment of all public schools should be achieved by 2015. Communities 
invest in their own schools and significant local resources have been 
unlocked, with every rupee of government grant leveraging 1.5 rupees in 
community funding. The decentralisation of teacher hiring has spurred 
accountability. Many communities are recruiting teachers locally and 
holding them accountable for their performance (World Bank 2009).
 • Community managed health facilities – Since the 1980s local com-
munities have been given oversight and management responsibilities 
over their local health facilities. This happened by the establishment of 
health facility management committees at primary health care centres, 
health posts and sub-health posts and hospital development committees. 
Community representatives play a leading role on these committees. The 
government provides doctors, staff and operational costs for the facil-
ities, while communities provide oversight for day-to-day operations. 
The involvement of communities has been critical to the large achieve-
ments in the health sector, with Nepal on track to achieve all the health 
Millennium Development Goals (World Bank 2012d).
 • Water supply and sanitation – The Rural Water Supply and Sanita-
tion Development Fund (RWSSDF), which was established in 1996, has 
successfully improved access to drinking water and sanitation in Nepal. 
This initiative takes a community-driven approach as beneficiary com-
munities, represented by water supply and sanitation users’ committees 
(WSUCs) identify, design, build, operate and maintain schemes. The 
community ownership engendered by this approach has had all-round 
benefits with better functioning schemes providing water where it is 
needed (Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Fund Development Board 
2012).
Although community-driven development in Nepal has realised many suc-
cesses this approach has faced many challenges especially where it has chal-
lenged the authority and control over resources by local elites. The write-ups 
in Boxes 20 and 21 show how the elites can either resist or encourage reform 
and how community-driven development can empower previously highly 
marginalised groups such as Dalit women.
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Box 20:  The role of politicians, elites and civil society in community- 
driven development
Local political and ethnic leaders, members of civil society, school teach-
ers and educated and rich people can influence community initiatives 
either negatively or positively. It is these members of the so-called elite 
who traditionally shape the direction of communities. CBOs are often 
made up of vulnerable and disadvantaged people. They may not function 
effectively if local elites and political and social leaders do not support 
them. The traditional elites may speak out against initiatives if they feel 
that their interests are not being served. Because of their connections 
at the district headquarters and central level, they can distort commu-
nication between an initiative and funding authorities that can lead to 
support being discontinued. They can also capture the decision theatre in 
community organisations by asserting that members do not have enough 
knowledge and should take their advice.
This scenario can derail community-driven development initiatives. As 
even successful CBOs will only command limited resources they must 
rely upon central and district authorities for many things. This dependen-
cy or subsidiary nature of community organisations makes them vulner-
able and can force them to agree with conditionalities imposed by local 
elites.
Alternatively, local political leaders and other elites can help strengthen 
community empowerment for good governance. They can help build the 
capacity of vulnerable community members and organise the voices of 
the previously voiceless people into a force to be heard by higher level 
leaders and political and social elites.
On a related point, caste discrimination is still widespread in Nepal. Dalit 
study respondents in Doti told how they were still commonly denied ac-
cess to drinking water taps and temples, although ‘high caste’ people 
did not discriminate against Dalits when it benefited their livelihoods or 
economic interests. In Mahottari, inter-caste tensions were said to exist 
between the so-called higher castes and Dalits.
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Box 21:  The impact of social mobilisation on the Dalit women of 
Laxmi Tole
The people of Laxmi Tole in Silgadhi, Doti have benefitted from social 
mobilisation programmes since the mid-1990s. Currently ward citizen 
forums and community awareness centres, PAF’s community organisa-
tions, a non-formal education programme and a mediation programmes 
are empowering local Dalit women by increasing their knowledge of 
their rights and other issues, training them on peacebuilding, raising their 
literacy levels and providing them with livelihood support.
The resulting increased awareness and confidence of local Dalit women 
led them in August 2008 to begin a campaign against caste discrimina-
tion and against restrictions on entering the local temple. The political 
parties initially did not support the campaign as it threatened the status 
quo. The Dalit women’s agitation persisted. Later, because of media cov-
erage, social pressure and national debates during the April 2008 elec-
tions, the political parties were compelled to raise this issue with the 
local administration. The local administration also kept itself aloof until 
the Dalit women threatened to humiliate them. Ultimately a compromise 
was made and now Dalits are allowed to enter the temple.
Source: Focus group discussion with Dalit women in Laxmi Tole, Silgadhi, Doti
4.2.2 Local conflict resolution
Community driven interventions are also playing a key role in conflict man-
agement in Nepal.
In Nepal local and domestic conflicts related to everyday life are becoming 
more politicised (Dahal / Bhatta 2008). Such conflicts are often initially 
minor, but if not resolved can easily escalate or become entrenched and 
seriously disturb communities. Such conflicts can destroy the ‘connectors’ 
of society by upsetting the equilibrium of local systems built on histori-
cally derived and understood rules, hierarchies, patriarchy and institutions. 
This happened in many places in Nepal during the armed conflict. In the 
past in Nepal, the political authority of the traditional elites made conflict 
resolution possible as elders, priests and other leaders helped resolve local 
disputes to maintain community harmony (Dahal / Bhatta (2008). These 
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systems are in decline although the Mahottari focus discussion group told of 
a traditional local form of mediation still in use where village elders decide 
local litigation cases.
Nowadays modern community mediation is increasingly being used to 
rectify local disputes (see Box 22). The traditional approaches are being 
complemented or replaced by this new approach that respects the rights of 
marginalised and disadvantaged people. Community mediation is mostly 
being introduced by NGOs with development partner support. An official at 
Janakpur municipality said that it also had a mediation programme support-
ed by development partners. Pyuthan’s local development officer said that 
paralegal committees are working in parts of the district against violence 
against women and children. These community groups are resolving domes-
tic violence cases and other conflicts through participatory mediation. They 
facilitate both sides to meet and agree on common solutions. Local peace 
committees are also playing an important role in local dispute resolution 
(see Chapter 5).
Box 22: Community mediation for local conflict resolution
Community mediation is based on principles of social justice and equal-
ity and serves as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. This has 
proved especially useful in the present transitional period where there 
are no elected local governments to help resolve local conflicts and the 
formal court systems are often inaccessible to poor and rural people. 
The Local Self-Governance Act, 1999 gave some judicial powers to local 
governments for arbitration and mediation (Dahal / Bhatta 2008). The 
introduction of community mediation in ten districts to resolve disputes 
through village level mediation and arbitration has reported positive re-
sults (Lederach / Thapa 2012). It increased participants’ self-esteem by 
enabling them to participate in community decision making and to fa-
cilitate and lead the resolution of local conflicts with many women and 
low-caste participants growing in confidence to speak out. It also helped 
communities better understand the causes of conflict and how communi-
ties can resolve disputes. Having tools to analyse and respond to conflict 
diminished the feeling of helplessness many experienced prior to know-
ing about mediation.
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4.3 Views on community-driven development in Nepal
The questionnaires and interviews found a range of opinions on the strengths 
and weaknesses of community-driven development in Nepal.
Many community-level people favour community-driven development as 
they have so often been let down by governing authorities. They agreed 
that most governance institutions and actors had not served them well. On 
the other hand they told how they had good experiences of working in their 
communities and wanted to build their social capital to become more em-
powered and to access resources to implement their own projects. They also 
said that district administrations tended to be exclusionary, elite based and 
disconnected from the general public.
Several central level governance stakeholders said that CBOs have a great 
potential role to promote local democracy and that this role should be 
strengthened by officially recognising them and integrating them into local 
governance structures. There were differing views on the challenges faced 
by community-driven development although a common theme was the need 
to align such development and the work of CBOs with local government 
processes.
4.3.1 The role and potential of community-driven 
 development
There were mixed opinions among the non-Poverty Alleviation Programme 
(PAF) questionnaire respondents about the effectiveness of communi-
ty-driven development programmes (Figure 12).3 While 67 % of them said 
it promoted harmony and people’s participation and 62 % said it promoted 
peace and stability, less than a half (41 %) agreed that community-driven 
development as practised by PAF is a transparent, accountable and inclu-
sive approach to development, with local and central government members 
agreeing the least and thus being the most distrustful of this approach. Only 
a half of respondents agreed that community-driven development produced 
sustainable development results in an efficient and cost-effective way.
3 Note: The Poverty Alleviation Programme is a community-driven development pro-
gramme and so, to maintain greater objectivity, only the questionnaire responses of non-
PAF respondents are presented here.
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Some respondents believed that community-driven development is a posi-
tive force that empowers local people and makes them independent of the 
often negative influences of politicians. Shri Krishna Upadhyaya, develop-
ment practitioner and winner of the Alternative Livelihood Award, has con-
siderable experience working with CBOs. He says that active CBOs make 
central and local governments perform more in the interests of local people 
(Box 23).
Sixty-four per cent of all respondents agreed that community groups are 
closer to the people and are therefore more likely to understand and solve 




Figure 12: Views of non-PAF respondents on community-driven development 
    (CDD) for peace and development (61 non-PAF respondents) 
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groups act as conduits of development and agents of change. In line with 
this many respondents also believed that local government officials should 
be made more aware of the great potential of community-driven develop-
ment.
Box 23:  Shri Krishna Upadhyaya on the potential of community- 
based organisations
Shri Krishna Upadhyaya gave a wide ranging summary of his experienc-
es of the positive and negative influences on local governance in Nepal
He believes that in Nepal individuals’ rights and liberties need protecting 
from state intervention and the negative influences of politicians. Fed-
eralism should not be taken as one more state structure to suppress in-
dividual liberties. The principle of subsidiarity should be followed with 
communities and local governments getting more power and the feder-
al provinces and the centre less power. Community organisations can 
pressurise local governments to improve their performance and be more 
transparent.
In Nepal many leaders feel threatened by aware and mobilised citizens. 
Many of these leaders behave like patrons by promising and giving pro-
jects to the people to attract votes. But they do not rationally choose 
projects. The leader–citizen relationship is mostly one of patronage. But 
mobilised communities can produce their own leaders and bring about 
change themselves and disregard the politicians.
The state should not organise the people: the people should organise the 
state. Social mobilisation should be an independent process. PAF carries 
out good social mobilisation while LGCDP is a part of local government 
and its social mobilisation gets entangled with political mobilisation by 
local leaders. As a result many user groups are politicised.
Tailored social mobilisation is essential for disadvantaged communities. 
The outcomes of mobilisation in community forestry user groups and 
PAF community organisations are the successful activities of these or-
ganisations. PAF does a good job as it provides both the institutions and 
the resources. The capabilities of communities can grow if they get re-
sources to implement their projects.
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Local governments should only provision and should not themselves pro-
duce public goods and services. CBOs should be the producers of public 
goods and services at the local level, such as for supplying drinking water 
and running schools. Local governments need to provide resources and 
support these institutions.
Source: Study interview (2012)
Many interviewees said that people‘s participation is essential for good lo-
cal governance. Local people need to be involved in planning, implementing 
and monitoring local projects to feel they own them. Local ownership and 
participation is fundamental to successful decentralisation. Most of the 61 
non-PAF questionnaire respondents said that community-driven develop-
ment allows people to participate in the design, planning, implementation 
and monitoring of development projects and therefore promotes better re-
source allocation, cost effectiveness, sustainability, transparency and ac-
countability. Former country director of the World Bank in Nepal, Kenichi 
Ohashi elaborated how community-driven development can promote a more 
democratic culture (see Box 24).
Krishna Sapkota, former chairperson of ADDCN said that social mobili-
sation should be tailored to different types of communities. For example, 
highly vulnerable groups such as Musahars (Terai Dalits) initially need a 
different type of social mobilisation to take into account their low capacity 
(they need more confidence building and backstopping). But as their soci-
oeconomic status grows they will start making their own decisions and the 
level of social mobilisation should increase their skills to climb the ladder 
of economic growth.
Box 24: Views of Kenichi Ohashi on community-driven development
A well designed community-driven development project will work like a 
micro-scale local government with community contributions being sim-
ilar to local taxes, community-driven development projects being like 
a service provided by local government and the grants for communi-
ty-driven development being equivalent to block grants that the national 
government gives to DDCs and VDCs.
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The reason why local tax mobilisation is often ineffective in Nepal is be-
cause tax payers do not believe that local governments provide effective 
services. Community-driven development overcomes this gap as people 
feel they can hold the officers of such projects accountable; and hence 
will be more willing to pay ‘local taxes’.
In a sense, well-functioning community-driven development is like an 
embryonic local government that performs (something Nepal has not 
seen much of). Letting people experience this kind of development will 
lay the foundations for good local governance and for people to under-
stand how local government should function.
In the future, some functions should shift from community-driven de-
velopment projects to formal local governments. But, the reality is that 
local elections are not yet in sight. Nepal can keep going with communi-
ty-driven development and by the time elections happen, the electorate 
will be better able to make local governments work properly.
Source: Study interview (2012)
Several respondents said that it is necessary to have good coordination 
between VDCs and CBOs. Krishna Sapkota said that this existed in many 
places up to 2002 with community organisations serving as the lowest level 
of governance. There was a two-way communication system between local 
governments and communities for sharing information and for the exercise 
of direct democracy and effective service delivery. But this does not often 
happen now because of vested interests and corruption among local govern-
ment officials. Jagadish Pokhrel, former vice-chairperson of the National 
Planning Commission, said that community development programmes, in-
cluding PAF and community forestry, should be integrated in VDC planning 
and implemented through them. But at the same time VDC officials should 
not envy the budgets and money that community driven projects attract.
Officials of the Federation of Community Forestry Users, Nepal (FECO-
FUN), said they wanted to see CBOs as the basic units of local governance 
and that their activities should be integrated into local government planning. 
They asserted that the role of CBOs should be spelt out in the new consti-
tution; but there should not be a multiplicity of different types of CBOs in 
the same locality under different programmes. The organisations should be 
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integrated and all development programmes or interventions should work 
through them. If a particular focus within the group has to be maintained, it 
can be done by forming sub-groups. For example, if ultra-poor households 
are the focus of an intervention, then a subgroup of these households should 
be formed within the community based organisation. But in most cases the 
elites and the poor and vulnerable households should work together in a 
single organisation for the sake of better communication, participation and 
cohesion.
4.3.2 Challenges for community-driven development in 
 Nepal
The main challenge was identified as the integration of the outcomes of 
community-driven development into local government while there were 
mixed views on the extent of corruption in this kind of development.
Some interviewed experts and former and present senior government offi-
cials said that, although directly funding communities to carry out their own 
development is a good thing, community-driven development initiatives 
should be integrated into local government planning. It is probably from 
this perspective that:
 • 54 % of non-PAF questionnaire respondents said that community-driven 
development programmes such as PAF are donor-driven and unlikely to 
sustain once donor resources dry-up;
 • 39 % of non-PAF respondents and 58 % of non-local government re-
spondents felt that community-driven development is a parallel structure 
to local government; and
 • 39 % of all respondents felt there is conflict between local governments 
and community-driven development (Figure 13).
Concerning the operations of community-driven development projects, 
32 % of all respondents, 36 % of non-PAF respondents and a half of local 
government respondents agreed that there is elite capture of project activ-
ities.
Only 13 % of non-PAF respondents said that community-driven develop-
ment is fraught with corruption (Figure 13). However, the representatives 
of ADDCN had a different view saying that corruption had reached user 
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groups and is very difficult to root out. They said that many user group offi-
cials are appointed by political parties to fulfil their agendas and for political 
mobilisation. As a result many user groups focus on money-making by illic-
it means and are a large source of corruption. The director of LGCDP said 
that the results of the public expenditure tracking survey (PETS) on LGCDP 
top-up grants for fiscal years 2009/10 and 2010/11 (ASI 2011) found many 
faults in the use of funds by user groups. Many public audits are performed 
as mere rituals. Former chief secretary of the government, Bimal Koirala 
viewed user groups as the new means of elite capture and corruption. On 
this subject one respondent recommended that community-driven develop-
ment needed strong monitoring and back-up support, otherwise funds are 





Figure 13: Opinions of non-PAF respondents on the challenges to community-
    driven development (CDD) (61 non-PAF respondents) 
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4.4 Conclusions
The large-scale community-driven development that has happened in Ne-
pal has helped alleviate poverty, raised social awareness and provided an 
organised voice for many communities. However, despite the many success 
stories, there has generally been a lack of commitment by central govern-
ment and the ruling elites to such programmes. Many communities still face 
challenges in mobilizing support, resources and commitments at the nation-
al level to strengthen and reform local and community governance and to 
support community empowerment. The credibility of political and bureau-
cratic leadership and their ownership of such programmes are low.
5 Four case study programmes
The study examined the achievements of four programmes on local gov-
ernance, poverty alleviation and peacebuilding support in Nepal by gath-
ering information from programme reports, evaluations, stakeholder con-
sultations, interviews and focus group discussions. The following four pro-
grammes were chosen as major on-going initiatives that work through local 
communities:
 • the Local Governance and Community Development Programme 
 (LGCDP);
 • GTZ/GIZ support to local governance in Nepal (PASRA, udle and 
 SUNAG);
 • the Poverty Alleviation Fund (PAF); and
 • local peace committees.
Note that only two are actually programmes (LGCDP and PAF) while an-
other is three-programmes-in-one (GTZ/GIZ support to local government) 
and another is an institution (local peace committees). Conclusions on 
the achievements and challenges faced by these programmes are given in 
 Chapter 6.
Vidyadhar Mallik
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)96
5.1 Local Governance and Community Development 
 Programme
5.1.1 Description
LGCDP is the main local governance and community development sup-
port programme in Nepal. It runs across all the country’s 75 districts and is 
executed by the government agency responsible for local government, the 
Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development (MoFALD) (Box 25). 
Its activities are integrated into local bodies’ plans with the executive heads 
of the districts, VDCs and municipalities coordinating local activities.
Box 25: Information on LGCDP 
Concerned ministry: Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Develop-
ment (MoFALD)
Development partners and donors: ADB, DFID, Denmark, Canada, 
UN system (UNDP, UNICEF, UNCDF, UNFPA), Norway, Switzerland, 
Germany
Type of donor support: Financial and technical 
Periods: Phase 1: 2008–2013. Phase 2: under preparation
Coverage: All 75 districts.
Source: MoLD (2008)
Whereas the predecessor programmes such as DLGSP (see Chapter 2) took 
more of a transactional approach by providing local communities with re-
sources, LGCDP is said to be a transformational programme aimed at trans-
forming local governance into a more participatory process through local peo-
ple’s empowerment via their participation in community awareness centres 
and ward citizen forums. In practice it seems that the two approaches overlap.
LGCDP combines large-scale government funding, mainly for block grants 
to local governments, with the funding from the development partners list-
ed in Box 25. The programme’s overarching objective is to contribute to-
wards poverty reduction through inclusive, responsive and accountable lo-
cal governance and participatory community-led development that ensures 
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the increased involvement of women, Dalits, Janajatis, Muslims, Madhesis 
and other disadvantaged groups in local governance (MoLD 2008, 23). The 
programme is introducing reforms in supply-side governance through bet-
ter public financial management methods and formula based funding, and 
in demand-side governance through social mobilisation in ward citizen fo-
rums, community awareness centres and local infrastructure projects.
The programme aims to provide a framework for recovery following the 
armed conflict and improve the delivery of basic services (health, education, 
communication, water, sanitation) to communities. The government recog-
nises that local government is the best means of providing these services 
(MoLD 2008).
LGCDP has the following three main areas of intervention:
1. Empowering citizens and communities for active engagement with local 
governments and strengthening downward accountability.
Enhancing the involvement of local communities in local governance is 
crucial in the absence of elected local governments. LGCDP is promoting 
CBOs as mechanisms through which all citizens, and especially those from 
marginalised groups, can interact with the local authorities and other service 
providers to have a say in prioritizing and overseeing the expenditure of lo-
cal public funds and the implementation of local development programmes. 
LGCDP is institutionalizing community involvement in decision making on 
local planning, monitoring and programme implementation by developing 
ward citizen forums and community awareness centres as mechanisms for 
community participation. These and other mechanisms require local gov-
ernments to seek community involvement and the endorsement of decisions 
on the use of their block grants. At the same time LGCDP is supporting 
social mobilisation to ensure that communities are furnished with the ca-
pacity to fulfil this role in an inclusive and accountable way. The intended 
outcome is that citizens and communities are empowered to exercise their 
voice; to engage actively with local governments and local government re-
source allocation and decision making; and that accountability processes 
enable greater citizen input and oversight.
2. Increasing the capacity of local governments to manage resources and 
deliver basic services in an inclusive and equitable manner.
LGCDP aims to build the capacity of local governments at all levels and 
support reform to promote the more effective delivery of basic infrastruc-
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ture and services. The programme is in particular promoting demand-driven 
mechanisms. It is also working with local government to develop social 
protection funding and to improve local tax revenue administration. The in-
tended outcome is that local governments are better able to manage resourc-
es and deliver basic services in an inclusive and equitable manner. A key 
aspect is strengthening local governments to use their annual block grants 
to provide goods and services. Substantially increased funding is being pro-
vided. LGCDP is also supporting the introduction of an annual evaluation 
of whether local governments meet minimum conditions (MC) and perform 
adequately (performance measures, PM). Successful local governments re-
ceive extra funding.
3. Strengthening policy and the national institutional framework for decen-
tralisation, devolution and community development.
The programme is supporting enabling policies and a regulatory and sup-
port framework for local governance. One focus is to help prepare for the 
introduction of federal government and the adaptations needed to fit local 
government into a federal system (MoLD 2008).
5.1.2 Performance
Overall impacts
There were mixed opinions on the overall achievements of LGCDP and in 
some cases it was difficult to tell whether the criticisms were about LGCDP 
in particular or local governance and local governments in general.
An evaluation of the first three years of LGCDP (2008 to 2011) reported its 
main successes of as being the setting up governance structures. The pro-
gramme established 2,200 community awareness centres and 23,000 ward 
citizen forums for inclusive participatory planning at the community level 
and funded civil society organisations to review the performance of local 
governments. It helped introduce a system of performance-based top-up 
grants for local governments, which were used to implement 30,000 pro-
jects, mainly for road building, water supply and education. And in 2010, 
around 45 % of funded projects were chosen by women and disadvantaged 
groups (MoLD 2011).
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A later evaluation (Freedman et al. 2012) found that relatively little progress 
had been made on engaging citizens and communities with local govern-
ments and on holding local governments more accountable. It pointed out 
how the new structures needed to be made more equal, inclusive and par-
ticipatory to overcome traditional social hierarchies. But it recognised that 
altering entrenched hierarchies, mainly by the intervention of young, local 
social activists was a challenging undertaking.
Central level interviewees said that the following three factors had most 
substantially limited the impacts of LGCDP:
 • The absence of elected local government had reduced effective service 
delivery and meant that the people’s aspirations were not reflected in 
local government programmes.
 • LGCDP’s prescribed 14-step planning process was not being followed 
and village development plans were hardly ever referred to, meaning 
that the approval of local plans was based on individual interests rather 
than local peoples’ identified needs.
 • The lack of resources to fund projects prepared by ward citizen forums 
and community awareness centres.
However, many district interviewees said that the ward citizen forums and 
community awareness centres were performing well in targeting socially 
deprived and excluded groups and the members of these forums and cen-
tres who took part in the focus group discussion agreed that they had been 
empowered by LGCDP’s support. However, some interviewees raised the 
concern about the lack of support for poor upper caste people as targeting is 
happening according to ethnicity more than levels of economic deprivation.
The evaluation by Freedman et al. (2012) found that a number of local gov-
ernments had increased their capacity to manage resources and deliver ba-
sic services in a more inclusive and equitable way. It also reported that, 
as of mid-2012, there were 3,786 social mobilisers at work (50 % female), 
covering almost all VDCs and municipalities. There was also large-scale 
participation in ward citizen forum meetings and 75 % of forum members 
were found to have participated in VDC decision-making, including for ap-
proving local government funded projects.
Overall only 24 % of non-local government questionnaire respondents 
agreed that LGCDP had strengthened local government (Figure 14). The 
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focus group discussion articulated the main challenges faced by LGCDP in 
particular and local governance in general as the apathy and corruption of 
politicians and the lack of commitment of many bureaucrats who headed lo-
cal governments. However, most questionnaire respondents agreed that LG-
CDP was a sound model as 86 % of all non-local government respondents 
said that community development and social mobilisation (as envisaged by 
LGCDP) should be an integral part of local governance. Many local people 
in the focus group discussions said that LGCDP had good potential to re-
duce corruption and make development programmes more people-oriented. 
The same proportion of respondents agreed that local governments should 






Figure 14: Role of LGCDP in local government strengthening  
 





Krishna Prasad Sapkota, former chairperson of ADDCN, said that LGCDP’s 
underperformance was partly due to its failure to make use of the resourc-
es created under previous support programmes including the thousands of 
trained social mobilisers. Similarly, while LGCDP currently lacks resources 
to fund local projects, a huge fund is lying idle in the saving and credit co-
operatives formed under earlier programmes.
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One chief district officer highlighted the frequent transfers of staff, distur-
bances caused by employees’ unions and the lack of support and resources 
district administrators receive from the centre as major problems. Another 
DDC official said that political leaders needed training as they do not un-
derstand many of the rules, planning process and policies of LGCDP and 
local government.
Accountability and transparency
One of the main objectives of LGCDP is to increase the accountability and 
transparency of local governance processes to limit the misuse of local 
 government funds. However, almost all study respondents said that there 
was widespread misuse of local government funds. Many participants in 
the focus group discussions highlighted the lack of transparency in local 
governments and charged local government staff with corruption (see 
Box 26).
Box 26: Criticisms of local government from Doti and Mahottari
The mostly Dalit participants of the Doti focus group discussions com-
plained about the elite capture of local government and the lack of open 
consultations to select the members of ward citizen forums with local 
politicians selecting their supporters. One Dalit woman leader said she 
did not know anything about the VDC budget earmarked for disadvan-
taged group people while others complained about the misuse of funds 
by the Dalit elites. The generally poor delivery of VDC level service was 
blamed on many VDC secretaries not living in their working areas.
The discussions in Mahottari asserted that corruption was rampant in 
local government. Many VDC secretaries asked for bribes to provide 
citizenship certificate recommendations and failed to share information 
about their VDCs’ budgets and programmes. They said that the ward citi-
zen forums were unknown to many local people and that their municipal-
ity had not provided any programmes for voiceless disadvantaged peo-
ple. Also hindering service delivery, many government service providers, 
including veterinarians, were often not available to attend emergencies 
and mostly provided services privately charging users.
Source: Focus group discussions, 2012
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A number of central level interviewees mentioned the widespread reporting 
in the media of local government misuse of LGCDP funds. LGCDP’s for-
mer programme coordinator, Teertha Dhakal, explained this as being due 
to several factors including the mistiming of programme activities. He said 
how the programme had helped produced guidelines to guide block grant 
funding and other reforms. However, the first round of increased block grant 
funding under LGCDP was released before these guidelines were in place 
and this led to many malpractices. The media thus painted the programme 
as causing the misuse of funds. He said that the widespread misuse also 
happened because initially LGCDP provided some non-earmarked funds 
for local governments, which were considerably misused. Also, social mo-
bilisation only happened later on, resulting in the spending of much money 
on un-prioritised activities, especially road building where the chances of 
corruption and misuse of funds is high. Along the same lines the cluster 
manager of LGCDP for Mid-Western Nepal said that LGCDP’s provision of 
grants to local governments before carrying out social mobilisation was a 
mistake. The funds were not so well used with poor targeting.
Most other respondents highlighted the corruption of many of the politi-
cians, communities and local government staff who are involved in local 
government development funds and said how there is hardly any downward 
accountability.
 • Bimal Koirala said that there had been widespread misuse of funds and 
this was at least partly due to LGCDP’s shortcomings. His review of the 
public financial management functions of LGCDP had found that the 
accountability framework promoted by LGCDP was weak as the display 
boards, social audits, public disclosure and financial audits were mostly 
treated as rituals to pass the MC/PM tests and were often not properly 
used. He had also found that the budget earmarked for disadvantaged 
persons was usually spent on workshops and seldom on poverty allevia-
tion for target groups. The actual priority of LGCDP in the field seemed 
to be building physical infrastructure and not governance and communi-
ty development as per the programme’s objectives.
 • Other central level interviewees pointed to widespread corruption in 
user groups. This was said to happen where user group leaders were 
chosen by local politicians. Associated with this are the money-making 
schemes of inflating project budgets and compromising the quality and 
quantity of deliverables through underhand means. This can happen as 
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quality inspectors and auditors are often in on these scams and get their 
share. In competitive bidding, muscle men affiliated to local elites often 
physically only allow favoured bidders to file their bids.
 • One chief district officer agreed that the formation of CBOs such as user 
groups is not enough to maintain good governance. Many of them are 
involved in corruption in collusion with politicians. He believed that the 
user groups formed by government agencies are mostly corrupt while 
the community organisations formed by UNDP and other donor agen-
cies and functioning outside of government interference deliver results 
and only misuse a small part of their funds.
 • Pyuthan’s local development officer Bhuban Prakash Bista said that 
only those all-party mechanisms that were corrupt should have been dis-
solved in 2011 as local government needs a mechanism for consulting 
with local politicians to decide on development policies and projects. 
He told how his DDC informally consulted with party representatives. 
Freedman et al. (2012) pointed out that the disbanding of the all-party 
mechanisms had caused uncertainty on how the political parties were to 
be consulted in local planning and project implementation.
 • One local development officer said that the political leaders blame the 
bureaucrats and the bureaucrats blame the politicians for corruption cas-
es. But neither blames the other where they are in collusion with one 
another. Many speak out against corruption but the same people demand 
favours that can only be had through corrupt practices.
 • Discussion group participants spoke out against the vested interests of 
political parties and the general apathy of the parties towards the com-
mon peoples’ problems. The Pyuthan group said that there was elite 
capture as the local political leaders would only fund projects they per-
sonally approved of. The Doti group said that the politicians decided 
on everything and did not care about the people’s views. There was no 
transparency and accountability and local people did not know about 
the funds the VDC received or how they were spent. The women in the 
Mahottari group discussion said that they kept struggling in their VDC 
council and with the VDC secretary and political leaders to access re-
sources but the political leaders opposed them and did not help them. 
Most people in the Mahottari group discussions said that local govern-
ments were not transparent and usually did not tell community members 
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about resources and programmes they received. They also said that only 
elite and rich persons were invited to VDC council meetings.
The central level interviewees recognised that LGCDP has been affected by 
the absence of elected representatives. This has caused local governments 
to fail because the bureaucrats appointed by central government are not ac-
countable to local people and have little incentive to provide services to 
local people. And the all-party mechanisms failed because they were not 
sufficiently regulated while many user committees fail because they are cre-
ated by politicians and not the will of local people. The Mahottari discussion 
group said that better coordination was needed between different interven-
tions within VDCs with VDCs acting as coordinators. But VDCs were in 
fact becoming weaker during the transition period.
A central strategy of LGCDP to improve governance and the use of local 
government funds is to introduce a system of rewarding local governments 
that perform well. Many central level officials, development partners, in-
dependent professionals and development practitioners believed that the 
system of evaluating local governments against minimum conditions and 
performance measures (the MC/PM system) needed reviewing so that local 
people weren’t punished for the inefficiency of local government staff. The 
officials in one municipality said that the chief executive officers of munici-
palities are not penalised when a municipality fails the MC/PM test; rather it 
is the citizens who are penalised as their municipality receives less funding. 
But when the municipality passes the test, municipality chiefs are also re-
warded. And they are frequently transferred so new office holders cannot be 
held responsible for the failures of their predecessors. It was reported that in 
recent years Mahottari district has had up to four local development officers 
in a year! However, one Mahottari DDC official stressed that the MC/PMs 
were helping to keep local governments on track.
A number of central level respondents said that formula based funding for 
local governments (with funding apportioned according to population and 
other factors) had helped bring more transparency and accountability. But 
they said that a much larger proportion of the government’s budget should 
be channelled through local government using formula based funding.
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Inclusive participation and social mobilisation
The establishment of ward citizen forums and community awareness centres 
is LGCDP’s main way of enabling citizens to influence and be involved in 
local decision making. These groups are formed by social mobilisation.
The focus group discussions in Pyuthan and Mahottari said that communi-
ty awareness centres and ward citizen forums were performing well. They 
had raised the awareness of women, Dalits and disadvantaged people about 
their rights and locally available resources and were helping them iden-
tify their needs and apply for their sub-projects to be included in VDC 
plans (Box 27). Most interviewees agreed that these forums and centres 
had empowered local people in contrast to user committees, many of which 
were formed by elites, did political mobilisation and are not connected 
with ward citizen forums. The Doti discussion groups said that the ward 
citizen forums and community awareness centres had questionable finan-
cial sustainability.
Quite a few interviewees said that most of LGCDP’s social mobilisers per-
formed well as they lived in the communities and helped build peace by 
engaging with and making communities more aware. But the evaluation 
by Freedman et al. (2012) reported that LGCDP’s social mobilisers needed 
better preparing to carry out their work and to understand how to foster 
transformative development in communities. Social mobilisation was also 
hindered by most district and municipal social mobilisation committees be-
ing inactive, by VDC staff being too busy with their service delivery re-
sponsibilities to respond to the demands of LGCDP and that participatory 
processes were often short-circuited in order to meet targets.
Box 27:  Praise for community awareness centres and ward citizen 
forums
 • The Pyuthan discussion group said that the ward citizen forums were 
connecting people and brought integrated planning to the VDC level. 
The forums and community awareness centres had empowered their 
members, but the role of citizens in decision making had increased 
only a little. They said that the ward citizen forums should be directly 
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funded to run livelihood and other community-based sub projects, 
as in PAF, after proper social mobilisation had been carried out. This 
group said that they received insufficient support from local govern-
ment for local development. They wanted training on kitchen gar-
dening, sanitation and improved stoves and support for river training, 
rehabilitation and employment.
 • The Doti group said that ward citizen forums and community aware-
ness centres were doing a very good job especially to make them 
aware of their rights. Community awareness centre members discuss 
their problems and seek solutions. The women members of these cen-
tres had become particularly aware of their rights and were success-
fully opposing violence against women, alcoholism in men, menstru-
al seclusion and the need to educate girls.
 • Mahottari community awareness centre members praised LGCDP 
for its social mobilisation which had made them more aware of pub-
lic health and other issues. This group said that they mostly needed 
support for flood control, sanitation, drinking water, jobs, irrigation 
pumps, community buildings and skill training.
Source: Focus group discussions, 2012
Several local government personnel said that LGCDP had done a good job 
in raising the awareness of local people. The mechanisms established under 
LGCDP informed the public about their VDCs’ budget and the earmarking 
of funds for women and disadvantaged communities. They also pointed out 
that the ward citizen forums shouldn‘t be politicised and should operate as 
forums of citizens, civil society, ethnic groups and women.
Neupane (2011, 36-37) however, reported that effective social mobilisation 
was constrained in LGCDP by the lack of enthusiasm in the government to 
expedite demand-side strengthening, the reluctance by local governments to 
own the social mobilisation process, sluggish support from service provid-
ers for social mobilisation and interference by political parties. Jha et al., 
(2009, 134) says that LGCDP needs to learn from other programmes that 
have used the transformational approach of social mobilisation. In particu-
lar it needs to focus on the ultra-poor as they were left out by most previous 
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programmes. It also importantly needs to link the group processes of social 
mobilisation to local government processes while keeping social mobilisa-
tion outside the direct responsibility of local government.
Fiscal decentralisation and the role of central government
In spite of efforts by LGCDP to provide more funds to local bodies, fiscal 
transfers to local bodies still make up only a small percentage of the na-
tional budget with most funding still going through central government. In 
2009/10 local government expenditure was only 2.07 % of GDP and 11.43 % 
of total public expenditure, while revenues generated by local governments 
were only 1.84 % of all national revenues. The increases in transfers to mu-
nicipalities and VDCs in recent years have been particularly modest in the 
light of the large increases in allocations to sectoral line agencies. This has 
resulted in local governments having several unfunded mandates includ-
ing for curbing environmental pollution, promoting tourism, and promoting 
cooperation amongst local people (Freedman et al. 2012). This situation is 
made worse by the fact that fund transfers are often delayed causing diffi-
culties in planning and implementation.
Local government bureaucrats interviewed for the study said they found it 
difficult to collect taxes and local fees and so local governments remained 
dependent on transfers from central government. These transfers usually 
come with strings attached thus undermining the autonomy of local govern-
ments to choose programmes. These bureaucrats and focus group discus-
sants complained that the central government’s earmarking of funds for lo-
cal government constrained local government autonomy and left them with 
little money for their chosen programmes. Pyuthan’s local development of-
ficer said that the resources available to local governments are unpredictable 
and MoFALD often takes ad hoc decisions and gives instructions to local 
governments that hamper their autonomy.
On the other hand a Mahottari DDC official said that it was necessary to di-
rect resources for social inclusion and uplifting marginalised communities, 
as this had been ignored by the all-party mechanisms. Officials from the 
Ministry of Local Development said that the frequent criticism of central 
government interference in local government was often unwarranted. Most 
of this so-called interference is actually legitimate interventions, for exam-
ple to ensure that the stipulated 35 % of block grants is spent on disadvan-
taged people as these funds are very susceptible to elite capture.
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5.2 GTZ/GIZ Support to local governance in Nepal  
(PASRA, udle, SUNAG)
5.2.1 Description
German development aid has supported local governance in Nepal since 
1987. Up until 2005 this support was mainly directed at developing the ca-
pacities of municipal local governments through the Urban Development 
through Local Efforts programme (udle). Between 2005 and 2011, alongside 
udle‘s continuing support to municipal governance, the Poverty Alleviation 
in Selected Rural Areas programme (PASRA) supported poverty alleviation 
by strengthening local governance. This involved building the capacity of 
local governments, social mobilisation, creating community groups, sup-
porting small rural infrastructure projects and generating employment in 
five conflict-affected districts in the Mid-West Development Region.
GIZ’s current governance support programme is the Sub-National Govern-
ance Programme, Nepal (SUNAG) (Table 6). Its current Phase 1 is strength-
ening local self-government with the participation of civil society (GIZ 
Nepal 2010). The planned second phase will support the new sub-nation-
al governance structures under a federal government. It is closely aligned 
 
 



















Pyuthan, Salyan and 











A corridor from 
Kalikot district in the 
north to Nepalgunj in 
the south 





Local and community governance for peace and development in Nepal
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 109
with LGCDP and the World Bank’s Urban Governance and Development 
Programme (UGDP) and provides technical assistance to LGCDP and both 
technical assistance and finance (through KFW) to some inputs of UGDP.
The major focus of SUNAG is to strengthen and enable sub-national ac-
tors, including local governments (and emerging provincial governments), 
civil society groups, citizens and business communities to make them more 
aware of their roles and to enable them to assume new tasks. It also aims to 
enhance interactions amongst them and to build an enabling environment 
for local economic development, public service delivery and poverty alle-
viation (GIZ 2010).
SUNAG has the following four components (GIZ 2010):
 • National policy reform, by supporting national policy-making focussed 
on fiscal decentralisation, functional assignments, inter-governmental 
transfers, infrastructure financing, sub-national financial arrangements, 
and an auditing strategy for existing and emerging sub-national govern-
ments (GIZ 2010).
 • Sub-national institutional reform, by addressing capacity constraints 
in selected sub-national governments focussing on financial manage-
ment, planning, budgeting, human resource management and strength-
ening dialogue between sub-national governments and interest groups 
for poverty alleviation and business.
 • Civil society participation at sub-national level, by strengthening civ-
il society organisations and citizen organisations that work at the local 
level.
 • Sub-national service delivery and local infrastructure, by 1) strength-
ening sub-national governance arrangements to provide key social ser-
vices (particularly for the poor) and promoting private sector-led local 
economic development; 2) strengthening service departments within 
sub-national governments; and 3) coordinating with the World Bank fi-
nanced Urban Governance and Development Programme (UGDP). The 
programme is also funding urban infrastructure projects with support 
from KfW (GIZ 2010).
Given the uncertainties about the future shape of Nepal’s political-adminis-
trative structure, SUNAG is currently focussing on strengthening municipal 
governance as municipalities are the entities most likely to remain intact 
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whatever the shape of the future national governance structure. It is also 
working to strengthen urban-rural links with an important objective being 
to improve the district level coordination of ministries. It will also support 
the new emerging state structures and the inter-governmental relationships 
within the forthcoming federal system.
5.2.2 Performance of udle, PASRA and SUNAG
Overall impacts
Evaluations of udle and PASRA report that these programmes played an 
important role in building the capacity of municipalities, VDCs and DDCs 
and helped institutionalised good governance practices like citizen report 
cards, participatory planning, participatory budgeting and downward ac-
countability frameworks. Their main overall contribution has been to pilot 
good governance practices to promote and demonstrate their use.
The major achievements of udle (1987–2005) were to establish and strength-
en the Urban Development Training Centre and the Town Development 
Fund (TDF) and support them to implement urban development projects. 
This led to more urban planning, land development and community-led ur-
ban conservation. Landmark urban development projects were supported 
in Bhaktapur and Patan. In the latter part of the programme municipalities 
were supported to improve revenue collection, develop integrated plans and 
implement peacebuilding activities. Support was also provided to design a 
revenue sharing and equalisation scheme between central government and 
the municipalities (GTZ Nepal 2006, 7-11). Chief of SUNAG Horst Mat-
theaus said that the performance measurement system adopted by the Min-
istry of Local Development (MoLD) around 2008/09 was first piloted by 
udle for its municipalities.
The major achievements of PASRA (2005–2011) were to increase food se-
curity and employment opportunities in the aftermath of the armed conflict 
and to build capacities for community development and self-governance. 
Eighty-seven per cent of beneficiaries of PASRA’s food security, livelihood 
and consumption pattern programmes reported improved food security with 
30 % of beneficiary households reporting less outward migration (WFP Ne-
pal 2009). District stakeholders in Pyuthan said that other programmes had 
not had as much of an impact as PASRA. The local communities wanted 
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PASRA to return as it had left just as local people started benefiting. They 
pointed to the example of how PASRA had benefitted the remote VDC of 
Udayapur Kot in a short time (see Box 28). The major contributions made 
by udle and PASRA for demand driven planning and giving citizens voice 
are detailed below.
Box 28:  Udayapur Kot VDC: a success story of local government 
 reform
Support from PASRA helped Udayapur Kot VDC in Pyuthan to become 
a model of good governance. The VDC has a committed secretary who 
disseminates information to everyone. He sensitises community groups 
for social awareness and demand mobilisation assisted by facilitators 
from PASRA and LGCDP.
PASRA was praised. It had helped form 20 volunteer groups, which 
now also serve as PAF community organisations. It also established par-
ticipatory learning centres which made citizens more aware of issues, 
challenges and opportunities. Women‘s empowerment resulted and now 
women participate in VDC-level decision making. One local initiative 
was the requirement that all households build toilets. By a consensus de-
cision those that don’t build them are punished by withholding VDC ser-
vices. The community and the VDC help poor households build toilets.
The VDC coordinates all local programmes including those of NGOs, 
INGOs and PAF. Although PAF data is included in overall VDC informa-
tion, but coordination with PAF needs improving.
Source: Focus group discussion at Udayapur Kot VDC, Pyuthan
SUNAG is a new programme and so no evaluations or impact studies have 
been carried out yet. Concerning the design of SUNAG Jagadish Pokhrel 
said that SUNAG’s approach of focussing governance and economic devel-
opment support on a corridor from Kalikot district in the north to Nepalgunj 
in the south, including promoting public–private partnerships for regional 
economic growth, builds on the successes of PASRA and udle in that region. 
Horst Mattheaus said that SUNAG works with LGCDP as much as possi-
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ble to reduce duplication. SUNAG has a few cluster offices that focus on 
networking and supporting municipalities to prepare capacity development 
plans.
Demand driven planning
SUNAG’s programme chief Horst Mattheaus and former vice-chairperson 
of the National Planning Commission Jagadish Pokhrel said that the udle/
PASRA model provided funding to the ward level for small scale infrastruc-
ture projects and through this developed demand-driven local and district 
planning capacities and multi-sectoral development. SUNAG is now doing 
the same and is helping build the capacities of LGCDP and DDC staff.
Many interview respondents agreed that this approach was successful al-
though the limited budgets and coverage and the brief periods of interven-
tion were criticised. Janakpur municipal officials said that udle had served 
poor people and empowered them by giving them access to resources and 
involvement in decision making. But it had worked in Janakpur for only 
three years in a small area with limited funds like a pilot programme testing 
innovative practices. Jagadish Pokhrel made the same point saying that udle, 
PASRA and now SUNAG have been criticised for only working at the micro 
level, providing limited funding for limited times. He pointed out that this 
was a deliberate strategy to use the energy created in communities by infra-
structure development and livelihood support to promote larger governance 
reforms through capacity development and training programmes.
Strengthening citizens’ voices and self-governance
Participants in focus group discussions in PASRA’s working areas said that 
the programme had successfully promoted local government, governance 
reform and an inclusive participatory process during and after the Maoist 
conflict. It had strengthened citizen‘s voices, helped integrate them in local 
government planning and decision making and provided resources for local 
development:
 • The employment generated through PASRA’s infrastructure programme 
has had a sustainable impact as local governments and leaders were 
closely involved in identifying and implementing projects while com-
munity people learned how to plan, build and operate them (WFP 2008).
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 • Pashupati Nath Jha of SUNAG’s Nepalgunj office pointed out how citi-
zens’ report cards were introduced in Pyuthan under PASRA for citizens 
to evaluate the performance of civil servants in forums of central and 
local government service providers, citizens groups and individuals.
 • District level stakeholders in Pyuthan said that PASRA had set up par-
ticipatory learning centres as citizens’ forums that gave voice to local 
people and ran awareness raising programmes. They also provided the 
model for LGCDP’s community awareness centres.
 • The staff of Silgadhi municipality, Doti, said that udle had helped create 
revolving funds for community organisations to spend on livelihood im-
provements for poor people
 • The staff of Janakpur municipality, Mahottari, said that udle had sup-
ported the preparation of poverty profiles in five wards of Janakpur mu-
nicipality and supported sanitation, drainage, road gravelling, tube-well 
and community building works.
5.3 Poverty Alleviation Fund (PAF)
5.3.1 Description
The World Bank supported Poverty Alleviation Fund (PAF) began in 2004 
as a new approach in Nepal for bringing households out of poverty (Box 29). 
PAF was designed against the background of previous poverty alleviation 
efforts that had been poorly targeted with tied funds, supply-driven invest-
ments, high administrative costs and complex procedures. They also tended 
to lack transparency and were dogged by corruption. Many poverty allevia-
tion efforts had also suffered from elite capture.
The objective of the current phase of PAF (2008–2014) is to empower the 
rural poor and improve their living conditions and livelihoods, with par-
ticular attention to groups traditionally excluded because of their gender, 
ethnicity, caste and location. It aims to reach about a million households in 
75 districts by:
 • investing in community-selected and managed sub-projects that create 
access to socioeconomic infrastructure and services, increase assets, 
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generate employment and expand income-generating opportunities in 
poor villages;
 • enhancing the capacity of local bodies, particularly VDCs, to provide 
better services for poor and socially excluded groups; and
 • improving government efforts to coordinate support for poor and ex-
cluded groups.
Box 29: Information on the Poverty Alleviation Fund (PAF)
Concerned ministry: Office of the Prime Minister and Council of 
 Ministers
Donors: World Bank, IFAD (financial support)
Period: Phase 1: 2004–2008. Extended phase 2: 2008–2014
Coverage: 40 districts, with on-going expansion to 15 more districts
Source: PAF (2011)
The programme targets the poor and promotes social inclusion through de-
mand driven, participatory community planning, direct payments to com-
munity organisations, and the community implementation of projects (PAF 
2011). It supports rural poverty alleviation through community-driven inter-
ventions, self-targeting by poor and excluded communities and community 
mobilisation that enhances voice, empowerment and social capital.
PAF implements its programmes through partner organisations, which carry 
out social mobilisation and capacity building at the community level. These 
organisations disseminate information about the project, mobilise commu-
nity groups and build their capacity to develop and manage sub-project pro-
posals. Partner organisations can be NGOs, CBOs, or local governments 
(VDCs and DDCs). They liaise with local governments to ensure that pro-
posed infrastructure sub-projects are consistent with VDC and DDC plans 
and priorities. While partner organisations may be entrusted by community 
groups to submit sub-project proposals to PAF, grant funds flow directly to 
communities (World Bank 2007, 11-14).
PAF supports sub-projects for small-scale village infrastructure and servic-
es, and for income generation. The rules that apply to these projects and the 
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project cycle are given in Box 30. Support is directed through community 
organisations which are expected to engage in participatory decision mak-
ing. These community organisations are formed under an inclusion formula 
and all executive positions have to be filled by disadvantaged people.
Box 30: The rules and project cycle for PAF sub-projects 
The rules:
1. Project proposals are identi-
fied by groups of poor people 
who come together as com-
munity organisations.
2. Decisions regarding sub-pro-
jects must be participatory 
and inclusive.
3. Community groups make cash 
contributions.
4. There are ceilings on the in-
vestments per household and 
the size of each sub-project.
5. Funds for implementing 
sub-projects and technical 




(a)  Community mobilisation and 
organisation formation.
(b)  Sub-project preparation in-
cluding developing operation 
and maintenance plans.
(c)  Appraisal by PAF technical 
team and partner organisa-
tion.
(d)  Approval by PAF technical 
appraisal committee.
(e)  Endorsement by DDC and 
VDC (infrastructure sub- 
projects only)
(f) Project implementation.
Source: World Bank (2007) 
PAF seeks to avoid the potential drawback of undermining local government 
by striving to work in collaboration with local governments. In this respect, 
all infrastructure sub-projects it finances have to be a part of local VDC and 
DDC annual plans. Also, PAF provides capacity building support for local 
governments (World Bank 2007). Note that PAF only gives money to com-
munity organisations for tangible projects and very little for organisational 
strengthening and for raising awareness.
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5.3.2 Programme performance
Overall impacts of PAF
Evaluations of PAF and the questionnaire responses pointed to it having 
improved the standard of living of many poor and vulnerable communities 
and has helped many of them escape the poverty trap. It has created small 
infrastructures to support poor people‘s livelihoods and has helped bring 
about improvements in education, health and sanitation.
After three years of implementation, it was reported that PAF was success-
fully targeting the extreme poor, including traditionally marginalised and ex-
cluded groups (World Bank 2007, 3-4). This evaluation found that 70 % of 
PAF beneficiaries were hard core poor people. There was said to be strong lo-
cal support for the programme due to this focus and its emphasis on local pri-
ority setting and decision-making. There had also been good rates of return 
on the total investment of 20-25 % in the first three years. Annual per capita 
incomes of beneficiary families had increased by 10–15 %. The success of 
Phase 1 led to the World Bank going ahead with a Phase 2 across all Nepal’s 
75 districts (World Bank 2007). The achievements of Phase 2 between 2008 
and 2011 (see Box 31) led to the World Bank agreeing to further fund PAF.
Participants in the focus group discussions agreed that the living standards 
of many PAF participants had improved. They said that PAF had helped the 
poor access affordable finance while its social mobilisation had improved 
awareness among women, Dalits and other disadvantaged people. Focus 
group discussants in Pyuthan and Doti agreed that the living standards of 
community organisation members had improved. They also said how more 
children were going to school and costly loans from local lenders were no 
longer necessary as PAF had made funds available to them at a low cost.
Raj Babu Shrestha, executive director of PAF, emphasised the role of PAF 
in local peacebuilding. He said that the livelihood support for community 
organisations of disadvantaged people has helped bring about less unequal 
communities. This has helped build peace, although initially it can bring 
conflict by threatening the status of rich people.
There was, however, less praise from some central and district level inter-
viewees who said that PAF was donor-driven, unsustainable and worked 
in parallel to local governments, and some community organisations made 
ineffective use of their funds. Bimal Koirala said that PAF functioned on 
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inputs rather than outputs and that the recorded improvements in economic 
well-being could well have been due to remittance incomes more than PAF. 
He also said that PAF has made some mistakes as its portfolio managers do 
not spend enough time in the districts and act like tourists when they travel 
to the field. A Maoist party member in Pyuthan said that PAF was not as 
effective as PASRA as it was not effectively distributing resources.
Box 31: Achievements of PAF
1. Achievements between 2008 and 2011
 • It covered Nepal’s 40 poorest districts, directly supporting 14,831 
community organisations and 418,000 poor households, and ben-
efitting more than 529,000 households.
 • 57 % of households supported were Dalit or Janajati – the most 
marginalised groups.
 • There was a 10 percentage point decrease in food insufficiency 
and a 6 percentage point increase in school enrolment for children 
aged 5-15 years.
 • There were significant positive impacts on food sufficiency, child 
schooling, women’s empowerment and access to services
Source: World Bank (2011b)
2. Achievements between 2007 and 2009
 • Programme interventions led to a 31 % increase in real per capita 
consumption growth and a more than 42 % increase in the real 
per capita consumption of households six or more months after 
they had received grants to support livelihoods activities. In the 
absence of the PAF programme these households would have re-
corded a negative growth in their consumption of about 2 %.
 • The programme was successful in targeting benefits to margin-
alised caste and ethnic groups as the real per capita consumption 
increase for Dalits and the Janajatis was 30 % while the increase 
amongst the poorest quintile of participants, including all ethnic 
and caste groups, was only about 16 %.
Source: CEDA (2010).
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Accountability, transparency and coordination
Interviews with central level stakeholders confirmed that PAF’s model of di-
rectly funding local communities makes for more transparency and account-
ability in funding local development, but that there had been inadequate 
coordination with local governments.
Raj Babu Shrestha of PAF said the inadequate support and cooperation PAF 
was receiving from local governments, government line agencies and local 
politicians was a strong justification for directly funding community organi-
sations. He pointed out how most local governments did not coordinate their 
activities with PAF and did not recognise PAF‘s efforts, while the political 
leaders did not involve themselves much with PAF as its money does not 
flow through them. He also said that government livestock offices did not 
cater to PAF members‘ needs for livestock care.
PAF community organisation members in Doti and Mahottari agreed that 
livestock care and agricultural advice services were often not available 
from government service providers who were often not available to attend 
emergencies meaning that local people had to pay private service providers. 
There was said to be a general lack of support from government officials.
Mr Shrestha went on to say that, in this context PAF’s direct funding modality 
has high levels of transparency and accountability. PAF insists on social and 
financial audits, the public display of accounts, consensus decision making 
and sharing of information with all group members. Every household knows 
about the funds received by their community organisation. PAF’s commu-
nity-driven development model has put pressure on other interventions to 
become more transparent and accountable. And networks of community or-
ganisations are exerting pressure on VDCs to be more transparent.
The district interviewees said that most PAF community organisations carry 
out social audits, display their accounts in public, and engage in consensus 
decision making and information sharing on sub-projects. PAF community 
group members in Doti asserted that all group members knew how much 
funding their community organisations had received from PAF. They made 
loan decisions by consensus and observed downward accountability. Ma-
hottari community organisation members said that their organisations op-
erated transparently and exerted group pressure for accountability. Some 
discussants said that there was however some corruption, fund mismanage-
ment, elite capture, and lack of information sharing.
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There were differing views on the levels of coordination between PAF’s 
community organisations and other agencies. Some district interview re-
spondents reported good linkages between the community organisations 
and local governments and ward citizen forums. They said that ward citizen 
forums and PAF community organisations worked together in some places 
and the social mobilisation done by PAF was helping LGCDP. A social de-
velopment officer from Mahottari DDC said that the present success of LG-
CDP social mobilisation was because of the previous achievements of PAF 
and other programmes. A number of PAF community organisation members 
disagreed pointing to the lack of coordination between their groups and 
local government and other agencies’ programmes.
Two senior governance experts called for closer links between PAF and lo-
cal governments. Jagadish Pokhrel said that the armed conflict had weak-
ened local governments, which created the need for direct interventions like 
PAF; but he strongly believed that PAF should now be run through local 
governments. Former senior MoLD official Ganga Dutta Awasthi said that 
PAF’s direct funding and community-driven development approach is good; 
but planning and coordination needed integrating with local government 
processes.
Inclusive participation and social mobilisation
Many interview respondents said that PAF had empowered local disad-
vantaged people. The focus groups in all three districts noted the inclusive 
participation of disadvantaged people and poor households in PAF commu-
nity organisation meetings. They agreed that PAF’s social mobilisation has 
raised awareness on livelihood issues and group dynamics for selecting and 
implementing small infrastructure projects. PAF community organisations 
exert group pressure for accountability and conformity to group rules. The 
story in Box 32 is one example of how PAF has enabled poor women out of 
the poverty trap.
In Mahottari, the community awareness centres, ward citizen forums and PAF 
were praised for raising the awareness of women, Dalits and disadvantaged 
communities about their rights and locally available resources. These initia-
tives had provided training and financial resources to these communities for 
implementing community-owned projects. However, the members of the PAF 
community organisations in Mahottari and some district interviewees said 
that PAF’s targeting of the ultra-poor was compromised by the programme 
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using a standard one-size-fits-all social mobilisation model that did not ad-
dress the low levels of confidence and capacity of the poorest communities.
Box 32: PAF support for women’s empowerment
Pasupatinagar is a remote VDC in Mahottari inhabited by Madhesi and 
hill Janajati people. In 2008 the women-only Ratu Community Organisa-
tion was formed under PAF. PAF gave the group NPR 520,000 for liveli-
hood development. They used the money to set up livestock enterprises, 
shops and a football making factory. The group provides loans of up to 
NPR 30,000 to its members, which have been used to boost members’ 
incomes. The group invests its interest income in a local cooperative and 
uses this income for further investments among members including to 
build toilets.
They have become much more aware of the issues and priorities in their 
VDC and about women’s issues. They now send their daughters to good 
schools as they earlier did with their sons and campaign against child 
marriage. They also run a mediation programme that resolves household 
and local conflicts.
Source: Focus group discussion with members of Ratu community organisation, 
Pasupatinagar, Mahottari (2012)
Challenges
In addition to the challenges mentioned above, the vested interests of poli-
ticians, resource overlaps with other programmes, the lack of integration of 
PAF support into VDC planning and the inadequate performance of some 
community mobilisers have all lessened the impacts of PAF.
The focus group discussions with members of community organisations 
highlighted a number of challenges to the effective implementation of PAF. 
The foremost was said to be the vested interests of political parties and their 
apathy towards the common peoples‘ problems. PAF community organisa-
tion members in Pyuthan said that the political leaders only brought resourc-
es to their favoured VDCs. In Mahottari, women PAF members said they 
kept struggling with and within their VDC councils and with their VDC sec-
retary and political leaders; but still got very little support. On the contrary 
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the participants in the discussions in Ratbara, Mahottari said that the local 
politicians had supported them. Pyuthan community organisation members 
related how VDC officials had said that they (the officials) were reluctant to 
direct support to them as they were already being supported by PAF.
Some respondents said that there is an overlap with local government pro-
grammes as PAF is not well-coordinated with local government planning 
and programme implementation. Raj Babu Shrestha, executive director of 
PAF, said that there is a need for joint social mobilisation by PAF and LG-
CDP to integrate citizen level initiatives to avoid gaps and overlaps. Some 
Pyuthan community organisation members agreed there was a duplication 
of resources because of a lack of coordination between different interven-
tions, probably because PAF’s planning and choice of projects has not been 
coordinated by VDCs.
Community organisation members in Pyuthan and Doti said that PAF and 
LGCDP had achieved mixed results. PAF was praised for directly funding 
communities and social mobilisation was said to be most successful where 
social mobilisers were committed. In the many places where the mobilisers 
were not committed PAF funding has not been so well used and has had less 
of an impact. These respondents also said that many of PAF‘s livelihood 
schemes were not production oriented and PAF had not empowered people 
where social mobilisation was weak.
Raj Babu Shrestha of PAF said that sustainability is a major issue for PAF’s 
community organisations. A new statute is needed to officially recognise, 
regulate and facilitate them. The community organisations need to build 
linkages with cooperatives, micro-credit institutions, local governments and 
other service providers. PAF community organisation members should au-
tomatically be members of ward citizen forums. PAF has reached an under-
standing with LGCDP and linkages between PAF and LGCDP have been 
established in 27 districts.
5.4 Local peace committees
5.4.1 Description
The Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) of November 2006 brought a 
formal end to the ten years of conflict between the government and the 
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Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). In early 2007 the government set 
about forming local peace committees to help implement the CPA and oth-
er agreements (Box 33). The committees are supposed to have inclusive 
participation and work in line with the spirit of the CPA and other peace 
agreements (MoPR 2009, section 9). District local peace committees have 
operated in Nepal since July 2007 and are operational in all 75 districts at 
varied levels of effectiveness.
Box 33: Information on local peace committees
Concerned ministry: Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction
Donors: Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF), a donor trust fund supported 
by Finland, Germany, Norway, Switzerland, UK and the European Com-
mission
Type of donor support: Financial and technical
Period: 2007 and on-going
Coverage: All 75 districts
Source: MoPR (2009)
The district committees were formed at consultation meetings with repre-
sentatives of local political parties, conflict-affected people, civil society, 
the media, human rights organisations, local businesses, ethnic communi-
ties and Dalits. District local peace committees can have a maximum of 23 
members and must have at least one-third women membership. They can 
form VDC and municipality peace committees. The committees nominate a 
coordinator from their members with this job rotating every six months. Vil-
lage (VDC) committees have nine member secretariats including the major 
political parties and at least two women. An officer appointed by the Min-
istry of Peace and Reconstruction (MOPR) is the secretary of district com-
mittees (MoPR 2009, section 3). The major responsibilities of local peace 
committees are listed in Box 34.
The terms of reference of the committees (MoPR 2009) say they can use 
local or national-level facilitators and monitors to help eliminate violence 
and prevent crisis situations. They should also work with local governments 
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and where they cannot resolve conflicts should seek the advice of the central 
level Peace and Reconstruction Consultative Committee.
Box 34:  The major responsibilities of district level local peace 
 committees
 • Help implement the Comprehensive Peace Accord.
 • Facilitate local peace negotiations, peacebuilding and conflict 
 transformation.
 • Monitor relief and reconstruction programmes.
 • Assist MoPR to collect data on conflict affected individuals, 
 families, and infrastructures.
 • Emphasise reconciliation, healing, and mutual trust.
 • Observe political and social developments at the local level.




Note that the following findings need to be set against the time they were 
reporting on.
Positive impact and potential of local peace committees
The study found the widespread view that local peace committees are rel-
evant in the current transition period by providing district forums for the 
peace process that involve all stakeholders.
The study by Prasai et al. (2008), carried out soon after their initial for-
mation, found a widespread view that local peace committees could serve 
an important purpose in the transition period as district level forums for 
peacebuilding. They reported that chief district officers believed that func-
tional local peace committees helped them deal with political conflicts that 
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could not be dealt with through administrative and legal procedures. Local 
politicians said that the committees could deal with issues that the all-party 
mechanisms of the time could not deal with and the participation of civil 
society representatives added to their legitimacy.
The same study found some active local peace committees and reported that 
they had helped prevent election-related inter-party violence at the 2008 
elections by holding all-party interactions, calling for the implementation of 
the code of conduct, and mediating disputes. Gross and Rajbhandari (2009) 
also found that some local peace committees had been effective. The com-
mittee in the highly conflict affected district of Rolpa had membership from 
all major political parties, civil society and marginalised groups who were 
working together on peacebuilding. The coordinator of Rolpa’s local peace 
committee was changing every six months (as it should) and the committee 
was working with the chief district officer to ensure that conflict-affected 
families received their due compensation.
ICG (2009b) said that local peace committees could be a crucial part of 
the peace process especially in the absence of elected local government. It 
said that the committees could promote inter-party cooperation, deal with 
local disputes, facilitate the provision of relief and rehabilitation funds and 
support district administrators to maintain law and order. Nevertheless, lo-
cal peace committees were only a stop-gap solution. However, a number 
of district and central level interviewees said that the committees will be 
needed even after local government elections as they can complement local 
governments by sharing mediation responsibilities. Most study respondents 
agreed that local peace committees could become alternative dispute reso-
lution mechanisms if properly institutionalised.
Many people were in favour of the committees because they were (and are) 
the only autonomous government-mandated body to bring political and civ-
il society leadership together at district level to work for peace (Prasai et 
al. 2008). On the other hand, although civil society representation is more 
than that of political parties, the political alignment of most civil society 
actors creates interesting dynamics. It tends to be the three main political 
parties who negotiate among themselves and decide which civil society rep-
resentatives, women, Dalits and Janajatis are included on the committees. 
The civil society members however claimed that they were professionally 
independent.
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A year later TAF and MoPR (2010) found a significant number of local 
peace committees to be active. Secretariats had been established in almost 
all district and VDC-level committees; but there was a large gap between 
the high expectations of MoPR and what the committees were actually de-
livering.
Challenges faced
The main challenges faced by local peace committees have been limited 
resources, capacity constraints, lack of transparency and inclusiveness, po-
liticisation, lack of guidance from MoPR and the lack of clear terms of 
reference.
The 2008 evaluation, carried out a year after the initiation of the commit-
tees found that only a few local peace committees were active (Prasai et 
al. 2008). Some non-civil society members said that that the committees 
were redundant as local politicians and the district administration and dis-
trict councils wielded all the decision making power. They also pointed out 
that the committees would work best if there was a consensus central gov-
ernment. In 2012, John Paul Lederach of the Kroc Institute said that many 
local peace committees were failing because they were led by politicians 
(Box 35).
Box 35: Most politicians only know how to compete for power
John Paul Lederach, who is engaged with peacebuilding and mediation 
at the local level in Nepal, said that the success of local peace committees 
depends upon the capacity of politicians to work together and mediate 
disputes. However, they find this difficult as they are only used to com-
peting for power and so most local peace committees are unsuccessful. 
The committees’ remit of mediating conflicts should be handled by civ-
il society and independent members. Only then will communities trust 
these committees. He also felt that the committees can play an important 
role working with future elected local governments to share mediation 
responsibilities. He pointed out that most politicians are creating rather 
than resolving local conflicts because of the competition for power.
Source: Study interview, 2012
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In 2009, Gross and Rajbhandari reported the many challenges faced by local 
peace committees. Many have lacked vital information on the peace pro-
cess, guidance and training from the government, and a clear vision of their 
mandate. Many have failed to reach outside the district capitals to address 
the localised grievances that threaten Nepal’s fragile peace at the village 
level. And as sporadic acts of violence, both criminal and political, continue 
to afflict the countryside, many committees have yet to reach a consensus 
on how to build peace.
One challenge was the lack of terms of reference. Even after the introduction 
of one in 2009 (MoPR 2009) MoPR is not providing adequate support for 
the committees to carry out their responsibilities and is mainly using them to 
collect data on conflict damage and victims. Many local peace committees 
felt that their other work was not appreciated by MoPR (Gross / Rajbhandari 
2009). Prasai et al. (2008) said that political and policy complications at 
the central level had prevented MoPR from providing the committees with 
initial logistical and budgetary support. This 2008 study also found wom-
en and Dalits to be grossly under-represented with the proportion of civil 
society representation almost double that of politicians. In 2012, one local 
administrator said that many of the decisions of local peace committees are 
based on political considerations and there is often intense bargaining for 
distributing compensation to conflict-affected people.
Santosh Bisht of the NPTF support programme said that local governments 
should be involved in resolving local and domestic conflicts although the 
local peace committees could play a role in resolving local political con-
flicts that could lead to violence. He said that there is elite capture of these 
committees in some places.
The members of Mahottari and Doti local peace committees said that confu-
sion over their mandate and the political bias of central government and lack 
of resources hindered their work (see Box 36). VDC level peace committees 
were being formed in all three study districts, but lacked adequate resources 
to carry out their mandates (Box 37).
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Box 36: Lack of resources and authority for local peace committees
Mahottari: The members of Mahottari local peace committee said that 
it lacked adequate resources, there was confusion over its role and almost 
every time the minister changed at MoPR the committee’s secretary also 
changed to match the minister’s political affiliation. And the agencies 
involved in peacebuilding in the district did not coordinate with the lo-
cal peace committee. The complaint was heard that members’ transport 
expenses were often not reimbursed. The coordinator said he lacked the 
authority or resources to select peacebuilding projects and these were 
mostly imposed by MoPR. He also said that some genuine conflict vic-
tims have not been compensated after the committee recommended them 
to MoPR while others have received compensation because of their po-
litical connections.
Doti: The members of Doti‘s local peace committees said that they had 
been prevented from doing their job. They complained that the commit-
tee had been politicised with the secretary appointed on a political basis. 
They said that a number of people who were not conflict victims had 
received compensation because of their political connections while gen-
uine victims had not been compensated because of the mishandling of 
data and interference by MoPR. Also, a number of conflict victims had 
not received compensation because of lack of funds, because they live 
in remote villages, and for lack of knowledge on the availability of com-
pensation. Costs have gone up and the rate of compensation has become 
inadequate. They also said that few of their recommendations are taken 
seriously by MoPR and it just keeps on asking for more proofs. They also 
pointed out that none of the property seized during the conflict has been 
returned and that they had received data on disappeared people from the 
Nepal Army but not from the Maoists.
Source: Discussion with Mahottari and Doti local peace committee members 
(2012)
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Box 37: VDC level peace committees
Pyuthan: 19 VDC level peace committees have been established and 
13 more were under formation. However they lacked adequate budgets 
and personnel. These committees were helping resolve household level 
and other small conflicts including domestic and gender violence. The 
district peace committee was said to be mostly collecting data on conflict 
victims and physical infrastructure damage, although it had helped man-
age some inter-group conflicts. Pyuthan’s local development officer said 
that they were visiting remote areas to mediate conflicts.
Doti: The local peace committee was mainly engaged in collecting and 
verifying data on conflict victims. VDC level committees had settled do-
mestic violence cases and conflicts between Dalits and non-Dalits.
Mahottari: 22 VDC level peace committees had been formed recently. 
Conflict affected people said they valued these committees as the only 
venue where they could communicate with the government and seek 
help. But their effectiveness was said to be limited by most committee 
coordinators, the VDC secretaries, living outside their VDCs.
Source: Study focus group discussions, 2012
Mixed impacts
A number of the respondents and evaluations had mixed opinions on local 
peace committees. The Carter Center (2011) said that by 2011 there had 
been a clear positive shift across the country in terms of local peace com-
mittee formation and functioning; but despite all the support, funds, and 
training provided, in 12 of the 33 districts visited local peace committees 
had either not been formed or were inactive. Nineteen of them were active 
and meeting regularly, but their effectiveness and impact was unclear, and 
most were not living up to their broad mandates. Only 2 of the 33 commit-
tees were very functional. The conclusion was that local peace committees 
would continue to be challenged by a lack of relevance, politicisation and 
limited resources.
Christoph Feyen of the Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF) support programme 
pointed to the design and mandate faults that were holding back the perfor-
mance of local peace committees. He said that the allegations of politicisa-
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tion were irrelevant as some committee members have to be politicians and 
they are needed to tackle political conflicts. He also said that local peace 
committees have been criticised for not helping local peacebuilding activi-
ties. He said this is true and happens because they lack a clear mandate, polit-
ical support and adequate resources. Ganga Dutta Awasthi, who has reviewed 
the Nepal Peace Trust Fund, said in 2012 that local peace committees lacked 
clear mandates, political support and the resources to perform effectively. It 
is difficult for the committees to do a proper job as MoPR does not adequate-
ly support them for peacebuilding and alternative dispute resolution.
Durga Nidhi Sharma, who was previously an MoPR official and director of 
the Nepal Peace Trust Fund, said that there had been tensions in the appoint-
ment of local peace committee coordinators and some district officials see 
these committees as externally imposed. He said that the committees have 
not had much impact on building peace, but have played an important role 
in collecting and verifying data on conflict-affected people and damage to 
physical infrastructure.
A number of study respondents suggested how their performance could be 
improved (Box 38).
Box 38:  Suggestions for improving the impact of local peace 
 committees
Many questionnaire respondents said that local peace committees need-
ed providing with more resources and capacity building opportunities. 
They needed more personnel with longer term tenure and local peace 
committee secretaries should be appointed on merit and not political af-
filiation. They also said that the committees should be managed by inde-
pendent civil society representatives. Another widespread opinion was 
that MoPR should stop interfering in the committees’ business while one 
respondent said that the committees’ mandate should be enshrined in law.
Some respondents said that local peace committees should be integrated 
with local government and closed down once the official peace process 
ended. In the meantime they should work only on larger political con-
flicts while local government handled micro-level conflicts. But other 
respondents said that local peace committees were well-suited to mediate 
household and community level conflicts.
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The focus group discussions with local peace committee members said 
that the committees should be granted tenure of at least three years to 
cover the period until after the next parliamentary and local government 
elections. The transition may continue for longer and so staff should be 
appointed on longer term contracts.
Doti peace committee members said that they needed to be trained on 
carrying out their mandate while VDC secretaries should coordinate the 
work of VDC peace committees but not interfere in their daily opera-
tions.
Source: Study respondents, 2012
6 Conclusions and overall findings
This chapter presents the overall findings and conclusions of key issues in-
vestigated and summarises the performance of the four case study govern-
ance and peace support programmes and the many challenges they face.
6.1 Local and community governance for peace and 
 development
The study found that community and local governance structures can 
benefit each other. The community awareness centres, PAF’s community 
organisations and other types of CBOs are having a large positive impact 
on development and peace. Most questionnaire respondents agreed that 
social mobilisation and community development should be an integral 
part of local governance reform (86 %) (Figure 15) and that local govern-
ment and community-driven development (as practiced by PAF) can be 
complementary and provide more benefits if they work together (74 %) 
(Figure 16).
But local government and community-driven development are seen by 
some as incompatible either for community organisations usurping local 
government functions or local governments hindering the functioning of 
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Figure 15: Should community development and social mobilisation be an  
    integral part of local governance? (all 82 respondents) 
 




CBOs. Many of these institutions compete for resources and power. Many 
members of community groups and associations feel that central level pol-
iticians and bureaucrats do not support them and are indifferent towards 
their concerns. They also perceive that such politicians envy their growing 
collective power as it can transform into political strength. At the same 
time the people at the helm in local government and central government 
give confusing signals as their words favour community development and 
empowerment but their deeds show little commitment to community ini-
tiatives.
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6.2 Local and community governance and the transition to 
federalism
The study’s findings suggest that strengthened local and community govern-
ance will smooth the transition to a federal system of government in Nepal 
and help bring about peace by promoting good governance at all levels and 
helping resolve local conflicts. Good local and community governance can 
be the shock absorber of the vagaries and uncertainties of the transition to 
full-fledged federalism. It is desirable both to help manage the transition to a 
federal state and for longer term peacebuilding and sustainable development 





Figure 16: Opinions on whether local government and community-driven 
    development are complementary (all 82 respondents)  
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The majority of questionnaire respondents agreed that local governments 
should be the subsidiary units of the federal provinces and that strengthened 
local governance and governments will help the transition to a federal sys-
tem (Figure 17).
Nepal has an estimated 100,000 CBOs (see Box 19) formed mostly under 
different development programmes. These institutions can help manage the 
transition and build peace and development if treated as outreach mecha-





Figure 17: Perceptions on local government and peace and development  
    under a federal system (all 82 respondents) 
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6.3 Performance of the four case study programmes
The four case studies programmes have empowered communities and 
strengthened local governments and communities to contribute to develop-
ment and peace. Many targeted individuals and groups have benefitted. The 
impacts of some social mobilisation efforts have gone deeper and have been 
transformational while others have concentrated on limited objectives, as 
with PAF’s livelihoods programme. A number of challenges have dampened 




Figure 18: Nepal’s community and local level governance institutions (2012) 
Source: own representation 
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6.3.1 LGCDP
LGCDP has successfully enabled demand-side mobilisation. The commu-
nity awareness centres and ward citizen forums set up by committed social 
mobilisers and with good local commitment have helped raise the awareness 
of disadvantaged communities and enabled them to demand their rights and 
funding for local projects. These results have been achieved in a short time 
and should lead to improved community and local governance and better 
transparency, accountability and resource management. The programme’s 
promotion of formula-based grants and performance-based top-up funding 
was praised by most stakeholders.
The study also found that LGCDP’s impact has been hindered in a number 
of ways. The community awareness centres and ward citizen forums face 
many challenges including unpredictable resources, and inadequate capaci-
ty. They lack terms of reference and many are too politicised. They also lack 
funding to execute community-led projects. LGCDP now faces a situation 
where the forums and centres are raising the demands of citizens, but the 
lack of capacity of elected local government and funding makes it difficult 
to fulfil these demands. Also, a number of respondents believed that women 
and people from disadvantaged groups had little influence on user com-
mittees, monitoring committees, integrated planning committees and ward 
citizen forums and their attendance at meetings is often a formality to fulfil 
quotas.
Overall the lack of elected local government and the resulting low credi-
bility of the political and bureaucratic leadership have resulted in a lack of 
transparency and accountability in local government and poor coordination 
between local governments, central government and community institu-
tions. This is the main reason why only 24 % of questionnaire respondents 
said that local governments had been strengthened by LGCDP (Figure 19). 
The generally poor performance of local governments was said by 68 % of 
respondents to be a major reason behind the demands for federalism while 
71 % of them felt that local government reforms have not been successful. 
The programme has also suffered from inadequate financial, technical and 
manpower resources including the fact that local governments are not mobi-
lizing sufficient financial resources on their own.
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6.3.2 GTZ/GIZ support to local governance
The main overall impact of GTZ/GIZ support to local governance in Nepal 
has been to demonstrate good governance practices and to inform later inno-
vations in local governance including LGCDP’s community awareness cen-
tres, ward citizen forums and the MC/PMs. Whilst doing this it has strength-
ened many municipalities, VDCs and DDCs and the ability of citizens to 
participate in local governance.
PASRA and udle successfully supported the planning and implementation 
of local infrastructure and livelihood improvements to demonstrate good 
governance, community development, and social mobilisation practices to 
local governments. PASRA had a much appreciated social mobilisation pro-
 
 
Figure 19: Local government reform and LGCDP’s performance 
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cess and had good coordination with local governments and communities. 
The local governments where PASRA and udle worked praise these pro-
grammes’ support for social mobilisation, public hearings, citizen report 
cards, and social mobilisation. The main shortcomings of these programmes 
were said to be their limited geographical coverage, limited resources and 
short periods of operation. The new GTZ local governance programme 
(SUNAG) is learning from these experiences. It is supporting LGCDP to 
strengthen community awareness centres, ward citizen forums and local 
governments and provides a vehicle to support the forthcoming federal 
structures.
6.3.3 The Poverty Alleviation Fund
PAF’s interventions have lifted many poor people out of poverty although 
one high level respondent said that it was difficult to directly attribute this 
effect only to PAF as it was likely also caused by the large increases in re-
mittance incomes. But the overall impact on targeted communities has been 
positive with many empowered women and disadvantaged people and other 
impacts such as increased school attendance and better access to services.
PAF’s model of directly funding groups of disadvantaged people was wide-
ly praised for ensuring that more benefits reach target groups compared to 
programmes run by local governments and line agencies. This approach has 
led to transparent community governance and demand-driven, communi-
ty-owned development. Social capital formation and the direct provision of 
resources to communities to execute projects have brought many poor Ne-
palis out of poverty. It is not only resources that have brought this change as 
per capita funding by PAF is minimal at around $40 per person. The credit 
must also go to the community empowerment and community governance 
practices that have helped bring peaceful development and group insurance 
for rainy days.
The main challenges to the continuing success of PAF’s community organ-
isations are uncertainties about future funding, their limited connectivity 
with local government and line agencies and the limited support from poli-
ticians, the national government and development partners as many of them 
see PAF as carrying out functions that should be carried out by local gov-
ernment. And the programme is yet to reach certain ultra-poor and highly 
vulnerable communities.
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6.3.4 Local peace committees
Since 2007 local peace committees have been established in all Nepal’s 75 
districts and in many VDCs for local peace and transitional justice. They 
have contributed to the national peace process by collecting data on conflict 
victims and other damage and by helping conflict victims receive compen-
sation. They are helping build peace at the local level by mediating local 
disputes. The participation of civil society representatives gives these com-
mittees legitimacy. Many respondents said that peace committee have great 
potential for resolving local conflicts but their impacts have been limited 
by a lack of resources, capacity, proper mandate and limited central level 
support.
6.4 Shortcomings and gaps in the four programmes
The study identified a number of shortcomings and seven types of gaps in 
the four case study programmes.
6.4.1 Planning and implementation shortcomings
LGCDP’s long gestation period resulted in the late establishment of com-
munity awareness centres and ward citizen forums, the programme’s main 
strategy for promoting demand side governance. This happened because the 
programme made inadequate use of the savings and credit groups, com-
munity organisations and skilled social mobilisers built by its predecessor 
programmes; because it took longer than expected to write the manuals for 
operating these and other grassroots institutions and because the NGOs for 
supporting social mobilisation were appointed late and were accused in 
places of being selected on a political basis. LGCDP thus spent its initial 
one and a half years identifying structures to work with and writing manuals 
while funding mostly went on the secondary objective of infrastructure im-
provements. This brought it a bad reputation because of the corrupt practic-
es of politicians and bureaucrats. The whole programme fell prey to focus-
sing on infrastructure projects with its large scope for corruption as a sound 
foundation for this work had yet to be put in place by carrying out demand 
mobilisation. The programme has also been challenged by the apathy of pol-
iticians and central government officials in supporting decentralisation and 
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community development and by failing to provide adequate incentives for 
programme implementers in the local development and finance ministries.
PAF has failed to produce timely procurement plans, to properly sequence 
management decisions and to mobilise human and financial resources on 
time to support and strengthen community organisations and their sub-pro-
jects. Lack of proper planning and the timely implementation of activities 
and sub-projects meant that the programme has achieved less on its core 
objectives of targeting the ultra-poor and building links with local govern-
ments. The targeting of the ultra-poor by PAF has been compromised by the 
programme using a one-size-fits-all type of social mobilisation that does not 
fit the different situation of the poorest communities. It has not built strong 
linkages with local governments and other agencies. PAF has also failed 
to properly organise at regional and district levels as it expanded to new 
districts and has not made exit and sustainability plans for its community 
organisations. It did not hire staff on time, did not restructure for its expand-
ed coverage, and in many instances did not disburse funds to community 
organisations on time. It has also been accused of a top-down approach 
that inhibits the autonomy of community organisations and bypasses group 
decision making. Its limited lesson learning has meant that at many times 
PAF has looked like a regular government programme that dies because of 
its failure to learn from experience.
The local peace committees have not formed adequate links with local 
government and other agencies and lack staff, resources and capacity to 
operate effectively. Initially they did not have clear terms of reference, and 
lacked commitment from MoPR and have often been politicised. Despite 
their fit for purpose institutional structures, they have been pushed aside by 
the petty interests of national level actors.
6.4.2 Commitment gaps
Many development programmes have had reduced impacts because of the 
lack of commitment of central government officials, politicians and bureau-
crats. These people voice their commitment, but their actions show other-
wise. LGCDP, PAF and local peace committees have all suffered in this way. 
The support of local and community people is not enough; they need the 
support of central government. LGCDP has lacked the commitment of min-
isters and top bureaucrats in the line ministries. These central agencies have 
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acted more as controllers than facilitators of the devolution of authority. On 
the other hand, district level politicians are cognisant of the peoples‘ power 
and hence speak for decentralisation and federalism while finding ways of 
protecting their sources of power. The politicians try to win over the NGOs, 
community organisations and user groups by placing their own people in 
them and by promising community organisations favours. LGCDP, PAF and 
the local peace committees, have got stuck time and again in the nexus of 
the elites.
6.4.3 Incentive gaps
The above lack of commitment is partly explained by programmes provid-
ing inadequate incentives to their key actors to ‘walk the talk‘. There is a 
large gap between what is said, preached or agreed to and what is actually 
done. The resulting bad governance is not the result of innocent omissions, 
but mostly the deliberate commission of actors who know they will not be 
held to account for their double speak and empty promises.
Politicians, bureaucrats, development partners and elite class people are 
four of the most influential actors for development programmes in Nepal. 
Their actual incentives to act often prevent programmes from achieving 
their objectives (Table 7).
 
Table 7: The real incentives for four types of actors in development 
 programme in Nepal 
Actors The real incentives 
Politicians Power, corruption, political support 
Bureaucrats and technocrats Power, corruption, centralising authority 
Elite class people Connectedness to the power base  
Development partners Quick and visible impacts, their visibility and 
implementing headquarters’ policies and 
theories 






Nepal’s politicians face the electorate infrequently and there is no mecha-
nism for making them answerable to the people in-between elections. Pol-
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iticians cling to power by serving their elite clients who reinforce these 
networks for mutual benefit. The nexus between politicians and the elites 
opposes inclusive institutions and the achievement of equity and justice 
for all. The elites view the extension of the power base as a threat to their 
power. This nexus was smart enough to maintain the balance in its favour 
even when threatened by the Maoist conflict. It proved its strength by kill-
ing off the constituent assembly out of fear of having to share power with 
the masses and expanding the elite base through the federal restructuring 
of the state.
Nepal’s bureaucrats are mostly driven by money-making and maintain-
ing their centralised authority. They are only evaluated in a ritual way by 
higher level bureaucrats. They tend to ignore citizens’ concerns and seek 
to serve the elites and political leaders. The nexus of politicians and bu-
reaucrats enrich each other by fooling the people or managing the peoples’ 
expectations. They put in place arcane bureaucratic and formalistic struc-
tures, create loopholes and delay the introduction of reforms to deny the 
rights of the general people (see Box 39). The bureaucrats protest against 
new requirements to make them more accountable to the people and revolt 
when a minister threatens their power. When ministers accuse bureaucrats 
of corruption, the bureaucrats’ unions, opposition politicians and parts of 
the media come out to support the corrupt bureaucrats. On the other hand 
honest bureaucrats are punished to stop them threatening the status quo, 
often by being transferred to remote or low status postings.
Box 39:  Delaying tactics to prevent the reserved places bill becoming 
law
Nepal’s bureaucracy and security forces are dominated by people from 
the Midhills higher castes. A debate on the inclusion of disadvantaged 
and less represented people in the civil service, police, army and other 
state organs has been on-going for more than decade. A draft law was 
pending in the legislature for reserved places for disadvantaged groups. 
But delaying tactics meant that the bill was still pending when the Con-
stituent Assembly was dissolved in May 2012. Most parties say they fa-
vour this legislation; but the fear of losing their power stopped the politi-
cians from seeing this bill into law.
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The elite class in Nepalese society strive to connect or stay connected to the 
power centres. This leaves disadvantaged communities and the masses of 
voiceless people with little option but to take to the streets to protest.
The development partners assign high priority to the visibility of their 
brand and are little concerned with adapting their approaches to condi-
tions in the countries they work in. They preach what their headquarters 
tell them to say. Nepal’s development partners fail to follow the declara-
tions they signed in Paris, Accra and Busan. They still take a fragmented 
approach in key sectors such as governance and community development 
with the World Bank promoting the PAF approach and most other devel-
opment partners supporting the LGCDP approach. They are not concerned 
about the burden they impose on national actors by their standard oper-
ating procedures, and prefer to support programmes that achieve quick 
results. They care less for empathetic, long and deeper engagement with 
stakeholders. Their impatience has helped the government elites serve its 
narrow client base. This happens as the development partners impose rig-
orous formal monitoring structures on programmes and insists on quick 
results. Quick results can be realised more easily by people allied to the 
elites. The ultra-poor or hard core disadvantaged communities are left 
 behind.
6.4.4 Credibility gaps
The lack of credibility of Nepal’s political and bureaucratic leadership poses 
serious challenges to LGCDP and PAF. The development partners are fed 
false promises by many national actors, the CBOs do not trust the author-
ities and this undermines their sense of commitment as they doubt that the 
pledged resources and support will materialise.
The very poor credibility of Nepal’s politicians, bureaucrats and technocrats 
is due to them so often failing to deliver on their promises. Local politicians 
have not had to face the electorate since 1997 to prove their worth. The 
2008 Constituent Assembly elections brought back competitive politics, but 
about a half of members were elected through the proportional system. And 
many of the new representatives soon lost contact with the concerns of their 
constituents. Acemoglu (2002, 37-39) says that societies and political par-
ties in power may choose not only wrong policies but also disastrous courses 
of action that only benefit the people in power. In such cases they do not 
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care for their credibility as any contract between such powerful groups and 
society is effectively non-enforceable.
The bureaucrats also feel safe in politicking and serving their masters at the 
centre and there is no elected local government to force them to prove their 
accountability towards the citizens and their CBOs. Many covertly oppose 
community initiatives and do not support poverty alleviation, good govern-
ance, decentralisation nor the modalities of LGCDP, PAF and local peace 
committees.
6.4.5 Coordination gaps
LGCDP, PAF and the local peace committees suffer coordination gaps with 
local government and district line agencies and other organisations that work 
at the district level. At first many of the projects proposed by LGCDP’s com-
munity awareness centres and ward citizen forums were not able to source 
funding from their VDCs; but the situation is improving as these new insti-
tutions become more integrated with village and municipal level planning. 
PAF’s community organisations suffer more from lack of coordination with 
local government and the line agencies. The district local peace committees 
have inadequate coordination with local government and other agencies work-
ing for peace, human rights promotion and dispute resolution in the districts.
Coordination gaps also arise as the Government of Nepal and its develop-
ment partners do not share the same commitment to programmes and use 
ad hoc instruments to cope with the prolonged transition. The peace and 
development strategy prepared by UNDP and other development partners 
for 2011–13 was not prepared in full consultation thus undermining joint 
ownership (UNDP 2011b). A major challenge facing the development part-
ners is maintaining coordination amidst the frequent changes in political 
and bureaucratic leadership.
6.4.6 Resource gaps
All four programmes lack resources, largely as a result of the incentive, 
linkage and coordination gaps explained above.
 • For LGCDP the absence of elected local government has made it very 
difficult for its technocratic leadership to mobilise more internal re-
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sources from local taxes and fees and so they continue to mostly depend 
on the block grants from central government. These civil servants are 
frequently transferred and mostly absent from the field. And LGCDP 
support for local government capacity building and technical backstop-
ping is limited and its social mobilisers underpaid. The resource gap is 
limiting the work of the community awareness centres and ward citizen 
forums as they foster demand side pressure on local governments, but 
only about one of six projects demanded by the centres and forums are 
funded.
 • PAF suffers a large resource gap. Its expansion to many new districts has 
resulted in the under-funding of community organisations’ livelihood 
and small infrastructure projects. The community organisations were es-
tablished with the expectation that PAF would fund their projects. But 
the lack of funding has meant that PAF is now being viewed as a pro-
gramme that does not fulfil its promises. The situation is worsening as, 
after being told by PAF staff that they would be given funding, a number 
of community organisations took high interest loans for their counter-
part funding. But many of them have not been provided with funding 
and still have to pay back the loans. PAF is also challenged by technical 
and capacity gaps among its staff, partner organisations and community 
organisations.
 • Local peace committees have been seriously affected by a lack of re-
sources personnel, mandate and other support. They were set up to run 
for short periods but the peace process lingers on and the tenure of the 
committee secretaries is extended year-by-year.
 • SUNAG has a lower level of funding and coverage than its predecessor 
programmes PASRA and udle in spite of the success of these two pro-
grammes and strong local demands for their continuation.
6.4.7 Outreach gaps
LGCDP, PAF and local peace committees suffer from significant outreach 
gaps.
 • LGCDP’s outreach to communities is limited by the fact that communi-
ty awareness centres and ward citizen forums have yet to be established 
in all VDCs and municipalities and by inadequate financial and techni-
Local and community governance for peace and development in Nepal
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 145
cal resources. Elite and political capture of local institutions also pose 
challenges for expanding the programme into needier, less visible and 
voiceless disadvantaged groups. Also, poor people from ‘non-disadvan-
taged’ identity groups are not covered. The outreach to the ultra-poor is 
hindered by the lack of safety net programmes for these kinds of people.
 • PAF has inadequately targeted the ultra-poor and disadvantaged com-
munities. In some cases it has failed to expand its outreach as the pro-
gramme sought to meet its targets for lifting people out of poverty and 
by-passed the ultra-poor where much more effort is needed to achieve 
the same results. The programme has also failed to expand its outreach 
because of lack of resources, its more general and less intensive social 
mobilisation efforts and lack of organisational capacity.
 • The local peace committees are only just beginning to extend their out-
reach to village and community levels for peacebuilding. But they lack 
resources and face other challenges that constrain them from expanding 
their working areas.
6.4.8 Empathy gaps
Working with disadvantaged communities demands particular ways of 
working and great empathy to engage them and build trust. Longer gesta-
tion periods are needed. A lack of understanding of the limited capabilities 
of disadvantaged communities has undermined the effectiveness of LGCDP 
and PAF. Their one-size-fits-all approach to social mobilisation has only 
achieved limited results with highly disadvantaged communities. These pro-
grammes demand formal reporting, monitoring and follow rigorous result 
indicators, and it is often difficult for CBOs to meet these demands. The 
local peace committees do not have an empathy gap as they are made up of 
local stakeholders.
6.5 The outlook for Nepal
Focussing on the many identified gaps and the more critical views of study 
respondents would give a pretty negative picture of governance in Nepal 
with citizens and local governments disconnected from power and demo-
cratic channels, and an authoritarian central government in power. Given 
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current trends the introduction of a federal system may not improve things 
if the powers continue to strive to maintain their autocratic control and just 
make an outward ritual show of democracy (see Figure 20). Indeed, the 
debate around federalism has not engaged the general public and has been 
confined to the elite class who want to centralise power and not institute 
genuine democracy. The experience of many people in Nepal leads them to 
believe that this will be the future reality.
The unpredictability of political developments means that over the next few 
years Nepal could face a number of scenarios.
The best case would see Nepal experiencing moderate to high econom-
ic growth based on inclusive development within the next two years. For 
this to come about the political parties would have to soon agree on a new 
constitution with the leaders responding to pressure from the general pub-
lic for fear of being totally discredited. At the same time the integration 
of the combatants into the Nepal Army would be completed and the other 
ex- Maoist combatants would re-join society. In this scenario Constituent 
 
 
Figure 20: The likely situation of governance in Nepal once a federal system is 
    introduced 
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Assembly elections would take place in 2013, the new constitution would 
be adopted in 2014 and the assembly would work as a regular legislative 
parliament from 2015. These developments would cause Nepal’s friends and 
development partners to provide more support and growth and inclusive 
economic development would gain pace. At the same time local government 
and provincial elections would be held and strengthened and empowered 
CBOs would help advance the good governance agenda.
The medium case would see the stalemate of 2012/13 continue to the end 
of 2014, with progress coming within the following year by holding elec-
tions for a new Constituent Assembly. The constitution would be produced 
in another two years, by 2017. The delay in adopting a new constitution 
and concluding the peace process would lead to continued slow economic 
growth and inept governance. As a result mistrust would grow among the 
parties, ethnic divisions would increase and the frustrations of the general 
public would grow resulting in more strikes and demonstrations. The grow-
ing divisions within the political parties would lead to the emergence of new 
parties and regional and ethnic-based political forces. The transition would 
become more painful and debilitating, although there would be no serious 
violence or guerrilla warfare against the state. Deteriorating law and order, 
rule by ordinance, ad hoc limited annual budgets, the fragmented control of 
state power by powerful political and ethnic groups, rising corruption and a 
failure to deliver basic services would retard economic growth.
The worst case would see civil war restarting leading Nepal to become 
a failed state with zero economic growth. This could happen if either the 
ultra-left or right wing hardliners came to power. The former would seek to 
form a people’s republic while the latter would push for reinstating the mon-
archy and the powers of the traditional elites. Either scenario would lead Ne-
pal into a dark tunnel of no growth, no democracy, no popular participation, 
no community involvement, weak governance and no fundamental human 
rights. This would cause development partners to withdraw most of their 
development aid through government. The government would be unable to 
handle the violence, frustrations and protests and killings and mass violence 
would result within one or two years. Local government would be unable to 
function and CBOs would have to show wisdom to survive and help direct 
humanitarian support to the people.
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7 Recommendations and suggestions
The following suggestions for improving governance in Nepal lead on from 
the findings of the study. They provide general and specific recommenda-
tions for the Government of Nepal, local governments, community organi-
sations and Nepal’s development partners.
The overarching need as of February 2013 is to write the new constitu-
tion and conclude state restructuring to establish a federal government for a 
more inclusively governed Nepal.
Beyond this the foremost recommendations of this study are directed mostly 
at the government:
 • to institute a compact with its people and its development partners;
 • to bring about more inclusive institutions and development;
 • to develop a new peace and development strategy;
 • to make local governments more accountable in a number of ways in-
cluding by holding transitional local government elections; and
 • to strengthen the role of community organisations in local governance.
These initiatives will need considerable support from local stakeholders and 
external development partners to be successful.
7.1 Compact with the people and the development partners
Recommendation 1: The central government should make a compact with 
the people and implement it at all levels of govern-
ment.
The absence of elected local government has meant that in most places local 
people have had no way of participating in local governance. The govern-
ment needs to make a compact with its people to listen to and respond to 
their opinions. A key part of this compact would be providing a framework 
for discourses on major public issues to engage the people in peacebuilding 
and development. In the absence of elected local government this could 
happen by setting up formal dialogue structures between the government 
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and civil society or through existing structures such as ward citizen forums, 
community awareness centres, PAF community organisations or VDC level 
peace committees. Peace and development can result even during the pres-
ent precarious transition in Nepal if the choices and preferences of the peo-
ple are addressed.
Recommendation 2: The government should institute a compact with its 
development partners.
Many of Nepal’s development partners are disillusioned with the delays in 
producing the new constitution and the deteriorating governance situation. 
The government needs to also make a compact with its development part-
ners to spell out the action it will take to improve the governance situation. 
This will involve taking a do-no-harm and conflict sensitive approach to de-
velopment and, where appropriate, working through civil society and CBOs 
without compromising country ownership and the use of country govern-
ance systems. A joint government–development partner ‘Nepal Develop-
ment Forum’ should be organised once there is some measure of political 
stability to deliberate on and adopt such a compact.
7.2 Inclusive institutions and inclusive development
Recommendation 3:  Make Nepal’s institutions more inclusive.
A major reason why the debate on ‚identity based federalism‘ has gained 
prominence is because Nepal lacks inclusive institutions (for a discussion 
on inclusive and extractive institutions, see Acemoglu / Robinson 2012). 
More inclusive institutions that provide open access to all segments of the 
population will help bring about stability, peace and prosperity for all Ne-
pal’s citizens (for a discussion on open access and limited access institu-
tions, see North et al. 2007). Many communities and ethnicities are now 
demanding that their identities are officially recognised with proportional 
political representation. The government needs to introduce programmes to 
promote inclusive institutions and inclusive development, which cater to 
the needs of the diverse groups within Nepalese society (for discussions 
on inclusive development, see UNDP 2012) at all levels of governance, in-
cluding in the discourse on transitional governance, the peace process and 
constitution writing.
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Recommendation 4:  The government should encourage more diversity in 
its workforce by introducing affirmative action legis-
lation and training civil servants from disadvantaged 
groups for higher level jobs.
Recommendation 5: The government should institute local languages as 
working languages in local government.
The government needs to especially encourage more diversity in higher 
level decision making positions in national and local government and the 
bureaucracy to facilitate more empathy with the needs of Nepal’s many dis-
advantaged and marginalised people. It should also use local languages in 
local government to facilitate the involvement of all those (especially wom-
en) with limited Nepali language skills. Another key recommendation for 
promoting diversity and social inclusion is to strengthen the role of CBOs 
by ensuring their formal representation in local government (see later rec-
ommendation).
7.3 Accountability in local government
The current lack of accountability in local governance and government is 
one of the main challenges to good governance in Nepal. Under the present 
system the back door influence of politicians serves only their partisan in-
terests. The urgent need is to have peoples’ representatives in power at the 
local level and to bring the bureaucrats who run local government under 
the control of the citizenry. These positions need to be filled on the basis of 
some kind of political competition.
Recommendation 6:  Hold elections for temporary local governments until 
the new federal structures are in place.
The recommendation is to elect temporary transitional local governments 
with limited powers to fill the accountability vacuum. This is appropriate as 
the introduction of a new constitution is still a distant prospect and many 
parties do not want full-fledged local elections until a new federal provincial 
structure is in place for fear of weakening the new federal structures. Such 
elections will involve amending the Local Self-governance Act to make it 
compatible with the Interim Constitution (especially for more inclusive rep-
resentation). The elected politicians should have well-defined responsibil-
ities and VDC and municipal government should be linked to the citizen 
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awareness centres and ward citizen forums. Should elections not be possible 
before a new constitution is in place, a minimum solution should be to ex-
plicitly mandate local politicians and other stakeholders to form inclusive 
local governments instead of the current practice whereby political parties 
wield influence but carry no formal accountability.
Recommendation 7: Make the public sharing of information and decisions 
mandatory by local governments and CBOs particu-
larly on financial matters and project selection.
Small gestures for improved accountability, transparency and people’s par-
ticipation could pave the way for larger reforms and make politicians and 
bureaucrats look more credible and trustworthy. Suggested interventions 
would include civil servants wearing a badge saying “I am the people‘s 
servant”; putting displays in easily understood language to describe the 
procedures for citizens to access services and their rights (citizen charters) 
and ensuring that citizens are compensated if officials fail to deliver quality 
services on time. Other measures that could be easily introduced are those 
piloted by LGCDP, PASRA, udle, and PAF including citizen report cards, 
the public disclosure of information, engagement with the media, citizens’ 
evaluations of officials and public hearings and public audits.
Other important means of promoting accountability in local government 
are to give CBOs a strong and defined role in local government, to appoint 
more local people as heads of government offices and to promote commu-
nity-driven development:
Recommendation 8: Integrate project identification by CBOs into VDC 
and municipal planning and fund and provide techni-
cal support for locally prioritised and approved pro-
jects.
Recommendation 9: Appoint more local people as local government 
chiefs and secretaries to make them more responsive.
7.4 Strengthen demand side governance
Recommendation 10: Strengthen support for demand mobilisation and 
community empowerment, especially for disadvan-
taged groups.
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It is claimed that the widespread social mobilisation programmes rolled 
out in Nepal have created spiralling demands among Nepal’s disadvantaged 
communities (including for identity-based federalism), many of which can-
not be satisfied because of the limited capacity of the state. Such critics 
see the need to focus on building the capacity of bureaucrats and the state 
machinery rather than strengthening demand-side governance. However, 
few would disagree that social mobilisation is a positive force for inclusive 
democracy. Both demand and supply side strengthening are needed.
7.5 Institutionalise the role of CBOs in local governance
One of the best ways of making governance more inclusive and strength-
ening demand side governance is to strengthen the role of CBOs. The fol-
lowing recommendations would officially recognise these organisations as 
the base level of governance to link the general population with the central 
government and the future provincial governments via VDC and municipal 
governments.
Recommendation 11: Mention community level governance institutions in 
the new constitution.
Recommendation 12:  Introduce a statute to regulate, empower, monitor 
and facilitate CBOs and to institute formal links be-
tween CBOs and local and central governments.
Such a statute would require CBOs to register with local government and 
would empower them to play an official role in local governance. It would 
specify the role, rights, responsibilities of the various types of CBOs.
Recommendation 13: Amend the Local Self-governance Act to recognise 
CBOs and their federations as formal institutions for 
community governance.
Recommendation 14: Provide citizen awareness centres and ward citizen 
forums with clear terms of references and integrate 
their functions into local government planning, mon-
itoring, oversight and decision making related to 
them.
Recommendation 15: Give the associations and federations of CBOs a role 
in local government planning.
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In the ideal governance framework, ward citizen forums (or another type of 
CBO) would act as the means of linking local communities with local gov-
ernment processes. The proposed structure of governance (see Figure 21), 
 
Figure 21: The ideal structure of governance in Nepal 




German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)154
would see CBOs represented on ward citizen forums to forward citizens’ 
views to VDCs. Their views would also be represented at VDC level by 
federations of CBOs. The resulting VDC level issues and concerns would 
then be presented at the DDC level. Thus there would be a direct channel for 
local concerns to reach the DDC level with district level federations further 
advocating the interests of CBOs (see Figure 21).
7.6 Strengthen social mobilisation
A key part of promoting demand side governance is to carry out social mo-
bilisation that empowers communities to demand governance-for-the-peo-
ple and improved service delivery. The following measures will strengthen 
social mobilisation in governance support programmes.
Recommendation 16: As far as possible select social mobilisers from target 
communities. Train them as village social workers, 
encourage them to stay and work in their communi-
ties and compensate them adequately.
Recommendation 17: Select local service provider NGOs at the regional 
level via a competitive process.
Recommendation 18: Encourage CBOs to act in a politically neutral way.
One way of achieving the difficult outcome of political neutrality is to dis-
allow the appointment of political activists as heads of these organisations.
Recommendation 19: Tailor social mobilisation to suit differing types of 
communities according to their level of development 
with special attention to building the confidence of 
ultra-poor communities.
This recommendation for better reaching the ultra-poor is based on the ex-
periences of PAF.
7.7 Decentralisation and federalism for good governance, 
peace and development
Recommendation 20: Conclude state restructuring as soon as possible and 
strengthen decentralised governance for effective 
federal government.
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The time has come to decide on federalism, federal structuring, justice for 
all and the many demands for ethnic and other identities. Delaying the fed-
eralism project and state restructuring will only complicate the political sit-
uation and weaken the credibility of the state and the political parties. The 
identity agenda is an agreed agenda of the parties for introducing federal-
ism, but debate is still raging on what kinds of identities need to be taken 
into account. The need is to conclude the debate on federalism through a 
compromise between the ‘ethnic identity’ and ‘non-ethnic identity’ based 
models with adequate attention given to other political and economic con-
siderations. Federalism should be seen as a larger project to establish de-
centralisation and make it irrevocable. The division into provinces and the 
full decentralisation of authority to local governments is needed to bring the 
state closer to its citizens (Figure 22).
Recommendation 21: Develop an action plan for the decentralisation of 
sectoral functions to local governments.
Recommendation 22: Make MoFALD act as a facilitating rather than a 




Figure 22: The principle of subsidiarity for government in Nepal with the 
    authority to govern flowing from bottom to top 
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The Government should show more commitment to and ownership of the 
decentralisation agenda. In particular MoFALD should encourage other 
sectoral line ministries, central agencies and the development partners to 
promote decentralisation. MoFALD needs to transform itself into a ministry 
that facilitates the decentralisation process rather than a controlling central 
ministry. It needs to act as a liaison agency that helps builds up local gov-
ernments.
Genuine decentralisation must be a cornerstone of governance reform. 
Grassroots participatory democracy will help stabilise the volatile politi-
cal environment at the local level. But fundamental reforms are needed at 
higher levels. The majority demand for a federal state did not emerge only 
because of identity demands and equity concerns. It also arose from the 
widespread desire for better service delivery and easier access to the state. 
Governance reform at the grassroots, community and local levels must be 
matched with the larger structural reforms promised in the Interim Consti-
tution. The answer to the poor implementation of decentralisation is deeper 
and wider decentralisation.
Recommendation 23: Restructure DDCs, VDCs and municipalities by 
redrawing their boundaries to make them more ef-
ficient, effective and homogeneous and consider re-
ducing the number of levels of local governments.
The redrawing of local government boundaries will facilitate federal re-
structuring at the provincial level. A restructuring plan is under considera-
tion by MoFALD. The aim should be to make local government units more 
homogeneous in terms of geography, ethnicity, language and access.
7.8 Strengthen supply side government
Recommendation 24: Strengthen the supply side of government to deliver 
public goods and services by building the capacity of 
state and non-state service providers.
The supply side of government and governance needs strengthening to en-
able it to respond to the growing demands for improved governance and 
service delivery.
Recommendation 25: Make bureaucrats’ standard operating practices more 
responsive to the needs of service receivers.
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Recommendation 26: Make bureaucrats’ jobs performance-based by re-
warding them when they perform well and punishing 
them when they do not, with citizens evaluating their 
performance.
Recommendation 27: Lessen the power of bureaucrats by putting the deliv-
ery of some services into the hands of civil society 
and the private sector.
Recommendation 28: Do not punish local people for the failings of local 
government staff on the MC/PM test or the inept 
behaviour of MoFALD including the too frequent 
transfer of local development officers.
Note that, related to the recommendation for performance evaluations by 
citizens, reforms have already been introduced by handing over school man-
agement to communities with the authority to hire and fire teachers. This 
practice needs rolling out to other sectors.
The incomplete implementation of the Local Self-governance Act, 1999 
means that there is some confusion over responsibilities for service delivery 
at the local level.
Recommendation 29: Improve coordination between local government 
and line agencies by clarifying the roles, mandates 
and terms of references of line agencies and local 
governments and propagating coordination and team 
working between line agencies and local govern-
ment.
7.9 Peace and development strategy
Recommendation 30: With government leadership support the production 
of a new peace and development strategy for 2013/14 
to 2015/16.
Nepal needs an agenda for peace and social justice. The government feels 
insufficient ownership of the peace and development strategy for 2010–2015 
(UNDP 2011b). A new strategy is needed that focuses on community-led 
peacebuilding and conflict-sensitive development to stabilise the nation and 
achieve a peace dividend for Nepal’s people and the national economy. This 
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document would provide the basis for national planning, governance reform 
and mobilizing donor support.
7.10 Nepal’s development partners
Recommendation 31: The external development partners should provide 
more predictable aid including for the conclusion of 
the peace process. They need to remain engaged for 
a sustained period with adequate amounts of support 
and widespread geographical coverage.
Recommendation 32: The support provided by Nepal’s development part-
ners should be balanced between supporting system 
strengthening and supporting system change.
Recommendation 33: Nepal’s development partners should promote com-
munity-driven development as a core part of their 
support for local governance. They should engage 
with non-state actors and CBOs in designing, plan-
ning, implementing and delivering interventions and 
encourage the government to do the same.
Nepal’s development partners have a crucial role to play in supporting the 
transition to a better governed and more inclusive Nepal. They need to 
maintain a balance between:
 • engaging with the government and other stakeholders to help conclude 
the peace process and supporting the empowerment of the traditionally 
marginalised and disadvantaged groups; and
 • changing the mind-set of the bureaucracy and other actors and building 
the capacity of the state machinery and key actors for implementing 
development programmes.
7.11 Improve political party governance
Recommendation 34: Reform the internal governance of political parties 
and make politicians more responsive to the general 
public.
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Recommendation 35: Educate politicians about community based develop-
ment and community organisations.
The internal governance of the political parties needs reforming. They need 
internal democracy and inclusive participation. The cadres and party of-
ficials should not be recruited on the basis of nepotism and loyalties, but 
through competitive politics, inclusion and merit. Party officials should be 
open to scrutiny from party members. The parties should also practice fi-
nancial transparency. The CIAA and Election Commission have failed to 
make the parties audit their accounts and investigate financial irregularities. 
Election finances should be provided by the state. Suri et al. (2007) give a 
number of other practical suggestions to improve the financial transparency 
and internal democracy of political parties in South Asia.
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Annex 1: Questionnaire respondents
Note: the following are the designations at the time the questionnaire was 
administered.
A.  Respondents associated with local government at the time of the 
study (LGCDP, local government and MoLD) (12)
1. Bharat Dhungana, MoLD
2. Dhruba Bahadur Khadka, MoLD
3. Ganga Dutta Awasthi, former Secretary and Joint Secretary, 
MoLD (included in this category as maintains close links with 
LGCDP)
4. Gopal Adhikari, MoLD
5. Hari Prasad Dahal, MoLD
6. Hem Raj Lamichhane, ADDCN
7. Krishna Babu Joshi, central LGCDP official
8. Ramesh Chandra Joshi, LGCDP
9. Reshami Raj Pande, Joint Secretary, MoLD
10. Shiba Ram Pokhrel, MoLD
11. Teertha Dhakal, Joint Secretary, NPC, programme director of 
 LGCDP
12. Yam Nath Sharma, Under Secretary, MoLD
B.  Respondents associated with the Poverty Alleviation Fund at time of 
the study (21)
13. Akhilesh Chandra Dass, PAF
14. Bhupananda BK, Portfolio Manager, Doti, PAF
15. Binod Pokhrel, development practitioner and member of 
PAF partner organisation, Pyuthan
16. Bishnu Bhatta, development practitioner and member of 
PAF partner organisation, Dadeldhura
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17. Kiran KC, development practitioner and member of PAF partner 
organisation, Pyuthan
18. Lav Dev Joshi, development practitioner and member of 
PAF partner organisation, Baitadi
19. Lokendra Badal, PAF
20. Mahendra Shahi, development practitioner and member of 
PAF partner organisation, Dadeldhura
21. Manoj Chipalu, PAF
22. Manoj Gupta, PAF
23. Murari Lal Chaudhari, PAF
24. Nirak Sunar, PAF
25. Padam Singh Thagunna, portfolio manager, Pyuthan, PAF
26. Pradeep Paudel, portfolio manager, Mahottari, PAF
27. Raj Babu Shrestha, executive director, PAF
28. Ram Prasad Dhakal, PAF
29. Ramesh Lama, PAF
30. Sanjay Jha, PAF
31. Sanjay Rijal, development practitioner and member of PAF 
partner organisation, Pyuthan
32. Shriram Subedi, PAF
33. Tara Prasad Joshi, PAF
C.  Other respondents (civil society, academia, development partners, 
 other) (49)
34. Arun Regmi, Sub National Governance Programme
35. Avanindra Kumar Shrestha, Secretary, Government of Nepal
36. Bal Gopal Baidya, Former member of NPC and PAF board, 
development practitioner
37. Bhanu Acharya, former Finance Secretary, Government of Nepal
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38. Bharat Prasad Poudel, Joint Secretary, MoPR
39. Bhoj Raj Pokhrel, former Chief Election Commissioner and 
former secretary, Government of Nepal
40. Bimal Wagle, former Secretary, Government of Nepal
41. Bishnu Sapkota, Nepal Transition to Peace and The Asia 
Foundation
42. Christoph Feyen, GIZ and Nepal Peace Trust Fund
43. Deependra Nath Sharma, Joint Secretary, MoPR
44. Deven Lawoti, UNDP Nepal
45. Dilli Raj Khanal, former member of NPC, macro-economist and 
member of UCPN(M)
46. Ganesh Adhikari, Associate Professor, Public Administration 
Campus, Tribhuvan University
47. Ganesh Upadhyaya, Chief, Relief and Rehabilitation Unit, MoPR
48. Govinda Narayan Mallik, development practitioner (SIDEF)
49. Hare Ram Shrestha, development practitioner (SIDEF)
50. Hari Krishna Upadhyaya, former NPC member and development 
practitioner (CEAPRED)
51. Horst Matthaeus, GIZ and Sub National Governance Programme
52. Indira Koirala, UNICEF Nepal
53. Jagadish Pokhrel, former Vice Chairperson of NPC and 
development practitioner
54. Jaya Dev Shrestha, Joint Secretary, MoPR
55. Kedar Bahadur Adhikari, Joint Secretary and CEO, Kathmandu 
Metropolis
56. Ken Ohashi, Former country director, World Bank, Nepal
57. Khem Raj Nepal, former Secretary, MLD and development 
practitioner
Vidyadhar Mallik
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)176
58. Kiran Bhandari, journalist on governance and political editor of 
Nagarik daily
59. Krishna Gyawali, secretary, Government of Nepal and former 
secretary of MoLD
60. Lava Dev Awasthi, Joint Secretary, MoE
61. Laxmi Kanta Paudel, Faculty member of Public Administration 
Campus, Tribhuvan University
62. Laxmi Kumari Basnet, Joint Secretary, MoPR
63. Madhab Gautam, professor of biochemistry and development 
practitioner
64. Min Bahadur BK, member of civil society and development 
practitioner, Doti
65. Narendra Paudel, member of faculty, Public Administration 
Campus, Tribhuvan University
66. Pashupati Nath Jha, GIZ and Sub National Governance 
Programme, Nepalgunj
67. Prem Bahadur BK, development practitioner and member of civil 
society, Doti
68. Prithwi Raj Ligal, former Vice Chairperson of NPC and 
development practitioner
69. Punya Prasad Neupane, Executive Director, Nepal Administrative 
Staff College, and former Secretary, MoLD
70. Purushottam Subedi, professor of public administration, 
KASPAM, Purbanchal University
71. Rajendra Dhoj Joshi, World Bank Ethiopia, formerly World Bank 
Nepal
72. Rita Thapa, member of civil society (Tewa and Nagarik Aawaz) 
and development practitioner
73. Sadhu Ram Sapkota, Joint Secretary, MoPR
74. Sajana Maharjan, Nepal Transition to Peace and The Asia 
Foundation
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75. Santosh Bisht, GIZ and Nepal Peace Trust Fund
76. Shankar Pathak, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Peace and 
Reconstruction
77. Shri Krishna Shresta, professor, Public Administration Campus, 
Tribhuvan University
78. Shri Krishna Upadhyaya, former member of NPC, development 
practitioner (SAPPROS)
79. Shyam Krishna Upadhyaya, development practitioner
80. Yagya Raj Awasthi, development practitioner, Dadeldhura
81. Yagya Raj Joshi, GIZ and Sub National Governance Programme, 
Nepalgunj
82. Yashoda Kafle, faculty member, Public Administration campus, 
Tribhuvan University
Annex 2: Interviewees
Central level interviews (interview date in brackets)
1. ADDCN officials (17 February 2012)
2. Arun Regmi, GIZ and SUNAG (23 February 2012)
3. Bimal Koirala, former Chief Secretary (19 February 2012)
4. Christoph Feyen, GIZ and NPTF (13 March 2012)
5. Durga Nidhi Sharma, Regional Administrator, Far West Regional 
Administration Office, formerly in NPTF/MoPR (2 March 2012)
6. FECOFUN officials (20 March 2012)
7. Ganga Dutta Awasthi, former Secretary, MoLD (26 February 
2012)
8. George Varughese, the Asia Foundation (28 March 2012)
9. Gopi Khanal, LGCDP (11 March 2012)
10. Horst Matthaeus, GIZ and SUNAG (23 February 2012)
11. Jagadish Pokharel, former Vice Chairperson, NPC (5 Apr. 2012)
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12. John Paul Lederach, Kroc Institute for International Peace 
Studies, US (22 March 2012)
13. Khem Raj Nepal, former Secretary, MoLD (9 March 2012)
14. Krishna Prasad Sapkota, formerly with ADDCN (19 March 2012)
15. Raj Babu Shrestha, PAF (17 February 2012)
16. Ram Prasad Dhakal, PAF (17 February 2012)
17. Santosh Bishta, GIZ and NPTF (13 March 2012)
18. Shri Krishna Upadhyaya, SAPPROS Nepal and recipient of Right 
Livelihood Award (14 March 2012)
19. Teertha Prasad Dhakal, formerly LGCDP (11 March 2012)
District level interviews
1. Bhuvan Prakash Bishta, LDO, Pyuthan and DDC officials (29 
February 2012)
2. Bir Bahadur Balayar, Nepali Congress, Doti (3 March 2012)
3. Jaleswor municipality officials (1 Apr. 2012)
4. Janakpur municipality officials (1 Apr. 2012)
5. Local peace committee members, Doti (4 March 2012)
6. Local peace committee members, Mahottari (30 March 2012)
7. Local peace committee members, Pyuthan (29 February 2012)
8. Luk Bahadur Khatri, CDO, Pyuthan and other officials of district 
administration office (29 February 2012)
9. Pasupati Nath Jha, SUNAG Regional Office (1 March 2012)
10. Pradip Raj Kadel, CDO, Mahottari (30 March 2012)
11. Prem Khapung, CDO, Doti (4 March 2012)
12. Raghu Nath Wosti, Rastriya Jan Morcha, Doti (3 March 2012)
13. Sharati Kumari Dhami, social mobiliser, CAC and LGCDP, Doti 
(3 March 2012)
14. Shree Krishna Bhatta, Public Health Office, Doti (4 March 2012)
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15. Silgadhi municipality officials, Doti (4 March 2012)
16. Tika Ram Panthi, Coordinator, LGCDP Cluster Office, Nepalgunj 
(1 March 2012)
17. Tuba Raj Pokhrel, LDO and DDC officials, Mahottari (1 Apr. 
2012)
18. Usha Rokai, WCF Faciltator, Pyuthan (27 February 2012)
Annex 3: Participants in focus group discussions
1. CAC members of Banlek VDC, ward 8, Doti, (3 March 2012)
2. CAC , PAF community organisation and mother group members, 
Barpata VDC, wards 2, 3, 4, Doti, (3 March 2012)
3. PAF community organisation members, Bhingri VDC, ward 1, 
Pyuthan, (27 February 2012)
4. WCF and CAC members, Bindhi VDC ward 6 , Dhanusha (close 
to Mahottari) (31 March 2012)
5. PAF community organisation members, Dhirapur ward 9, 
Mahottari (31 March 2012)
6. PAF community organisation members, Jaleswor municipality, 
ward number 8, Ratbara, Mahottari (30 March 2012)
7. WCF and PAF community organisation members, Kochibang 
VDC, ward 9, Mirsing, Pyuthan (28 February 2012)
8. PAF community organisation members, Pashupati Nagar ward 
number 8, Mahottari (31 March 2012)
9. PAF community organisation and WCF members, Silgadhi 
Municipality ward 4 Laxmi Tole, Doti (4 March 2012)
10. PAF community organisation members, Silgadhi Municipality 
ward 6 Gholtada, Doti (3 March 2012)
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